Collaboration among the Police, Professional Practitioners, and the Community in the Criminal Justice Process and in Crime Prevention Programs

Crime-preventing neurointerventions (CPNs) are increasingly being used or advocated for crime prevention. There is increasing use of testosterone-lowering agents to prevent recidivism in sexual offenders, and strong political and scientific interest in developing pharmaceutical treatments for psychopathy and anti-social behaviour. Recent developments suggest that we may ultimately have at our disposal a range of drugs capable of suppressing violent aggression, and it is not difficult to imagine possible applications of such drugs in crime prevention. But should neurointerventions be used in crime prevention, and may the state ever permissibly impose CPNs as part of the criminal justice process? It is widely thought that preventing recidivism is one of the aims of criminal justice, yet existing means of pursuing this aim are often poorly effective, restrictive of basic freedoms, and harmful. Incarceration, for example, tends to be disruptive of personal relationships and careers, detrimental to physical and mental health, highly restrictive of freedom of movement and association, and rarely more than modestly effective at preventing recidivism. Neurointerventions hold the promise of preventing recidivism in ways that are more effective and more humane, but the use of CPNs in criminal justice raises several ethical concerns. CPNs could be highly intrusive and may threaten fundamental human values, such as bodily integrity and freedom of thought, and humanity has a track record of misguided, harmful, and unwarrantedly coercive use of neurotechnological ‘solutions’ to criminality. This collection brings together original contributions from emerging scholars and internationally renowned moral and political philosophers to address these issues.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Duff

On 1 April 1996, a rather odd provision was introduced into the Scottish criminal justice process, namely a duty on both prosecution and defence to try to agree uncontroversial evidence in advance of criminal trial.1 As far as the writer is aware, such a provision is unique, although the philosophy underlying its introduction is not totally alien to inquisitorial systems of criminal justice.2 What is particularly peculiar about this duty is that there is no sanction for a failure, however unreasonable, to agree uncontroversial evidence.3 The lack of a sanction resulted from a concern that the creation of any penalty would impinge unjustifiably upon the rights of the accused. The intention in this article is to explore in detail the relationship between the duty to agree uncontroversial evidence and the position of the accused, and to suggest that the imposition of a sanction for a breach of this duty is not as problematic as was thought by those responsible for the legislation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-50
Author(s):  
Jhovindo Sitorus ◽  
Rizkan Zulyadi ◽  
Wessy Trisna

Protection against victims of theft is a protection according to Law Number 13 of 2006 concerning Protection of Witnesses and Victims, all efforts are to fulfill rights and provide assistance to provide security to victims that must be carried out by the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK) or other institutions according to criteria. This protection is given at all stages of the criminal justice process within the judicial environment. The following are the rights of victims and witnesses in Law Number 13 of 2006 concerning Protection of Witnesses and Victims Article 5. The research method in this paper is a normative method that collects library data. The results and discussion of this study is about the protection of victims of theft based on the decision number: 20 / Pid.B / 2017 / PN. Mdn, based on the principle or theory of justice is not fair because there is no restitution or compensation to the victim, and the judge's consideration is to pay attention to things that are lightening and burdensome and pay attention to the absence of justification and forgiveness reasons for imposing a criminal sentence in the form of imprisonment for 2 years against the perpetrators.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-190
Author(s):  
Charlotte Barlow ◽  
Sandra Walklate ◽  
Kelly Johnson

The limits of inter-agency understandings of risk in the context of intimate partner violence are well documented. Informed by Hester’s (2011) ‘three planet’ analogy and using empirical data in one police force area in the south of England, this paper offers an exploration of intra-agency operations, focusing on police risk assessment practices. Exploring the policing risk lens and the victim-survivor journey together, findings highlight police operate with at least three risk assessment moments (call hander, front-line and Safeguarding Hub) and point to the tensions that result when failing to centralise victim-survivors’ own assessment of their risk. Using complexity theory, this paper examines the complex interplay of risk that occurs when the victim-survivor risk journey intersects with the policing aspect of the criminal justice process.


Prejudice ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 135-154
Author(s):  
Endre Begby

This chapter addresses recent concerns about “algorithmic bias,” specifically in the context of the criminal justice process. Starting from a recent controversy about the use of “automated risk assessment tools” in criminal sentencing and parole hearings, where evidence suggests that such tools effectively discriminate against minority defendants, this chapter argues that the problem here has nothing in particular to do with algorithm-assisted reasoning, nor is it in any clear sense a case of epistemic bias. Rather, given the data set that we are given to work with, there is reason to think that no improvement to our epistemic routines would deliver significantly better results. Instead, the bias is effectively encoded into the data set itself, via a long history of institutionalized racism. This suggests a different diagnosis of the problem: in deeply divided societies, there may just be no way to simultaneously satisfy our moral ideals and our epistemic ideals.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document