scholarly journals Against the stream: Antidepressants are not antidepressants – an alternative approach to drug action and implications for the use of antidepressants

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Moncrieff

SummaryAlthough antidepressants are regarded as effective and specific treatments, they are barely superior to placebo in randomised trials, and differences are unlikely to be clinically relevant. The conventional disease-centred understanding of drug action regards antidepressants as targeting an underlying brain process, but an alternative ‘drug-centred’ view suggests they are psychoactive substances that modify normal mental states and behaviour. These alterations, such as numbing of emotions, may reduce feelings of depression, and also create amplified placebo effects in randomised trials. Patients should be informed that there is no evidence that antidepressants work by correcting a chemical imbalance, that antidepressants have mind-altering effects, and that evidence suggests they produce no noticeable benefit compared with placebo.Declaration of interestThe author is co-chairperson of the Critical Psychiatry Network.

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-78
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Telcharov ◽  

The article presents the psychological analysis of the implicit mind theory and its research methods. The main problems of empirical research in psychology are briefly described. The main problems of research of the mind theory are highlighted; and the status of this phenomenon’s in scientific psychology is defined. The implicit mind theory is defined as a psychological quality expressed in the ability to explain and attribute mental states – beliefs, desires, emotions, knowledge, etc. – to themselves and others; as well as understanding that others have different beliefs, desires, intentions, and attitudes. Current difficulties in the research on the implicit mind theory are described. Age-related features of formation of the implicit mind theory are depicted. The latest scientific studies on the implicit mind theory are highlighted. Biological correlates of the theory are shown. It is also described that in the case of an alcohol addiction, certain brain areas that are known to be neurological correlates of the implicit mind theory are damaged. The main research methods, which are separated into three groups, are highlighted. The first group includes methods that study the implicit mind theory using behavioural experiment with special tasks. The second group includes methods that use semi-structured interview. The third group includes methods where respondents are asked to identify an emotion or an affective state of another person based on the visual stimuli (photo, picture etc.).The main methods of research of this psychological phenomenon, features, procedure, advantages, and disadvantages are described in detail. The most appropriate methods to examine addicts’ implicit mind theory are proposed. The procedure of investigation and psychological assessment of the implicit mind theory for people dependent on psychoactive substances is offered.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather C. Lench ◽  
Aaron B. Taylor ◽  
Shane W. Bench

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Kihlstrom

Over its history, medicine has vacillated between acknowledging placebo effects as important and trying to overcome them. Placebos are controversial, in part, because they appear to challenge a biocentric view of the scientific basis of medical practice. At the very least, research should distinguish between the effects of placebos on subjective and objective endpoints. Theoretically, placebos are of interest because they underscore the other side of the mind-body problem: how mental states can affect physical conditions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Ester Navarro ◽  
Sara Anne Goring ◽  
Andrew R. A. Conway

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability understand that other people’s mental states may be different from one’s own. Psychometric models have shown that individual differences in ToM can largely be attributed to general intelligence (g) (Coyle et al. 2018). Most psychometric models specify g as a reflective latent variable, which is interpreted as a general ability that plays a causal role in a broad range of cognitive tasks, including ToM tasks. However, an alternative approach is to specify g as a formative latent variable, that is, an overall index of cognitive ability that does not represent a psychological attribute (Kovacs and Conway 2016). Here we consider a formative g approach to the relationship between ToM and intelligence. First, we conducted an SEM with reflective g to test the hypothesis that ToM is largely accounted for by a general ability. Next, we conducted a model with formative g to determine whether the relationship between ToM and intelligence is influenced by domain-specific tasks. Finally, we conducted a redundancy analysis to examine the contribution of each g variable. Results suggest that the relationship between ToM and intelligence in this study was influenced by language-based tasks, rather than solely a general ability.


Author(s):  
Sergio Vicencio ◽  
Mario Villalobos ◽  
Pedro Maldonado ◽  
Rodrigo Vergara

Explaining the emergence of behavior and understanding on the basis of neuronal mechanisms is still elusive. One renowned proposal is the Free Energy Principle (FEP), which uses an information-theoretic framework derived from thermodynamic considerations to describe how behavior and understanding would emerge. FEP starts from a whole organism approach, based on mental states and phenomena, mapping them into the neuronal substrate. An alternative approach, the Energy Homeostasis Principle (EHP), initiates a similar explanatory effort, but starting from single neuron phenomena and building up to the whole organism’s behavior and understanding. In this work, we develop the EHP as an alternative but complementary vision to FEP and try to explain how behavior and understanding would emerge from the local requirements of the neurons. Based on EHP and a strict naturalist approach that sees living beings as physical and deterministic systems, we explain scenarios where learning would emerge without the need for volition or goals. Given these starting points, we state several considerations of how we see the nervous system, particularly the role of function, purpose, and the conception of goal-oriented behaviors. We problematize these conceptions, giving an alternative teleology-free framework in which behavior and, ultimately, understanding would still emerge. We reinterpret neural processing explaining basic learning situations up to simple anticipatory behavior. Finally, we end the work with an evolutionary perspective of how this non-goal-oriented behavior appears. We acknowledge that in the current form of our proposal, we are still far from explaining the emergence of understanding. Still, we set the ground for an alternative neuron-based framework to ultimately explain understanding.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Schultz

