scholarly journals Investor Sentiments

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Izmalkov ◽  
Muhamet Yildiz
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
General Class ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Common Prior ◽  
Investor Sentiments ◽  
The Common ◽  
Relevant Notion ◽  
Strategic Outcomes

We consider a general class of games that have been used to model many economic problems where players' sentiments are believed to play an important role. Dropping the common prior assumption, we identify the relevant notion of sentiments for strategic behavior in these games. This notion is tied to how likely a player thinks that some other player has a more optimistic outlook than himself when they obtain their private information. Under this notion, we show that sentiments have a profound effect on strategic outcomes—even with vanishing uncertainty. (JEL C73, D82, D83, G11)

Little Wukan, Big China: Lessons to Be Drawn from the Wukan Incident for China’s Political and Economic Development

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Yanbing ◽  
Zeng Zhimin
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Social Problems ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Democratic Rights ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
China Today ◽  
Do So

Abstract This paper argues that the Wukan Incident reflects the common difficulties faced at the state-society level by contemporary China as the country finds itself experiencing both an important strategic chapter in its development, and a period during which social problems are coming to the fore. As such, the task of developing an understanding of the Wukan Incident offers the chance to draw crucial lessons about China’s future political and economic development. Firstly, the modernization development model, according to which economic growth and development take precedence above all else, has already led to a building up of serious social problems. China’s future development efforts must draw on and put into practice the theories of the Scientific Outlook on Development. Secondly, the demands made by the villagers of Wukan could feasibly become political and economic problems common throughout the whole country. This includes issues such as how state-owned assets and land are dealt with; transparency of public finances; and safeguards for the democratic rights and interests of Chinese citizens. The government must face these difficulties and use reforms to tackle each of them. Should it fail to do so, these issues could spark a serious social crisis or even affect the stability of the political order. Thirdly, the current mechanisms by which the Party and the government respond to the public’s interest-related claims require urgent improvement. Finally, there is no magic pill to solve the political and economic problems faced in China today. Elections are certainly not a magic solution.

scholarly journals Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Gilboa
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Bibliographical Note ◽  
Final Version ◽  
Common Prior ◽  
The Common ◽  
Bayesian Rationality

AbstractThis note documents Aumann's reason for omitting the “empty shells” argument for the common prior assumption from the final version of “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” It then continues to discuss the argument and concludes that rational entities cannot learn their own identity; if they do not know it a priori, they never will.

Christian Democracy in Italy

1947 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Einaudi
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Action ◽  
The United States ◽  
Clearing House ◽  
Christian Democracy ◽  
American Mind ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Common Foundation ◽  
The Common ◽  
Simple Definition

The American mind has been traditionally more ready to accept the validity of political parties which tend to reflect the complexity of political and economic problems and are not based on any simple ideology. For a nation's mind is not a simple one, nor are its interests capable of simple definition. In a free society, a political party with any claim to national scope and to a lasting identification with the task of solving the particular problems of the country in which it operates, will probably be found to be a composite movement, a meeting ground where different groups bring their different attitudes, a clearing house from which compromises emerge. This is the kind of party to which the United States has grown accustomed. It satisfies an instinctive desire to avoid those clashes on a straight ideological basis which would divide the country and endanger the maintenance of the common foundation and the survival of methods of political action accepted by all.

Bargaining under the Illusion of Transparency

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (11) ◽  
pp. 3500-3539
Author(s):  
Kristóf Madarász
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Relative Speed ◽  
Common Prior ◽  
Illusion Of Transparency ◽  
Partial Reversal

This paper studies bargaining with noncommon priors where the buyer projects and exaggerates the probability that her private information may leak to the seller. Letting the buyer name her price first, raises the seller’s payoff above his payoff from posting a price. In seller-offer bargaining, projection implies a partial reversal of classic Coasian comparative static results. Weakening price commitment can benefit the seller and, as long as the relative speed at which imaginary information versus offers arrive does not converge to zero too quickly, frictionless bargaining converges to a fast haggling process which allows the seller to extract all surplus from trade. Bargaining under common prior transparency is instead slow and becomes equivalent to simply waiting. The comparative static predictions are consistent with experimental evidence. (JEL C78, D82)

