scholarly journals Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 149-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Baranski
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Design ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Multilateral Bargaining ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Production Stage ◽  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism ◽  
Voluntary Contribution ◽  
Bargaining Experiments

I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low. (JEL C78, D63, D71, D72, H41)

UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 407-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUIBIN YAN
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Characteristic Functions ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Multilateral Bargaining ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Uniqueness Results ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Special Case

Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function? This paper investigates a random-proposer model first studied in Okada (1993) in which each period players have equal probabilities of being selected to make a proposal and bargaining ends after one coalition forms. Focusing on transferable utility environments and Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE), we find ex ante SSPE payoff uniqueness for symmetric and convex characteristic functions, considerably expanding the conditions under which this model is known to exhibit SSPE payoff uniqueness. Our model includes as a special case a variant of the legislative bargaining model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and our results imply (unrestricted) SSPE payoff uniqueness in this case.

scholarly journals Partial Versus General Compulsory Solidarity: an Experimental Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 249-279
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Arianna Galliera ◽  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism ◽  
Voluntary Contribution

AbstractWe focus on ways and means of solidarity and their more or less voluntary and involuntary character. Alternative ways of redistribution are modeled by combining redistribution as emergent from a non-discriminatory voluntary contribution mechanism, VCM, with an outside option for a “super-rich”, R, participant to donate to VCM participants. The outsider may discriminate between participants of the VCM on the basis of information accessible at a cost to her. Inclusion in and exclusion from the VCM are involuntary while contributions in it are voluntary. How involuntary inclusion of R in VCM affects her discriminatory voluntary donations and contribution behavior is explored experimentally.

Institutions and information in multilateral bargaining experiments

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 485-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Shupp ◽  
John Cadigan ◽  
Pamela M. Schmitt ◽  
Kurtis J. Swope
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Uniform Distribution ◽  
The Other ◽  
Multilateral Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Experiments ◽  
Alternating Offers

Abstract This paper examines the behavior in multilateral bargaining experiments with alternating offers and asymmetric information. In all experiments, a single buyer has up to ten bargaining periods to purchase one unit of a good from each of two sellers. Treatments vary based on who makes the first offer (buyer or sellers), timing (consistent buyer-offer/sellers-demand or alternating), and information (buyer’s value and sellers’ costs are known or come from a uniform distribution). We find that actual bargaining outcomes are virtually identical when offers alternate, regardless of which player makes the first offer. We find that alternating offers reduce bargaining delay slightly compared to treatments in which one side or the other makes repeated take-it-or-leave-it offers. Finally, we find that incomplete information increases bargaining delay and the likelihood of failed agreements.

scholarly journals More dangerous than dyads: how a third party enables rationalist explanations for war

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Gallop
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Analysis ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
State Preferences

For the bargaining model of war, in the absence of incomplete information and commitment problems, war is irrational. But this finding rests on a simple and rarely discussed assumption, that bargaining is between exactly two participants. When we relax this assumption, in a three-player bargaining game, war is an equilibrium. Thus, a key finding of the bargaining model, that there is always an agreement that all states prefer war, is an artifact of dyadic analysis. By removing this limitation, we can find new factors that affect the risk of war: the number of actors, divergence in state preferences, alliance dynamics, and the issue being bargained over.

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