Powered by philosophic argument, scientific evidence, and multibillion dollar pharmaceutical companies sponsoring multimillion dollar advertising campaigns, the chemical imbalance hypothesis has saturated our academic and popular culture. This saturation is, at least partially, responsible for the more than 10 billion dollars annually spent on antidepressant medication in the United States. But what is the “chemical imbalance” hypothesis? And what evidence supports it? This article will provide an account of the chemical imbalance hypothesis, a history of its development, and the evidence provided for its justification. This article will show that the evidence for the chemical imbalance hypothesis is unconvincing. It will discuss why, despite the unconvincing evidence, the hypothesis lingers. And, finally, it will suggest an alternative approach to mental illness that avoids some of the pitfalls of a biological reductionistic account of mind.


2022 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Vicencio-Jimenez ◽  
Mario Villalobos ◽  
Pedro E. Maldonado ◽  
Rodrigo C. Vergara

It is still elusive to explain the emergence of behavior and understanding based on its neural mechanisms. One renowned proposal is the Free Energy Principle (FEP), which uses an information-theoretic framework derived from thermodynamic considerations to describe how behavior and understanding emerge. FEP starts from a whole-organism approach, based on mental states and phenomena, mapping them into the neuronal substrate. An alternative approach, the Energy Homeostasis Principle (EHP), initiates a similar explanatory effort but starts from single-neuron phenomena and builds up to whole-organism behavior and understanding. In this work, we further develop the EHP as a distinct but complementary vision to FEP and try to explain how behavior and understanding would emerge from the local requirements of the neurons. Based on EHP and a strict naturalist approach that sees living beings as physical and deterministic systems, we explain scenarios where learning would emerge without the need for volition or goals. Given these starting points, we state several considerations of how we see the nervous system, particularly the role of the function, purpose, and conception of goal-oriented behavior. We problematize these conceptions, giving an alternative teleology-free framework in which behavior and, ultimately, understanding would still emerge. We reinterpret neural processing by explaining basic learning scenarios up to simple anticipatory behavior. Finally, we end the article with an evolutionary perspective of how this non-goal-oriented behavior appeared. We acknowledge that our proposal, in its current form, is still far from explaining the emergence of understanding. Nonetheless, we set the ground for an alternative neuron-based framework to ultimately explain understanding.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ester Navarro ◽  
Sara Anne Goring ◽  
Andrew R. A. Conway

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand that other people’s mental states may be different from one’s own. Psychometric models have showed that individual differences in ToM can largely be attributed to general intelligence (g) (Coyle et al., 2018). Most psychometric models specify g as a reflective latent variable, which is interpreted as a general ability that plays a causal role in a broad range of cognitive tasks, including ToM tasks. However, an alternative approach is to specify g as a formative latent variable, that is, an overall index of cognitive ability that does not represent a psychological attribute (Kovacs & Conway, 2016). Here we consider a formative g approach to the relationship between ToM and intelligence. First, we conducted SEM with reflective g to test the hypothesis that ToM is largely accounted for by a general ability. Next, we conducted SEM with formative g to determine whether the relationship between ToM and intelligence is more influenced by language ability (Study 1). Finally, we conducted a psychometric network analysis to examine associations among ToM and intelligence measures (Study 2). Results suggest that the relationship between ToM and intelligence is largely due to language-based factors, not a general ability.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Moncrieff

Aims.This article explores an alternative understanding of how psychiatric drugs work that is referred to as the drug-centred model of drug action. Unlike the current disease-centred model, which suggests that psychiatric drugs work by correcting an underlying brain abnormality, the drug-centred model emphasises how psychiatric drugs affect mental states and behaviour by modifying normal brain processes. The alterations produced may impact on the emotional and behavioural problems that constitute the symptoms of mental disorders.Methods.Arguments are put forward that justify the consideration of the drug-centred model. The research necessary to support the prescription of drugs according to such a model is explored.Results.Evidence from neurochemistry and comparative drug trials do not confirm the disease-centred model of drug action. Since psychiatric drugs are recognised to have mind- and behaviour-altering properties, the drug-centred model constitutes a plausible alternative. The drug-centred model suggests that research is needed to identify all the alterations produced by various sorts of drugs, both acute and long term, and how these might interact with the symptoms and problems associated with different mental disorders. This requires detailed animal and volunteer studies and data from patients prescribed drug treatment long term, along with placebo-controlled and comparative trials that look at the overall impact of drug-induced alterations on well-being and functioning as well as symptoms. Research is also needed on alternative ways of fulfilling the function of drug treatment. The moral aspect of using drugs to modify behaviour rather than treat disease needs honest and transparent consideration.Conclusions.It is hoped this discussion will encourage the psychiatric and pharmaceutical research community to provide more of the information that is required to use psychiatric drugs safely and effectively.


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