scholarly journals Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Talia Bar ◽  
Sidartha Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Project Selection ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Optimal Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Value ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Selection Mechanisms

We study mechanisms for selecting up to m out of n projects. Project managers' private information on quality is elicited through transfers. Under limited liability, the optimal mechanism selects projects that maximize some function of the project's observable and reported characteristics. When all reported qualities exceed their own project-specific thresholds, the selected set only depends on observable characteristics, not reported qualities. Each threshold is related to (i) the outside option level at which the cost and benefit of eliciting information on the project cancel out and (ii) the optimal value of selecting one among infinitely many ex ante identical projects. (JEL D21, D82, O32)

Institutional Investors, Private Information, and the Cost of Capital

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huong Giang (Lily) Nguyen ◽  
Xiangkang Yin ◽  
Luong Hoang Luong
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Overconfidence and Timing of Entry

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Luis Santos-Pinto ◽  
Tiago Pires
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Welfare Effect ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Rational Player ◽  
Timing Of Entry ◽  
Game Players ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of overconfidence and intermediate cost asymmetries, there is a unique cost-dependent equilibrium where the overconfident player has a higher ex-ante probability of being the Stackelberg leader. Overconfidence lowers the profit of the rational player but can increase that of the overconfident player. Consumer rents increase with overconfidence while producer rents decrease which leads to an ambiguous welfare effect.

scholarly journals Effects of Increase in the Cost of Building Materials on the Delivery of Affordable Housing in South Africa

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1772
Author(s):  
Bimpe Alabi ◽  
Julius Fapohunda
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Affordable Housing ◽  
Building Materials ◽  
Statistical Technique ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Maintenance Cost ◽  
Cost Increase ◽  
Sequential Mixed Methods ◽  
Adequate Provision ◽  
The Cost

Adequate provision of affordable human settlements is a huge challenge in South Africa since its independence. This paper investigates the effects of the cost increase of building materials on affordable housing delivery in South Africa. With potential solutions for cost minimisation of building materials, with the aim of achieving affordable housing delivery in South Africa are provided. This study uses a sequential mixed methods approach, wherein surveys were conducted among the construction professionals (project managers, site managers architects, site engineers, quantity surveyors, contractors, building materials suppliers, and government workers) in the construction industry within Cape Town, South Africa, who were considered as the research participants. The qualitative data obtained from the survey exercise were analysed using content analysis, while the quantitative data were analysed using a descriptive statistical technique on SPSS. The findings attained show fluctuation in construction cost and a rise in maintenance cost (caused by poor workmanship) as significant effects in the cost increase of building materials for affordable housing delivery. Adequate application of the recommendations given in this study will minimise the effects of high cost of building materials and enhance affordable housing delivery. Appropriate handling of the findings given in this study will reduce the effects of the high cost of building materials and augment timely delivery of affordable housing and stakeholders’ satisfaction.

We Never Built Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), but What Do We Know About Modularization in Construction?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benito Mignacca ◽  
Giorgio Locatelli ◽  
Mahmoud Alaassar ◽  
Diletta Colette Invernizzi
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Schedule Compression ◽  
Small Modular Reactors ◽  
Key Characteristics ◽  
Additional Costs ◽  
Structured Knowledge ◽  
The Cost

The key characteristics of small modular reactors (SMRs), as their name emphasized, are their size and modularity. Since SMRs are a family of novel reactor designs, there is a gap of empirical knowledge about the cost/benefit analysis of modularization. Conversely, in other sectors (e.g. Oil & Gas) the empirical experience on modularization is much greater. This paper provides a structured knowledge transfer from the general literature (i.e. other major infrastructure) and the Oil & Gas sector to the nuclear power plant construction world. Indeed, in the project management literature, a number of references discuss the costs and benefits determined by the transition from the stick-built construction to modularization, and the main benefits presented in the literature are the reduction of the construction cost and the schedule compression. Additional costs might arise from an increased management hurdle and higher transportation expenses. The paper firstly provides a structured literature review of the benefits and costs of modularization divided into qualitative and quantitative references. In the second part, the paper presents the results of series of interviews with Oil & Gas project managers about the value of modularization in this sector.

scholarly journals Method of Assessing the Risk of Implementing Railway Investments in Terms of the Cost of Their Implementation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (23) ◽  
pp. 13085
Author(s):  
Jan Kowalski ◽  
Mieczysław Połoński ◽  
Marzena Lendo-Siwicka ◽  
Roman Trach ◽  
Grzegorz Wrzesiński
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Original Method ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Simple Method ◽  
Construction Companies ◽  
Risk Forecasting ◽  
Specific Object ◽  
Effective Cost ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Exceeding the approved budget is often an integral part of the implementation of construction projects, especially those where unforeseen threats may occur. Therefore, each construction investment should contain elements of risk forecasting, mainly in terms of the cost of its implementation. Only a small number of institutions apply effective cost control methods, taking into account the specifics of a given industry. Especially small construction companies that participate in the structure of the implementation of large construction projects as subcontractors. The article presents a method by which it is possible to determine, with certain probability, the final cost of railway construction investments carried out in Poland. The method was based on a reliable database of risk factors published in sources. In this article, the main presumptions of the original method are presented, which take into account the impact of potential, previously recognized, risks specific to railway investments, and enable project managers to relate them to the conditions where the implementation of a specific object is planned. The authors assumed that such a relatively simple method, supported by a suitable computational program, would encourage teams that plan to implement railway projects to use it and increase the credibility of their schedules.

