Informational Cycles in Search Markets
Keyword(s):
I show that market participants’ equilibrium beliefs can create fluctuations in the volume of trading, even in a stationary environment. I study a sequential search model where buyers face an unknown distribution of offers. Each buyer learns about the distribution by observing whether a randomly chosen buyer traded yesterday. A cyclical equilibrium exists where the informational content of observing a trade fluctuates, which leads to fluctuations in the volume of trading. The cyclical equilibrium is more efficient than steady-state equilibria. The efficiency result holds also if buyers get a signal about past transaction prices or past trading volumes. (JEL D82, D83)
2004 ◽
Vol 48
(6)
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pp. 1287-1300
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2020 ◽
Vol 11
(3)
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pp. 793-809
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2014 ◽
Vol 104
(9)
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pp. 2918-2939
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Keyword(s):