scholarly journals The Decentralized Central Bank: A Review Essay on The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve by Peter Conti-Brown

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 621-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narayana R. Kocherlakota

This essay discusses the structure and governance of the Federal Reserve System in light of the many changes in its activities over the past thirty years. Based on this analysis, it argues in favor of four specific reforms: clarification of Congressional expectations for the system; enhanced Federal Reserve Board of Governors transparency with respect to its oversight of the Reserve Banks; stripping monetary-policy votes from the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Boards of Directors of the Reserve Banks; and the initiation of a public conversation about redesigning the Federal Reserve as a unified public entity. (JEL D72, E44, E52, E58, G21, G28)

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 105-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Feldstein

Martin Feldstein interviewed Paul Volcker in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on July 10, 2013, as part of a conference at the National Bureau of Economic Research on “The First 100 Years of the Federal Reserve: The Policy Record, Lessons Learned, and Prospects for the Future.” Volcker was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1979 through 1987. Before that, he served stints as President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1975 to 1979, as Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs in the US Department of the Treasury from 1969 to 1974, as Deputy Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs in the Treasury from 1963 to 1965, and as an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1952 to 1957. He has led and served on a wide array of commissions, including chairing the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board from its inception in 2009 through 2011.


Author(s):  
Owen F. Humpage

The Federal Reserve System is a model of an independent central bank, with the authority to resist political pressure and act in the long-term best economic interest of the country. But this has not always been the case. In the past—and not too distant past at that—US monetary policy has frequently yielded to other governmental requirements. Even for the modern Federal Reserve, independence is a nuanced, mutable and, ultimately, fragile concept, but one that is essential to maintain.. This Economic Commentary is a short version of: “Independence within—not of—Government: The Emergence of the Federal Reserve as a Modern Central Bank,” Owen F. Humpage, 2014. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, working paper no. 14-02. That paper contains a complete set of references and figures.


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