Who Benefits from Information Disclosure? The Case of Retail Gasoline

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Luco
Keyword(s):  
Local Search ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Search Behavior ◽  
Distributional Effects ◽  
Disclosure Policy ◽  
Retail Gasoline ◽  
Gasoline Industry ◽  
Sequential Implementation

How does online price disclosure affect competition when both consumers and firms can use the disclosed information? This paper addresses this question exploiting the sequential implementation of an online price-disclosure policy in the Chilean retail gasoline industry. The results show that disclosure increased margins by 9 percent on average, though the effects varied across the country depending on the intensity of local search behavior. Because margins increased the least, and even decreased, in high-search areas, where income is also higher, the results also show that price disclosure policies may have important distributional effects. (JEL D83, L11, L71, L81, O13, Q35, Q41)

The impacts of adaptive attacking and defending strategies on mitigation of intentional threats

Kybernetes ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 825-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Shifei Shen ◽  
Rui Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Adaptive Strategies ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Disclosure Policy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.Design/methodology/approachA stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.FindingsThe result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.Originality/valueThis paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.

scholarly journals Diffusing Coordination Risk

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deepal Basak ◽  
Zhen Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Dynamic Information ◽  
Viability Test ◽  
Disclosure Policy ◽  
Private Signals

In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others’ previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates. (JEL C72, D82, G21)

scholarly journals Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 591-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Byrne ◽  
Nicolas de Roos
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Retail Gasoline ◽  
Gasoline Industry ◽  
Urban Market ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Equilibrium Transition ◽  
Detection Strategies

This paper studies equilibrium selection in the retail gasoline industry. We exploit a unique dataset that contains the universe of station-level prices for an urban market for 15 years, and that encompasses a coordinated equilibrium transition mid-sample. We uncover a gradual, three-year equilibrium transition, whereby dominant firms use price leadership and price experiments to create focal points that coordinate market prices, soften price competition, and enhance retail margins. Our results inform the theory of collusion, with particular relevance to the initiation of collusion and equilibrium selection. We also highlight new insights into merger policy and collusion detection strategies. (JEL G34, L12, L13, L71, L81, Q35)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document