Criminal Aspects of Illegal Migration

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (33) ◽  
pp. 74-83
Author(s):  
Stanislav Križovský ◽  
Adela Kavečanská ◽  
Jozefína Drotárová
Keyword(s):  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Irregular Migration ◽  
Illegal Migration ◽  
Underdeveloped Countries ◽  
Safe Environment ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Illegal Migrants ◽  
The Common ◽  
Racial Ethnic ◽  
Take All

Illegal migration in Europe means that an ever-increasing number of people are leaving their homes to live in better countries. Migration carries risks that affect individuals and groups of people, sometimes society as a whole, and therefore states decide to intervene in migration processes. The causes of current irregular migration are quite diverse, but the common feature is that migrants had to leave their countries of origin because they could not live a normal life there. Illegal migrants are increasingly nationals of economically underdeveloped countries, who do not have financial resources, are socially deprived, and because of all these facts are involved in committing criminal anti-social activities. In countries where the number of migrants has risen sharply, the racial, ethnic and religious structure of the population composition may change. The escalating tensions between the indigenous peoples and immigrants accelerate racism (bilaterally), radicalism in politics, socio-economic problems, crime, and other risk factors. It is in the European Community’s interest to take all possible legal and effective measures to eliminate the risks of irregular migration and to ensure a safe environment for the population. The paper characterizes migration and analyzes its causes and consequences, including crime associated with illegal migration.

PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
HARVEY LEDERMAN
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Doxastic Attitude ◽  
Common Prior ◽  
The Common

AbstractRobert Aumann presents his Agreement Theorem as the key conditional: “if two people have the same priors and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal” (Aumann, 1976, p. 1236). This paper focuses on four assumptions which are used in Aumann’s proof but are not explicit in the key conditional: (1) that agents commonly know, of some prior μ, that it is the common prior; (2) that agents commonly know that each of them updates on the prior by conditionalization; (3) that agents commonly know that if an agent knows a proposition, she knows that she knows that proposition (the “KK” principle); (4) that agents commonly know that they each update only on true propositions. It is shown that natural weakenings of any one of these strong assumptions can lead to countermodels to Aumann’s key conditional. Examples are given in which agents who have a common prior and commonly know what probability they each assign to a proposition nevertheless assign that proposition unequal probabilities. To alter Aumann’s famous slogan: people can “agree to disagree”, even if they share a common prior. The epistemological significance of these examples is presented in terms of their role in a defense of the Uniqueness Thesis: If an agent whose total evidence is E is fully rational in taking doxastic attitude D to P, then necessarily, any subject with total evidence E who takes a different attitude to P is less than fully rational.

Giving Order to Districts: Estimating Voter Distributions with National Election Returns

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgia Kernell
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Bayesian Model ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Error Model ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Squared Error ◽  
Out Of Sample ◽  
The Common ◽  
Direct Measures

Correctly measuring district preferences is crucial for empirical research on legislative responsiveness and voting behavior. This article argues that the common practice of using presidential vote shares to measure congressional district ideology systematically produces incorrect estimates. I propose an alternative method that employs multiple election returns to estimate voters' ideological distributions within districts. I develop two estimation procedures—a least squared error model and a Bayesian model—and test each with simulations and empirical applications. The models are shown to outperform vote shares, and they are validated with direct measures of voter ideology and out-of-sample election predictions. Beyond estimating district ideology, these models provide valuable information on constituency heterogeneity—an important, but often immeasurable, quantity for research on representatives— strategic behavior.

Crack Cocaine use in Hamburg's Open Drug Scene

2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Thane
Keyword(s):  
Crack Cocaine ◽  
The United States ◽  
German Society ◽  
Convenience Sample ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Use Patterns ◽  
Crack Use ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Common ◽  
Crack Users

As consumption of crack cocaine has increased in Germany during recent years, the media have condemned it as a “demon drug,” claiming that it causes instantaneous addiction and violence. Although the issue is not comparable to the crack scare that occurred in the United States during the late 1980s, it is now being politicized in a similar manner. Because there is little known about crack use in Germany, the author initiated a small field study in Hamburg investigating the appearance of crack and the use patterns that developed in the open drug scene there. A convenience sample of 64 crack smokers provided responses to a questionnaire about their use of the drug. A number of significant differences were noted among users, variations that are mainly reflected in different methods of use and settings where the drug is consumed. The common assertion that crack cocaine causes violence was not substantiated here, although crack users are nevertheless often blamed for a variety of social, political, and economic problems in German society.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document