scholarly journals The Varieties of Religious Experiences by William James: a 19th-century description of the psychosis spectrum by way of religious and mystical experiences – psychiatry in literature

2018 ◽  
Vol 213 (6) ◽  
pp. 681-681
Author(s):  
Jianan Bao
Author(s):  
Daniel Maria Klimek

The chapter considers influential definitions of terms like “mysticism,” “mystical,” or “mystical experiences” as formulated by two of the most prominent scholars of mysticism of the twentieth century. The influence of William James to the study of mysticism and his famous four marks of a mystical state is observed. The influence of Evelyn Underhill to the study of mysticism and her defining characteristics of what is true mysticism is observed. The various forms of visionary experiences and locutionary experiences (mystically hearing voices) are studied and the nuances between mystical and visionary experiences are considered. Critiques of the work of James and Underhill are offered and brief case studies of three modern mystics—Maria Valtorta, Therese Neumann, and Gemma Galgani—are considered in support of the critiques.


Author(s):  
Stephen S. Bush

William James made signal contributions to the philosophical and psychological study of religion. One of James’s greatest contributions to the study of religion is his defense of the permissibility of religious beliefs. In his essay “Will to Believe,” he argues that it can be permissible (morally and epistemically), if certain criteria are met, to hold beliefs for which one does not have conclusive evidence in support (provided there isn’t conclusive evidence against). This applies to religious beliefs, but also to moral beliefs and certain beliefs that are essential to our social lives and to the scientific enterprise. His second-greatest contribution to the study of religion is his methodological focus on individuals’ religious experiences, which we see most extensively in Varieties of Religious Experience. In addition to these two contributions, he has important things to say on the relation between religion and other aspects of culture, such as ethics, politics, science, and philosophy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Graus

This article examines how and why criminal proceedings were brought against alleged cases of Catholic mysticism in several European countries during modernity. In particular, it explores how criminal charges were derived from mystical experiences and shows how these charges were examined inside the courtroom. To bring a lawsuit against supposed mystics, justice systems had to reduce their mysticism to ‘facts’ or actions involving a breach of the law, usually fraud. Such accusations were not the main reason why alleged mystics were taken to court, however. Focusing on three representative examples, in Spain, France and Germany, I argue that ‘mystic trials’ had more to do with specific conflicts between the defendant and the ecclesiastical or secular authorities than with public concern regarding pretence of the supernatural. Criminal courts in Europe approached such cases in a similar way. Just as in ecclesiastical inquiries, during the trials, judges called upon expert testimony to debunk the allegedly supernatural. Once a mystic entered the courtroom, his or her reputation was profoundly affected. Criminal lawsuits had a certain ‘demystifying power’ and were effective in stifling the fervour surrounding the alleged mystics. All in all, mystic trials offer a rich example of the ways in which modern criminal justice dealt with increasing enthusiasm for the supernatural during the 19th century.


PhaenEx ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Iris Hennigfeld

In my paper, I want to focus not only on the notions of givenness and evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also on phenomenological work “after” Husserl. I will elaborate on how these phenomenological key ideas can methodologically be made fruitful, especially for an investigation into religious phenomena. After giving an outline of Husserl’s notions of (self-)givenness, evidence, and original intuition (I), I want to portray key elements of Steinbock’s discovery of a generative dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology and show how this approach correlates to the field of religious experiences (II). Subsequently, I want to focus on Steinbock’s book Phenomenology of Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (2007), and elucidate how for Steinbock different historical examples of mystical experiences can serve as leading clues for the revelation of the essential, eidetic structures of “vertical experiences”—or, phenomenologically speaking, the eidos of religious experience, which turns out to be “epiphany” (III). The expression “verticality,” as opposed to “horizontality,” denotes the existential and dynamic dimension of experiences which are oriented toward a new height (religiously or morally) “beyond” ourselves.


Author(s):  
Ruth Anna Putnam

The American William James was motivated to philosophize by a desire to provide a philosophical ground for moral action. Moral effort presupposes that one has free will, that the world is not already the best of all possible worlds, and, for maximum effort, according to James, the belief that there is a God who is also on the side of good. In his famous, often misunderstood paper ‘The Will to Believe’, James defended one’s right to believe in advance of the evidence when one’s belief has momentous consequences for one’s conduct and success, and a decision cannot be postponed. One such belief is the belief in objective values. Generally, a belief is objective if it meets a standard independent of the believer’s own thought. In morals, objective values emerge from each person’s subjective valuings, whatever their psychological source, when these valuings become the values of a community of persons who care for one another. Still, even in such a community there will be conflicting claims, and the obligations generated by these claims will need to be ranked and conflicts resolved. James’ solution is to say that the more inclusive claim – the claim that can be satisfied with the lesser cost of unsatisfied claims – is to be ranked higher. This is not to be mistaken for utilitarianism: James is not a hedonist, and it is not clear what he means by the most inclusive claim. A concern for others makes sense only if there are others who inhabit with us a common world. Pragmatism, which he co-founded with C.S. Peirce, and radical empiricism provide James’ answer to those who would be sceptics concerning the existence of the common-sense world. Pragmatism is both a theory of meaning and a theory of truth. As a theory of meaning it aims at clarity; our thoughts of an object are clear when we know what effects it will have and what reactions we are to prepare. As a theory of truth, pragmatism makes clear what is meant by ‘agreement’ in the common formula that a belief is true if it agrees with reality. Only in the simplest cases can we verify a belief directly – for example, we can verify that the soup is too salty by tasting it – and a belief is indirectly verified if one acts on it and that action does not lead to unanticipated consequences. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, this does not mean that James defines truth as that which is useful; rather, he points out that it is, in fact, useful to believe what is true. James rejects the dualism of common sense and of many philosophers, but he is neither a materialist nor an idealist, rather what he calls a ‘pure experience’ (for example, your seeing this page) can be taken as an event in your (mental) history or as an event in the page’s (physical) history. But there is no ‘substance’ called ‘pure experience’: there are only many different pure experiences. You and I can experience the same page, because an event in your mental history and an event in mine can be taken to be events in the same physical history of the page; James may even have been tempted to say that a pure experience can be taken to belong to more than one mental history. According to James, pragmatism mediates the so-called conflict between science and religion. James took religious experiences very seriously both from a psychologist’s perspective and as evidence for the reality of the divine.


