Ultimate ownership structure and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

2015 ◽  
pp. 1031-1036
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Ultimate Ownership

scholarly journals CEO power and stock price crash risk in China: Do female directors' critical mass and ownership structure matter?

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 101457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasir Shahab ◽  
Collins G. Ntim ◽  
Farid Ullah ◽  
Chen Yugang ◽  
Zhiwei Ye
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Critical Mass ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Female Directors

Ownership Structure and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-75
Author(s):  
Maheen Imtiaz ◽  
◽  
Khalid Mahmood Ahmad ◽  
Abdul Karim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Model ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
The Impact ◽  
A Company

Stock price crash risk is one of the most significant risks associated with the firm. Therefore, it is important to consider the factors which may influence the price crash risk. Various factors of corporate governance found to have an impact on the stock price crash risk. The ownership structure of the firm is a critical attribute of corporate governance. This study's objective is to determine the impact of two types of ownership of a company (managerial ownership and institutional ownership) on its stock price crash risk. To examine whether a firm's ownership structures have an association with stock price crash risk, the multiple linear regression model applied on the panel data of 190 companies listed on KSE for the year 2009-2018. The results of this study show that there is a significantly positive relationship between the institutional ownership and stock price crash risk. However, no association found between managerial ownership and price crash risk. These results imply that the percentage of institutional ownership should be reduced in the firm's ownership structure to reduce the firm's stock price crash risk.

scholarly journals The Effect Of Ownership Structure On Future Stock Price Crash Risk: Korean Evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Yeon Park ◽  
Younghyo Song
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Negative Information ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Corporate Ownership Structure ◽  
Korean Market

This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on firm-specific stock price crash risk using listed firm (KOSPI) data in Korea. Prior literatures suggest that corporate governance has an impact on the level of disclosure and the quality. Managers may stockpile negative information about the company, but when such accumulated bad news crosses a threshold, the negative information suddenly becomes publicly available and a stock price crash is observed (Hutton, Marcus, & Tehranian 2009). Prior studies have documented the determinants of future stock price crash risk (Jin & Myer 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim, Li, & Zhang 2011; Hamm, Li, & Ng 2013; Xu, Jiang, Chan, & Yi 2013; Jo, Moon, & Choi 2015; Kim & Zhang 2016). However, it is hard to find the papers about corporate ownership and future stock price crash risk at the term of determinants of the risk. Compare to some financially advanced countries where ownership and management are effectively separated, there is no clear distinction between ownership and management in Korea. Using the percentage of managerial ownership and that of foreign ownership as proxies for ownership structure and measures for future stock price crash risk which was used by Callen and Fang (2013, 2015) and Kim and Zhang (2016), we conducted an empirical analysis examining the link between corporate ownership structure and companies’ subsequent stock price crash risk. We collect 4,294 firm-year observations listed on Korean market from 2002 to 2015, and we use the measures of firm-specific stock price crash risk based on Callen and Fang (2013, 2015) to examine the relation between corporate ownership structure and subsequent stock price crash risk. From the empirical tests, the percentage of managerial ownership is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. It implies that managerial ownership increases to align the interests of shareholders and managers, it could alleviate the agency problem between them (Jensen & Meckling 1976), helping to resolve information asymmetry and prevent bad news from being withheld, ultimately lowering future stock price crash risk. In addition, we find that higher foreign ownership significantly weakens the negative relation between the percentage of managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk. We interpret this results that the negative side of foreign ownership failed to effectively reduce agency costs, weakening the negative correlation between managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk. Our study may shed some light on the understanding of the ownership structure as a determinant of future stock price crash risk to firms and investors who want to handle crash risk in the stock market.

The impact of CEO pay and its disclosure on stock price crash risk: evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiahua Xu ◽  
Lan Zou
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Strong Indicator ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether CEO pay is related to stock price crash risk, and how ownership concentration mediates this relationship. Design/methodology/approach The authors hypothesize that companies who disclose CEO pay would experience lower stock price crash risk than their non-transparent peers. For companies whose CEO pay is published, the authors conjecture that the CEO pay slice is positively related to stock price crash risk. The authors also investigate whether the impact of CEO pay on crash risk would be weaker or stronger under a concentrated ownership structure and a mutual fund ownership structure. This study relies on 14,499 firm-year observations from the Chinese capital market to shed light on these questions. Findings The authors demonstrate that the magnitude of CEO pay slice has little effect on stock price crash risk. However, whether CEO pay is disclosed at all is a strong indicator for stock price crash risk. Originality/value The paper expands on the literature by adding a new factor to explain the stock price crash risk, which is vital to investor protection and the stability of the financial market. The research also adds to the sparse literature on CEO centrality and has implications for corporate governance and public policy.

Family Firms and Stock Price Crash Risk

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-86
Author(s):  
Hae-Young Ryu ◽  
Soo-Joon Chae
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Crash Risk

Study on the Relation between Dividend and Stock Price Crash Risk

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-86
Author(s):  
Taejin Jung ◽  
Sang-Giun Yim
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Crash Risk
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