scholarly journals Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 68-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey C Ely ◽  
Tanjim Hossain

We conducted a field experiment to test the benefit from late bidding (sniping) in online auction markets. We compared sniping to early bidding (squatting) in auctions for newly-released DVDs on eBay. Sniping led to a statistically significant increase in our average surplus. However, this improvement was small. The two bidding strategies resulted in a variety of other qualitative differences in the outcomes of auctions. We show that a model of multiple concurrent auctions, in which our opponents are naïve or incremental bidders as identified in the lab, explain the results well. Our findings illustrate how the overall impact of naïveté, and the benefit from sniping observed in the lab, may be substantially attenuated in real-world market settings. (JEL D44)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Alvarez ◽  
Alfredo Garcia-Hiernaux ◽  
Marcello Sartarelli

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson ◽  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Ching-I Teng

Internet auction bidders seldom have all the information resources upon which they have learned to comfortably rely. This raises the possibility that internet auction participants depend more on brand related knowledge and employ bidding strategies consistent with heightened valuations of brand related information. This study empirically examines how differences in brand equity affect consumer online auction behavior on eBay. Branded products with objective values (certified coins) are examined for differences in bidding behavior across auctions. The results indicate auction participants employ incremental bidding strategies for preferred brands that have higher prices except when those brands were for coins of the highest quality. Auctions that had sellers who were not power sellers or which did not take Paypal are more prone to attract late or last minute bidders.


Author(s):  
Carrie Heeter ◽  
Chandan (Dan) Sarkar ◽  
Becky Palmer-Scott ◽  
Shasha Zhang

In this study, the authors show that online multiplayer gaming via local Wi-Fi can be used as a “social lubricant” to increase social connections between co-located strangers at a café. In a field experiment in real world cafés, they recruited people who were sitting alone at the same café to play an online game together using iPads, from wherever each happened to be sitting. Some pairs could see each other; some were facing in opposite directions, some were in separate rooms. Visibility influenced how and how much players communicated outside of the game, but had no impact on enjoyment or self-reported experience of social connection. The authors measured “friendship drive” and found that social yearners were more interested in gaming with a stranger and more likely to hope to see their gaming partner again than were socially satiated players. Friendship drive did not impact communication between players or feeling social connection.


2009 ◽  
pp. 1526-1539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson

Internet auctions have gained widespread appeal as an efficient and effective means of buying and selling goods and services. This study examines buyer behavior on eBay, one of the most wellknown Internet auction Web sites. eBay’s auction format is similar to that of a second-price, hardclose auction, which gives a rational participant an incentive to submit a bid that is equal to his or her maximum willingness to pay. But while traditional second-price, hard-close auctions assume that participants have reliable information about their own and other bidders’ reservation prices, eBay participants usually do not. This raises the possibility that eBay participants may adapt their bidding strategies and not actually bid their reservation prices because of increased uncertainty. In this article, we empirically examine the bidding patterns of online auction participants and compare our findings to the behavior of bidders in more conventional auction settings.


Author(s):  
M. A. Otair ◽  
Ezz Hattab

In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the types of online auction. Yet many auctions with fixed-end times are experiencing “sniping” or submission of bids in the final minute of an auction. Late bidding deprives rivals of the ability of seeing one’s bid and undercutting it. Late bidding facilitates colludes or independent pricing well above that predicated by auction mechanism. This article aims to propose and implement a new type of online auction called Least and Unique Price (LUP). In the LUP auction, the winner will be the bidder who submits the least and unique price. Moreover, late bidding and specific closing time also be overcome by the LUP auction. In addition, this article presents the practical implementation of the proposed auction. In order to evaluate the proposed auction a comparative analysis of different auction types and the proposed one has been done.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document