Author(s):  
Daniel Maria Klimek

The chapter considers the ideological biases that have formed in academic culture against taking mystical experiences and similar phenomena seriously. An in-depth analysis of Ann Taves’s “naturalistic” approach to religious experiences shows how seemingly “neutral” secular approaches, while criticizing metaphysical hermeneutics, are not free of their own metaphysical and philosophical assumptions. The work of several scholars from various fields, theologian John Milbank, historian Brad Gregory, religion scholar Robert Orsi, psychiatrist Bruce Greyson, is considered in articulating how one worldview, a philosophy of secular naturalism, guides academic discourse across disciplines at the expense of another worldview, an ontology of the supernatural. The myth of “secular neutrality” is exposed by these scholars. The chapter concludes with the call for cultivating a new method for the study of religious experiences, an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach that considers the potential integrity of extraordinary religious experiences and a more holistic understanding of knowledge.


2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN S. BUSH

AbstractThe constructivist position, that mystical experiences are determined by the experiencer's cultural context, is now more prevalent among scholars of religion than the perennialist position, which maintains that mystical experiences have a common core that is cross-culturally universal. In large part, this is due to the efforts of Wayne Proudfoot in his widely accepted book,Religious Experience. In this article, I identify some significant unresolved issues in Proudfoot's defence of constructivism. My aim is not to defend perennialism, but to specify some objections to the constructivist thesis that constructivists need to address more adequately.


1992 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 568-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. A. Persinger

Vingiano's (1992) challenge concerning the relationship between right hemisphericity, low self-esteem, mystical experiences, and religiosity can be clarified by the concept of vectorial hemisphericity. Ontogenetic intrusions of right-hemispheric processes into the left hemispheric sense of self should be experienced most frequently as an apprehensive “presence” that results in lower self-esteem. Because transient above-normal left-hemispheric activity enhances positive affect and the sense of self, concurrent right-hemispheric intrusions are experienced as mystical experiences. Religiosity would be the consequence of persistent above-normal left-temporofrontal activation that encourages the delusion. Hence, extreme conditions, such as left lateralized temporal-lobe epileptic foci, encourage both mystical and religious experiences.


2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-226
Author(s):  
Heather D. Curtis

AbstractThis article examines how radical evangelicals employed psychological concepts such as sanity, temperament, and especially the subconscious as they struggled to understand and respond to the rapidly expanding pentecostal movement within their midst. By tracing the growing tensions over ecstatic spiritual experiences that emerged among Holiness and Higher Life believers during the 1880s and 1890s, this article demonstrates that differing assumptions about the importance of consciousness for the religious life presaged reactions to the pentecostal revivals of the early twentieth century. Although their proclivity for rational judgment predisposed Higher Life evangelicals to question the sanity of involuntary phenomena such as speaking in tongues, some prominent leaders within this community appealed to “mental science” in an effort to revise conventional understandings of the spiritual self and its capacities. For participants in the Christian and Missionary Alliance— an organization in which disputes over the propriety of pentecostalism were particularly contentious—notions of temperament and the subconscious articulated in the works of “new psychologists” like William James offered resources for reassessing Higher Life views of authentic spirituality in light of pentecostal revivalism. By analyzing how a particular faction within the radical evangelical movement made use of psychological theories to contend with the challenge of the revivals at Azusa and elsewhere, this article exposes some of the social divisions that exacerbated debates over the validity of pentecostal religious experiences. Exploring the complicated interactions and creative tensions that arose as Higher Life evangelicals appropriated constructs such as the subconscious in the wake of Azusa Street also shows that this influential contingent of conservative Protestants engaged with aspects of the field of psychology in dynamic and inventive ways that involved both selective borrowing and critical resistance. While there is truth in the common observation that radical evangelicals were deeply suspicious of the “new science of Psychology,” this article uncovers a more complex history that expands our understanding of the interplay among scientific discourse, the varieties of evangelical spiritual experience, and the emergence of pentecostalism in the early twentieth century.


1998 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEROME GELLMAN

This paper replies to Evan Fales' sociological explanation of mystical experience in two articles in Religious Studies vol. 32 (143–63 and 297–313). In these papers Fales applies the ideas of I. M. Lewis on spirit possession to show how mystical experiences can be accounted for as vehicles for the acquisition of political power and social control. The rebuttal of Fales contains three main elements: (a) the presentation of specific examples of theistic mystical experience from Christianity and Judaism which provide counter-examples to Fales' theory; (b) the presentation of some general objections to its plausibility; and (c) an argument for the conclusion that the burden of proof lies with naturalistic, reductionist explanations of religious experiences rather than with theistic interpretations of those experiences.


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