Station 51 Common Law and the Mental Health Act

2006 ◽  
pp. 163-166
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mental Health Act

scholarly journals The common law defence of automatism: a quagmire for the psychiatrist

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith J. B. Rix
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Psychiatric Disorder ◽  
Psychotropic Drugs ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

SummaryThis article sets out the complicated and confused law on automatism and identifies the role of the psychiatrist, including paradoxically a role in cases of non-psychiatric disorder where the law requires evidence from a doctor approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act. Legal definitions of automatism are introduced. The internal/external distinction, evidential burden, burden of proof, standard of proof, prior fault, intoxication and the degree of impairment illustrate how the courts limit the defence. Detailed accounts are given of cases in which the defence of automatism has been based on psychiatric disorder and on the effects of psychotropic drugs. Suggestions are made for approaches to assessment and medicolegal reporting.

scholarly journals Masterman-Lister and the Capacity to Manage One’s Property and Affairs

2014 ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Denzil Lush
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Important Decision ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
English Law

<p>The judgment of Mr. Justice Wright in Masterman-Lister v Jewell and Home Counties Dairies and Masterman-Lister v Brutton &amp; Co., [2002] EWHC 417 (QB), which was handed down on 15 March 2002, is the most important decision so far in English law on the meaning of the term ‘patient’. This, of course, is one of the two disabilities recognized in CPR Part 21. It is also the cornerstone of the Court of Protection’s jurisdiction under the Mental Health Act 1983.<br /><br />Section 94(2) of that Act defines a ‘patient’ as someone who is ‘incapable, by reason of mental disorder, of managing and administering his property and affairs.’ There are two prerequisites. A person must (a) have a mental disorder, and (b) as a consequence, be incapable of managing and administering his property and affairs.<br /><br />‘Mental disorder’ is defined in the legislation, but the incapacity to manage one’s property and affairs is not, and this is where Sir Michael Wright’s decision has filled a void, and possibly opened a debate. In fact, he said nothing startlingly new, but the significance of his judgment is that it will be widely reported, whereas previous decisions on the meaning of incapacity to manage one’s property and affairs have been inaccessible, either because they were unreported, or because they emanated from other common law jurisdictions, whose reports are only available in a few very specialist libraries.</p>

scholarly journals Section 136: the ‘grey zone’ after the 24-h validity period lapses

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-64
Author(s):  
Yathooshan Ramesh ◽  
Mukesh Kripalani
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Clinical Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mental Capacity ◽  
Grey Zone ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Mental Capacity Act ◽  
Legal Grounds

SUMMARYIf a Mental Health Act section 136 lapses at 24 h because no in-patient bed is available, the legal grounds to continue holding an individual in the place of safety are dubious. Duty of candour and a senior clinical review are essential. The use of common law and the Mental Capacity Act have limitations, the latter also raising a question about whether deprivation of liberty safeguards would also apply. Clarity of this dilemma is needed through legislation.

scholarly journals Holding powers in A&E departments

1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 615-617
Author(s):  
K. R. Nicholls
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Community Care ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
The Common

The Mental Health Act as an instrument of statute law is unable to address practicalities of caring for mentally disturbed persons who are awaiting formal detention. The common law relevant to this area is ill-defined and depends on interpretation of precedent. The resulting confusion and consequent problems will become more apparent with the advancement of community care, and is a matter which warrants urgent review.

Psychiatric emergencies

2010 ◽  
pp. 669-690
Author(s):  
Punit S. Ramrakha ◽  
Kevin P. Moore ◽  
Amir Sam
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Alcohol Withdrawal ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Deliberate Self Harm ◽  
Psychiatric Emergencies ◽  
Confusion Assessment ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Self Harm ◽  
Acute Confusion ◽  
The Law

Acute confusion: assessment 670 Acute confusion: management 672 Acute alcohol withdrawal 674 Dealing with violent patients 676 Deliberate self-harm 678 The Mental Health Act and common law 680 Treating patients against their will 682 The law on consent and capacity 683 Patients who do not wish to stay in hospital ...

scholarly journals Treatment for Mental Disorder - another step backwards?

2014 ◽  
pp. 180
Author(s):  
Simon Foster
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Psychiatric Patient ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Legitimate Interests ◽  
The Right

The case concerns the right of a psychiatric patient to choose to die by refusing intervention from the hospital. The Court considered the treatment provisions of Part IV of the Mental Health Act, capacity at common law and the legitimate interests of society in preserving life. However the notoriety of Mr Brady, and his own personality, meant that underlying the judgment were considerations of public policy as much as legal analysis.

scholarly journals The Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Mental Health Act 1983, and the Common Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (13) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Phil Fennell
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Institutional Care ◽  
Mental Capacity ◽  
Bodily Integrity ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
European Court ◽  
Mental Capacity Act 2005 ◽  
The Common ◽  
Mental Capacity Act

<p align="LEFT">This paper considers what has come to be known as the ‘interface’ between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act 1983. Until the 2005 Act comes into force in 2007, practitioners will have to be aware of the interface between powers to admit to institutional care and treat without consent under common law and those which exist under the Mental Health Act 1983.</p><p align="LEFT">In simple terms, the interface question is ‘When may the common law or, after 2007, the 2005 Act, be used to admit to institutional care and treat without consent, and when will use of the Mental Health Act be required?’ This article argues that there are two decisions of the European Court which need to be considered in determining how to bridge what has become the “Bournewood gap”: <em>HL v United Kingdom</em> and <em>Storck v Germany</em>. These will require that the State must provide effective supervisory mechanisms to ensure that mentally incapacitated people are not deprived of their liberty (Article 5) and do not have their right of bodily integrity interfered with (Article 8) without lawful authority.</p>

scholarly journals ECT and the Human Rights Act 1998

2014 ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Robert Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Electroconvulsive Therapy ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Incapacitated Patients

In the current edition of the Mental Health Act Manual1, Richard Jones condemns the practice of detaining mentally incapacitated patients for the purpose of giving treatment which could lawfully be administered under common law. Jones draws particular attention to the ‘sectioning’ of compliant patients who require electroconvulsive therapy (ECT).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document