Armed-Group Proliferation: Origins and Consequences

2020 ◽  
pp. 14-18
Keyword(s):  
Armed Group

Parties to Non-International Armed Conflicts under International Treaty Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Additional Protocol ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
Treaty Law ◽  
Treaty Interpretation

Chapter 2 examines international humanitarian law treaties. Using classical treaty interpretation methods, it establishes what degree of organization is required from a non-state armed group to become ‘Party to the conflict’ under article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, or an ‘organized armed group’ under article 1(1) of the Additional Protocol II or under the ICC Statute. Chapter 2 also analyses the travaux préparatoires of the different treaties, subsequent practice, and engages with the main doctrinal debates surrounding these questions. By subjecting the three treaties to thorough analysis, the chapter presents concise interpretations of the relevant organizational requirements, and compares the different thresholds. It also identifies and addresses under-researched questions, such as whether the organization criterion under international humanitarian law requires the capacity to implement the entirety of the applicable law.

Of Rebels, Insurgents, and Belligerents

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
State Practice

The first chapter opens the substantive analysis of the organization requirement for non-state parties to armed conflicts. First, it briefly examines why the laws of war have originally been state-focused, and shows how this state focus coined international law requirements of main characteristics of a party to an armed conflict. Second, it analyses how philosophers broadened the legal notion of ‘war’ as to include conflicts involving certain non-state entities. Subsequently, this chapter examines state practice to identify which qualities a non-state armed group needed to possess to obtain the ‘belligerent’ status. It also examines the question of which kind of entities could qualify as ‘insurgents’ or ‘rebels’.

Election delay will not solve Libya's problems

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
The Political ◽  
Parliamentary Election ◽  
Electoral Process ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
The Core

Significance This is expected to be followed by the first parliamentary election since 2014, at some point in early 2022. It now looks increasingly likely that both elections will be delayed. The electoral process lacks the elements it would need to be truly transformative, but it is prompting shifts in the political elite which will dictate developments for at least the next year. Impacts Khalifa Haftar will keep pushing for his armed group to form the core of Libya’s future army Seif al-Islam Qadhafi’s candidacy in the elections is unlikely to result in him becoming president. Aguileh Saleh looks set to stay on as House of Representatives speaker with no clear date for parliamentary elections.

scholarly journals The Organization of Political Violence by Insurgencies

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roos Haer
Keyword(s):  
Political Violence ◽  
Probit Model ◽  
Ordered Probit ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Ordered Probit Model ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
The World ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractA range of theories have attempted to explain the variation in civilian abuse of warring parties. Most of these theories have been focused on the strategic environment in which these acts take place. Less attention is devoted to the perpetrators of these human right abuses themselves: the armed groups. This study tries to fill this niche by using the organizational process theory in which it is assumed that armed groups, like every organization, struggles for survival. The leader tries to ensure the maintenance of her armed group by increasing her control over her troops. The relationship between the level of control and the perpetrated civilian abuse is examined with a new dataset on the internal structure of more than 70 different armed groups around the world. With the help of a Bayesian Ordered Probit model, this new dataset on civilian abuse is analyzed. The results show that especially particular incentives play an important role.

Studying Desertion in the spanish Civil War

Desertion ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 38-48
Author(s):  
Théodore McLauchlin
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
High Rate ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Group Characteristics

This chapter develops the account of desertion primarily in the context of the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, which clarifies the role of several variables through Spain. It looks at many different organizations on both the rebel side and the Republican side in order to examine the impact of different armed group characteristics on desertion. It uses the Spain case study to understand desertion dynamics in a particularly fascinating civil conflict. The chapter focuses on the Republican side, analyzing the dynamics of its relatively high rate of desertion at various points in the conflict. It demonstrates norms of cooperation and coercion at the micro level to statistically assess individual soldiers' decisions to fight or to flee.

Trust, Mistrust, and Desertion in Civil Wars

Desertion ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 15-37
Author(s):  
Théodore McLauchlin
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Social Rule ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
South Vietnam ◽  
Military Unit

This chapter mentions Viet Cong (VC) companies in South Vietnam that developed serious morale and motivation problems, which pose a major risk of desertion and defection. It investigates where trust and cooperation will come from if soldiers look for their chance to desert and put up a false front of enthusiasm and conviction. It also proposes a crucial way of keeping soldiers fighting through a norm of cooperation in a military unit, emphasizing a social rule saying that each will fight if others do. The chapter discusses whether an armed group can rely simply on the threat of punishment to keep combatants fighting, even if trust is not in the cards. It describes deeply mistrustful armed groups that use factional memberships or stereotypes to assess soldiers' loyalties, showing coercion as arbitrary persecution.

Handling Foreign Fighters

2019 ◽  
pp. 135-172
Author(s):  
Vera Mironova
Keyword(s):  
Local Population ◽  
Group Cohesion ◽  
The Other ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Additional Source ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Local Language ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
International War ◽  
Foreign Fighters

There are several major benefits foreign fighters, and only foreign fighters, can offer armed groups. They have knowledge and experience that the local population does not have and have connections in the international war industry. Usually they are more dedicated to their goals. Foreigners are better at raising funds in their home communities and thus provide armed groups with additional source of income. Finally, they can be successfully used by armed groups for propaganda purposes. On the other hand, it is much harder for the leaders of an armed group to manage foreigners versus locals. First, foreign fighters often do not speak the local language and are not familiar with the terrain. Second, they could have problems with the locals. Third, their presence in the group could decrease overall group cohesion. Fourth, they could be recruited as spies by foreign intelligence agencies more easily than locals. And finally, foreign fighters often joined the conflict with different motives than those of local fighters, which could lead to differences in combat strategy and tactics.

Crafting an Effective Protection Contract

Kidnap ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 79-106
Author(s):  
Anja Shortland
Keyword(s):  
Production Costs ◽  
Transactions Costs ◽  
Effective Protection ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Time Horizons ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Local Opposition ◽  
Reputational Costs

Firms cannot operate safely in rebel territory without making security arrangements with local powerbrokers. How does one make a protection contract with an armed group that is both self-enforcing and plausibly deniable? Protection contracts have prisoners’ dilemma characteristics: cooperation is only sustainable with indefinite time horizons or effective sanctioning mechanisms. This chapter discusses seven different options that are appropriate in different contexts and can also be deployed in parallel. Firms—advised by security consultancies—choose the options that minimize the total costs of obtaining security. These include production costs, transactions costs, and the potential reputational costs of engaging with rebel movements or deploying (para)military forces against local opposition groups.

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