scholarly journals Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (3) ◽  
pp. 608-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuhito Kojima ◽  
Parag A Pathak
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Additional Condition ◽  
Regularity Conditions ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Student Placement ◽  
Approximate Equilibrium ◽  
Stable Mechanism

A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets. (JEL C78)

scholarly journals Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero-Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Condition ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Proof Rule ◽  
Stable Mechanism ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Abstract We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

scholarly journals Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Coles ◽  
Alexey Kushnir ◽  
Muriel Niederle
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stylized Facts ◽  
Signaling Mechanism ◽  
Full Attention

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets. (JEL C78)

scholarly journals Matching with floor constraints

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 911-942
Author(s):  
Sumeyra Akin
Keyword(s):  
Additional Condition ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Medical Residency ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Prominent Feature ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Teacher Assignment ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Hard Floor

Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy‐proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.

Our Bodies, Whose Property?

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
The Body ◽  
Body Parts ◽  
Complex Issue ◽  
Human Organs ◽  
Property Owners ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

No one wants to be treated like an object, regarded as an item of property, or put up for sale. Yet many people frame personal autonomy in terms of self-ownership, representing themselves as property owners with the right to do as they wish with their bodies. Others do not use the language of property, but are similarly insistent on the rights of free individuals to decide for themselves whether to engage in commercial transactions for sex, reproduction, or organ sales. Drawing on analyses of rape, surrogacy, and markets in human organs, this book challenges notions of freedom based on ownership of our bodies and argues against the normalization of markets in bodily services and parts. The book explores the risks associated with metaphors of property and the reasons why the commodification of the body remains problematic. The book asks what is wrong with thinking of oneself as the owner of one's body? What is wrong with making our bodies available for rent or sale? What, if anything, is the difference between markets in sex, reproduction, or human body parts, and the other markets we commonly applaud? The book contends that body markets occupy the outer edges of a continuum that is, in some way, a feature of all labor markets. But it also emphasizes that we all have bodies, and considers the implications of this otherwise banal fact for equality. Bodies remind us of shared vulnerability, alerting us to the common experience of living as embodied beings in the same world. Examining the complex issue of body exceptionalism, the book demonstrates that treating the body as property makes human equality harder to comprehend.

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