scholarly journals Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 70-111
Author(s):  
Antonin Macé ◽  
Rafael Treibich
Keyword(s):  
Population Size ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
Heterogeneous Groups ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Apportionment Problem

We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e., the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups. (JEL C73, D71, D72)

scholarly journals Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-244
Author(s):  
Alexander Mayer ◽  
Stefan Napel
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Executive Director ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
To Come ◽  
A Priori Distribution ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Abstract Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across different electoral procedures. The USA’s Executive Director can expect to come closer to its top preference under plurality rule than for pairwise majority comparisons or plurality with a runoff; opposite applies to everybody else. Differences of US success between voting rules dominate the within-rule differences between most other Directors, and much of the latest reform of quotas.

Power, Control, and the Logic of Substitution in Institutional Design: The Case of International Climate Finance

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 671-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin R. Graham ◽  
Alexandria Serdaru
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Shopping Behavior ◽  
Climate Finance ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
Primary Means ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Financial Power ◽  
United Nations System ◽  
Nations System

AbstractHow do powerful states control international organizations (IOs)? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design, we propose that funding rules are equally important. Our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules—that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an IO are used—are a design substitute for weighted voting from wealthy states’ perspective. Whether asymmetric control is incorporated in design through voting or funding rules depends on whether egalitarian norms emphasizing political and legal equality, or shareholder norms emphasizing influence commensurate with financial power, govern voting and representation rights at the IO. Focusing on the domain of climate finance, we demonstrate that weighted voting rules are used at international climate finance institutions (ICFIs) associated with multilateral development banks, but that wealthy states pursued permissive earmark rules at ICFIs within the United Nations system where egalitarian norms are strong. In this way, powerful donors can exert control over resource allocation even when developing states appear to hold equal influence on governing bodies. In addition to providing a reassessment of how power translates into control at IOs, our framework offers insight into forum-shopping behavior and sheds light on substitution dynamics that involve other dimensions of design across a range of issue areas.

scholarly journals Equitable Voting Rules

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 563-589
Author(s):  
Laurent Bartholdi ◽  
Wade Hann-Caruthers ◽  
Maya Josyula ◽  
Omer Tamuz ◽  
Leeat Yariv
Keyword(s):  
Group Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Population Size ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Square Root ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Choice Procedures ◽  
Symmetry Assumption ◽  
Minimal Winning Coalitions ◽  
Crucial Assumption

May's theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.

scholarly journals Preference Integration and Optimization of Multistage Weighted Voting System Based on Ordinal Preference

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Yu-ke Chen ◽  
Yan Zou ◽  
Zhe Chen
Keyword(s):  
Individual Preference ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
Group Preference ◽  
Aggregation Model ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Weighted Voting System ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Ordinal Preference

Multistage voting is a common voting form through which the winners are selected. By virtue of weighted multistage voting rules, in this paper, we establish a weighted voting model by analyzing the correlation between individual preference and group preference. The weights of voters in each voting stage are adjusted through preference deviation degrees between individual preferences and group preference, and the ranking among candidates in each stage is determined according to weighted Borda function value. Examples are given to verify our model, which shows that weighted information aggregation model can mine more useful information from different individual preferences of voters to quicken the aggregation of group preference.

scholarly journals Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

Public Choice ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 183 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 187-210
Author(s):  
Aleksei Y. Kondratev ◽  
Alexander S. Nesterov
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Voting Rules

Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Addison Pan ◽  
Simona Fabrizi ◽  
Steffen Lippert
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Decision Making Models ◽  
Conventional Models

Abstract We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority.

Reduction of spermatogonia and testosterone in rat testes flown on space lab-3

1986 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 248-249
Author(s):  
Delbert E. Philpott ◽  
W. Sapp ◽  
C. Williams ◽  
T. Fast ◽  
J. Stevenson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Population Size ◽  
Physiological Response ◽  
Social Rank ◽  
Reproductive Function ◽  
Testicular Development ◽  
Organ Weights ◽  
Reproductive Maturation ◽  
Metabolic Activities

Space Lab 3 (SL-3) was flown on Shuttle Challenger providing an opportunity to measure the effect of spaceflight on rat testes. Cannon developed the idea that organisms react to unfavorable conditions with highly integrated metabolic activities. Selye summarized the manifestations of physiological response to nonspecific stress and he pointed out that atrophy of the gonads always occurred. Many papers have been published showing the effects of social interaction, crowding, peck order and confinement. Flickinger showed delayed testicular development in subordinate roosters influenced by group numbers, social rank and social status. Christian reported increasing population size in mice resulted in adrenal hypertrophy, inhibition of reproductive maturation and loss of reproductive function in adults. Sex organ weights also declined. Two male dogs were flown on Cosmos 110 for 22 days. Fedorova reported an increase of 30 to 70% atypical spermatozoa consisting of tail curling and/or the absence of a tail.

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