Bankruptcy, Finance Constraints, and the Value of the Firm

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Gale ◽  
Piero Gottardi

We study a competitive model in which market incompleteness implies that debt-financed firms may default in some states of nature, and default may lead to the sale of the firms' assets at fire sale prices when a finance constraint is binding. The anticipation of such “losses” alone may distort firms' investment decisions. We characterize the conditions under which fire sales occur in equilibrium, and their consequences on firms' investment decisions. We also show that endogenous financial crises may arise in this environment, with asset prices collapsing as a result of pure self-fulfilling beliefs. Finally, we examine alternative interventions to restore the efficiency of equilibria. (JEL D83, G31, G32, G33)

Author(s):  
Bruno Biais ◽  
Florian Heider ◽  
Marie Hoerova

Abstract In order to share risk, protection buyers trade derivatives with protection sellers. Protection sellers’ actions affect the riskiness of their assets, which can create counterparty risk. Because these actions are unobservable, moral hazard limits risk sharing. To mitigate this problem, privately optimal derivative contracts involve variation margins. When margins are called, protection sellers must liquidate some assets, depressing asset prices. This tightens the incentive constraints of other protection sellers and reduces their ability to provide insurance. Despite this fire-sale externality, equilibrium is information-constrained efficient. Investors, who benefit from buying assets at fire-sale prices, optimally supply insurance against the risk of fire sales.


2017 ◽  
Vol 132 (2) ◽  
pp. 765-809 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Muir

Abstract I analyze the behavior of risk premia in financial crises, wars, and recessions in an international panel spanning over 140 years and 14 countries. I document that expected returns, or risk premia, increase substantially in financial crises, but not in the other episodes. Asset prices decline in all episodes, but the decline in financial crises is substantially larger than the decline in fundamentals so that expected returns going forward are large. However, drops in consumption and consumption volatility are fairly similar across financial crises and recessions and are largest during wars, so asset pricing models based on aggregate consumption have trouble matching these facts. Comparing crises to “deep” recessions strengthens these findings further. By disentangling financial crises from other bad macroeconomic times, the results suggest that financial crises are particularly important to understanding why risk premia vary. I discuss implications for theory more broadly and discuss both rational and behavioral models that are consistent with the facts. Theories where asset prices are related to the health of the financial sector appear particularly promising.


2009 ◽  
Vol 210 ◽  
pp. 36-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell

It is useful to look at the distinction between transitory and permanent effects of a crisis. Financial crises normally bring on a recession, and the output costs can be large, as Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) discuss. In the majority of cases since 1970 in the OECD countries output returns to its trend level and there is no permanent effect. However, there may have been a permanent scar on the level of output in Japan after its crisis in the early 1990s, making the crisis and subsequent recession much more costly. This may reflect the nature and length of the crisis, as the banking sector was left to flounder for some years before its rescue toward the end of the crisis period. This appears to have left a permanent scar because risk premia were subsequently higher, and real asset prices have not fully recovered.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (05) ◽  
pp. 1650041 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. R. HURD ◽  
DAVIDE CELLAI ◽  
SERGEY MELNIK ◽  
QUENTIN H. SHAO

The scope of financial systemic risk research encompasses a wide range of interbank channels and effects, including asset correlation shocks, default contagion, illiquidity contagion, and asset fire sales. This paper introduces a financial network model that combines the default and liquidity stress mechanisms into a “double cascade mapping”. The progress and eventual result of the crisis is obtained by iterating this mapping to its fixed point. Unlike simpler models, this model can therefore quantify how illiquidity or default of one bank influences the overall level of liquidity stress and default in the system. Large-network asymptotic cascade mapping formulas are derived that can be used for efficient network computations of the double cascade. Numerical experiments then demonstrate that these asymptotic formulas agree qualitatively with Monte Carlo results for large finite networks, and quantitatively except when the initial system is placed in an exceptional “knife-edge” configuration. The experiments clearly support the main conclusion that when banks respond to liquidity stress by hoarding liquidity, then in the absence of asset fire sales, the level of defaults in a financial network is negatively related to the strength of bank liquidity hoarding and the eventual level of stress in the network.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viral V. Acharya ◽  
Hyun Song Shin ◽  
Tanju Yorulmazer

We present a model of equilibrium allocation of capital for arbitrage. If asset prices may fall low enough, it is profitable to carry liquid capital to acquire assets in such states. Set against this, keeping capital in liquid form entails costs in terms of foregone profitable investments. This trade-off generates occasional fire sales and limited arbitrage capital as robust phenomena. With learning-by-doing effects, arbitrage capital moves in to acquire assets only if fire sales are steep. However, once arbitrage capital finds it profitable to acquire assets, it requires similar returns elsewhere, inducing contagious fire-sale prices even for unrelated assets. (JEL G21, G28, G38, E58, D62)


2021 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 07045
Author(s):  
Josef Novotný ◽  
Iveta Jaklová

Research background: One of the financial market indicators are very important global financial indices. These express the state and development of the market for certain investment instruments that form the basis of an index. These international financial indices are used to facilitate the process of making investment decisions for investors. Global equity indices are mainly popular with the investing public. However, global indices of alternative investments are less popular. The main problem with alternative investments is their low awareness among the investing public, including the fact that many investors are unable to assess their strengths and investment potential, which can lead to an increase in their assets. Some alternative investments are gaining in popularity especially in times of world financial crises, uncertainty and economic recessions, when their prices tend to rise as investors seek a safe haven to value or protect their free cash, especially from inflation. Purpose of the article: The aim of the article is to draw attention to the importance and advantages of selected alternative investment with the support of financial indices in the global environment, which is whiskey. Methods: Methods of analysis, comparison and synthesis were used in the article. The principles of logical thinking were also used to achieve the goal, especially in the application of scientific methods that follow each other. Findings & Value added: The main finding was that the examined international alternative indices focused on whiskey performed higher than the global equity financial indices in the monitored period.


2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Tirole

The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a single statistic, and asks whether liquidity should be regulated given that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then analyzes market breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, and explains why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment. Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity, and analyzes how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and recapitalizations, and analyzes optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for macro-prudential policies. (JEL E44, G01, G21, G28, G32, L51)


2003 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guglielmo Maria Caporale ◽  
Nicola Spagnolo

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