scholarly journals Zero-sum repeated games: Counterexamples to the existence of the asymptotic value and the conjecture $\operatorname{maxmin}=\operatorname{lim}v_{n}$

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 1107-1133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Ziliotto
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Asymptotic Value ◽  
Zero Sum

scholarly journals A Continuous Time Approach for the Asymptotic Value in Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games

2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 1573-1596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Cardaliaguet ◽  
Rida Laraki ◽  
Sylvain Sorin
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Asymptotic Value ◽  
Zero Sum

Perturbed Zero-Sum Games with Applications to Stochastic and Repeated Games

2001 ◽  
pp. 165-181
Author(s):  
Eitan Altman ◽  
Eugene A. Feinberg ◽  
Jerzy Filar ◽  
Vladimir A. Gaitsgory
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Zero Sum

scholarly journals Existence of the uniform value in zero-sum repeated games with a more informed controller

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabien Gensbittel ◽  
◽  
Miquel Oliu-Barton ◽  
Xavier Venel ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Uniform Value ◽  
Zero Sum

Zu M. T Aylors Analysen des Gefangenendilemmas

1982 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hartmut Kliemt ◽  
Bernd Schauenberg
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Social Research ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Subsequent Paper ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Great Expectations ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Zero Sum

AbstractThe theory of games, though at first greeted with great expectations by some social scientists, soon became a source of frustrated hopes to many of them. Too much of the theory seemed to be devoted to “zero-sum” and “one-shot” games. But most social contexts are not zero-sum and involve repeated interaction too. There was a certain lack of such game theoretic models which could be successfully adapted to social phenomena as were apt to appear in reality. Recently the theory of games seems to be on its way to closing this gap within a special branch devoted to “repeated games” or “supergames”. Very promising is the approach of Michael Taylor which is surveyed and discussed in the subsequent paper. This approach has two main merits: First it can be understood with a modest mathematical background, secondly it can be adapted easily to a more precise reconstruction of classical topics in political theory. Though one might not agree with some of Taylor’s conclusions it seems to be worthwhile to get acquainted at least with the basics of his analysis and to take it as a first step to opening avenues for future social research.

Simulation of a Random Variable and its Application to Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehrdad Valizadeh ◽  
Amin Gohari
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Side Information ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Variation Distance ◽  
N Stage ◽  
Target Source ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Zero Sum

We provide a new tool for simulation of a random variable (target source) from a randomness source with side information. Considering the total variation distance as the measure of precision, this tool offers an upper bound for the precision of simulation, which is vanishing exponentially in the difference of Rényi entropies of the randomness and target sources. This tool finds application in games in which the players wish to generate their actions (target source) as a function of a randomness source such that they are almost independent of the observations of the opponent (side information). In particular, we study zero-sum repeated games in which the players are restricted to strategies that require only a limited amount of randomness. Let be the max-min value of the n stage game. Previous works have characterized [Formula: see text], that is, the long-run max-min value, but they have not provided any result on the value of vn for a given finite n-stage game. Here, we utilize our new tool to study how vn converges to the long-run max-min value.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document