Applications to Economics

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Common Effort ◽  
The Cost ◽  
All Pay Auction ◽  
Individual Effort ◽  
Applications To Economics

This chapter explores whether the equilibrium effects of noisy behavior can cause large deviations from standard predictions in economically relevant situations. It considers a simple price-competition game, which is also partly motivated by the possibility of changing a payoff parameter that has no effect on the unique Nash equilibrium, but which may be expected to affect quantal response equilibrium. In the minimum-effort coordination game studied, any common effort in the range of feasible effort levels is a Nash equilibrium, but one would expect that an increase in the cost of individual effort or an increase in the number of players who are trying to coordinate would reduce the effort levels observed in an experiment. The chapter presents an analysis of the logit equilibrium and rent dissipation for a rent-seeking contest that is modeled as an “all-pay auction.” The final two applications in this chapter deal with auctions with private information.

Negative-Emission Technologies and Patent Rights after COVID-19

Climate Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 225-265
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Sarnoff
Keyword(s):  
Access To Medicines ◽  
Private Funding ◽  
Compulsory Licensing ◽  
Patent Pools ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Patent Rights ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Cost ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Negative Emission Technologies

Abstract Governmental and particularly private funding has recently and dramatically expanded for both beccs and dac technologies. This funding and the associated research, development, and deployment efforts will generate intellectual property rights, particularly patent rights in nets. As with access to medicines, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted concerns that patent rights may incentivize RD&D at the cost of affordable access to the relevant technologies. Further, access may be restricted to particular countries based on sovereignty concerns to seek preferential supply agreements through up-front funding. As a result, nations will likely turn to controversial ex-post measures, such as compulsory licensing, to assure access and to control prices of the needed technologies. The same concerns with patent rights likely will affect RD&D of nets. Although international ex-ante measures exist (such as patent pools) which would help to minimize these concerns, such measures may not induce the requisite voluntary contributions, or may fail to materialize due to political disagreements. Focusing on both US law and international developments, this article proposes various ex-ante measures that can be adopted by national governments and private funders to minimize the likely forthcoming worldwide conflicts that will arise over balancing innovation incentives for, and affordable access to, patented nets.

7. Creditors

2020 ◽  
pp. 223-260
Author(s):  
Paul Davies
Keyword(s):  
Limited Liability ◽  
Creditor Protection ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Wrongful Trading ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Mandatory Rules ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Law

Because of limited liability, creditor protection has always been a feature of company law. Large creditors can contract ex ante for customised protection and the law facilitates this in various ways, notably by the creation of the floating charge. Non-adjusting creditors require the protection of mandatory rules, at least in some situations. Creditor protection in relation to companies in the vicinity of insolvency is now well established, not only through ‘wrongful trading’ but also via transaction invalidity rules and directors’ disqualification. For going-concern companies the emphasis is on rules restricting the shifting assets to shareholders via distributions and associated rules relating to the maintenance of capital.

scholarly journals Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids

Algorithmica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Leonardi ◽  
Gianpiero Monaco ◽  
Piotr Sankowski ◽  
Qiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Independent Set ◽  
Deterministic Algorithm ◽  
Matroid Intersection ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Budget Feasible

AbstractMotivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms with the goal of procuring an independent set of a matroid. More specifically, we are given a matroid $${\mathcal {M}}=(E,{\mathcal {I}})$$ M = ( E , I ) . Each element of the ground set E is controlled by a selfish agent and the cost of the element is private information of the agent itself. A budget limited buyer has additive valuations over the elements of E. The goal is to design an incentive compatible budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid of largest possible value. We also consider the more general case of the pair $${\mathcal {M}}=(E,{\mathcal {I}})$$ M = ( E , I ) satisfying only the hereditary property. This includes matroids as well as matroid intersection. We show that, given a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that returns an $$\alpha $$ α -approximation to the problem of finding a maximum-value independent set in $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M , there exists an individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism which is $$(3\alpha +1)$$ ( 3 α + 1 ) -approximated and runs in polynomial time, thus yielding also a 4-approximation for the special case of matroids.

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