scholarly journals Kirchhoff imaging beyond aliasing

Geophysics ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 654-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Biondo Biondi

Crucial image resolution may be lost when spatially aliased data are imaged with Kirchhoff algorithms that employ standard antialiasing methods. To maximize resolution, I introduce a method that enables the proper imaging of some aliased components in the data, while avoiding aliasing artifacts. The proposed method is based on a detailed analysis of the different types of aliasing that affect Kirchhoff imaging. In particular, it is based on the observation that operator aliasing depends on the dip spectrum of the data. A priori knowledge on the characteristics of the dip spectrum of the data, in particular on its asymmetry, can thus be exploited to enable “imaging beyond aliasing.” The method is not of general applicability, but it successfully improves the image resolution when a priori assumptions on the data dips are realistic. The imaging of salt‐dome flanks in the Gulf of Mexico has been enhanced by the application of the proposed method.

Author(s):  
Robert Audi

This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.


Author(s):  
Donald C. Williams

This chapter begins with a systematic presentation of the doctrine of actualism. According to actualism, all that exists is actual, determinate, and of one way of being. There are no possible objects, nor is there any indeterminacy in the world. In addition, there are no ways of being. It is proposed that actual entities stand in three fundamental relations: mereological, spatiotemporal, and resemblance relations. These relations govern the fundamental entities. Each fundamental entity stands in parthood relations, spatiotemporal relations, and resemblance relations to other entities. The resulting picture is one that represents the world as a four-dimensional manifold of actual ‘qualitied contents’—upon which all else supervenes. It is then explained how actualism accounts for classes, quantity, number, causation, laws, a priori knowledge, necessity, and induction.


Author(s):  
Keith DeRose

In this chapter the contextualist Moorean account of how we know by ordinary standards that we are not brains in vats (BIVs) utilized in Chapter 1 is developed and defended, and the picture of knowledge and justification that emerges is explained. The account (a) is based on a double-safety picture of knowledge; (b) has it that our knowledge that we’re not BIVs is in an important way a priori; and (c) is knowledge that is easily obtained, without any need for fancy philosophical arguments to the effect that we’re not BIVs; and the account is one that (d) utilizes a conservative approach to epistemic justification. Special attention is devoted to defending the claim that we have a priori knowledge of the deeply contingent fact that we’re not BIVs, and to distinguishing this a prioritist account of this knowledge from the kind of “dogmatist” account prominently championed by James Pryor.


1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (22) ◽  
pp. 1930-1931 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Anguita ◽  
S. Rovetta ◽  
S. Ridella ◽  
R. Zunino

Author(s):  
Yusuke Nakajima ◽  
Syoji Kobashi ◽  
Yohei Tsumori ◽  
Nao Shibanuma ◽  
Fumiaki Imamura ◽  
...  

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