◾ The Perceptual Representation of the 3D Shape

2011 ◽  
pp. 235-244
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
3D Shape

scholarly journals The perceptual representation of 3D shape

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 3-3
Author(s):  
J. T. Todd
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
3D Shape

Practical electron tomography

1995 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 742-743
Author(s):  
C.L. Woodcock
Keyword(s):  
Electron Tomography ◽  
Tomographic Reconstruction ◽  
Three Dimensional ◽  
3D Shape ◽  
Computational Resources ◽  
Shape Of Particles

Despite the potential of the technique, electron tomography has yet to be widely used by biologists. This is in part related to the rather daunting list of equipment and expertise that are required. Thanks to continuing advances in theory and instrumentation, tomography is now more feasible for the non-specialist. One barrier that has essentially disappeared is the expense of computational resources. In view of this progress, it is time to give more attention to practical issues that need to be considered when embarking on a tomographic project. The following recommendations and comments are derived from experience gained during two long-term collaborative projects.Tomographic reconstruction results in a three dimensional description of an individual EM specimen, most commonly a section, and is therefore applicable to problems in which ultrastructural details within the thickness of the specimen are obscured in single micrographs. Information that can be recovered using tomography includes the 3D shape of particles, and the arrangement and dispostion of overlapping fibrous and membranous structures.

3D SHAPE EVOLUTION IN GRASS SILICA SHORT CELL PHYTOLITHS: TAXONOMIC PATTERNS IN BAMBUSOIDEAE AND OTHER LINEAGES

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashly Senske ◽  
◽  
Claire Marvet ◽  
Sultan Akbar ◽  
Silishia Wong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Shape Evolution ◽  
Short Cell ◽  
3D Shape ◽  
Taxonomic Patterns

Direct Realism and Illusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Standard Response ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Ambiguous Stimuli ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Apparent Problem

The supposed problem of perceptual error, including illusion and hallucination, has led most theories of perception to deny formulations of direct realism. The standard response to this apparent problem adopts the mistaken presupposition that perception is indeed liable to error. However, the prevailing conditions of observation are themselves elements of perceptual representation, functioning in the manner of predicate modifiers. They ensure that the predicates applied in perceptual representations do indeed correctly attribute properties that perceived physical objects actually instantiate. Thus, perceptual representations are immune to misrepresentation of the sort misguidedly supposed by the spurious problem of perceptual misrepresentation. Granted the possibility that perceptual attribution admits of predicate modification, it is quite possible that perceptual experience permits both rudimentary and sophisticated conceptualization. Moreover, such treatment of perceptual predication rewards by providing an account of aspect alteration exemplified by perception of ambiguous stimuli.

Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual State ◽  
Content Of Experience

This chapter continues consideration of reductive intentionalism without embracing the doctrine, framing it in the context of cognitive science. Cognition, including perception, is representation. An agent’s cognitive, perhaps perceptual, state is a relation binding the agent to a proposition by means of her mental representation. Intentionalism would explicate the phenomenal character of a perceiver's experience in terms of the content of her prevailing perceptual representation. While minimal intentionalism maintains that the phenomenal character of the perceiver's experience merely supervenes on her representation's content, maximal intentionalism would reduce character to content. For maximal intentionalism maintains that phenomenal character is simply what introspection finds. Yet, according to maximal intentionalism, introspection, when tuned to conscious perception, detects only the content of experience. Hence, the maximalist identifies phenomenal character with the content carried by perceptual representation.

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