Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 164-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Blonski ◽  
Peter Ockenfels ◽  
Giancarlo Spagnolo
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Test ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Selection Criterion ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Axiomatic Approach ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Standard Criterion ◽  
Critical Discount Factor

We propose an axiomatic approach for equilibrium selection in the discounted, infinitely repeated symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma. Our axioms characterize a unique selection criterion that is also useful as a tool for applied comparative statics exercises as it results in a critical discount factor δ* strictly larger than δ, the standard criterion that has often been used in applications. In an experimental test we find a strong predictive power of our proposed criterion. For parameter changes where the standard and our criterion predict differently, changes in observed cooperation follow predictions based on δ*. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D81)

Predictive incapacity and rational decision

1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Rescher
Keyword(s):  
Human Resources ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Insufficient Information ◽  
Rational Agents

Even agents possessed of free will must—if rational—be substantially predictable. However, there will be some situations where the act-choices of rational agents will not be predictable—for example, in circumstances of underdetermination due to insufficient information. And moreover, unpredictability can also result in situations of analysis overdetermination that arise when equally cogent analyses yield disparate results, as in the example of Dr. Psychic Psycho. The Prisoner's Dilemma affords yet another instance of this. Clearly, when determination fails even after rationality has had its say, then rationality's predictive power is exhausted! Fortunately, however, that does not mean that our human resources of issue-resolution are at the end of their tether.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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