Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Dilemma of Conjoined Twins and Individual Rights

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vanessa E. Munro

The judgment in the English Court of Appeal case of Re A ( Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) highlights forcefully the highly individualistic and abstract assumptions that commonly shape the deployment of rights discourse in liberal legal adjudication. Forced by the all-or-nothing nature of this discourse into a dilemma between perceiving of the twins as separate right-bearers or perceiving of the stronger twin, Jodie, as the singular right-bearer and of Mary, her weaker sibling, as a non-legal entity, the court chose the former option.

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-58
Author(s):  
Andrew Bainham

IN Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All E.R. 961 the Court of Appeal faced the impossible dilemma of having to decide whether to authorise a complex operation to separate Jodie and Mary, ischiopagus conjoined twins (joined at the pelvis). The condition of the babies was extremely rare, it being estimated that only about once in 100,000 births will monozygotic twins fail to separate completely. Even then, ischiopagus twins account for only about six per cent. of the total instances of conjoined twins. Another very rare peculiarity of the case was the certainty that the operation, if sanctioned, would quickly and inevitably bring about the death of the weaker twin, Mary. This was because the twins shared a common aorta. Mary’s own heart and lungs were severely deficient and incapable of oxygenating and pumping blood through her body. Her life was thus sustained only by the common artery and separation would necessarily involve clamping and severing this. It was equally clear that the effect of failing to attempt the separation would be the inevitable death of both twins within three to six months. The cause of death would be heart failure since Jodie’s heart would sooner or later fail. The parents, devout Roman Catholics, opposed the operation, believing that in God’s eyes the twins were equal and that one could not morally be sacrificed to save the other. The hospital took a different view. It believed that a successful operation could be performed which could give the stronger twin, Jodie, a reasonable prospect of a worthwhile life.


2004 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 440-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Kugler

In criminal law theory, it is common to distinguish between the defence of necessity as a justification and the defence of necessity as an excuse. However, it is sometimes said that English law does not clearly distinguish between justification and excuse. In Re A (Children) the Court of Appeal permitted the separation of conjoined twins although the separation would lead to the immediate death of one of the twins. In his judgment, Brooke LJ invoked the defence of necessity and appears to be ready to base his decision on necessity as an excuse. It is, however, submitted in this article that Brooke LJ's decision should be interpreted as having been based on necessity as a justification. Consequently, it cannot be said any longer that English law does not distinguish between justification and excuse.


1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 289-292
Author(s):  
F Sharmin ◽  
F Begum ◽  
T Parveen ◽  
SF Khatun ◽  
W Fatima

A patient at her 38+ wks of pregnancy as a ultrasonographically diagnosed case of conjoined twin admitted in our department with ruptured membrane. Two live female babies joined at the chest were delivered by caesarean section. The parents refused a separation operation and the mother and the babies were discharged from hospital at 6th post natal day. A review of the literature suggests that early diagnosis by a combination of ultrasound and MRI is essential for management as it provides prognosis for viability and process of surgical separation and also the opportunity for early counseling of parents and termination if indicated. Key world: Conjoined twins; thoracopagus; prenatal diagnosis; separation procedure DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/bjms.v10i4.9504 BJMS 2011; 10 (4): 289-292


1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 618-623
Author(s):  
Stephen Smith

This article examines a recent decision of the English Court of Appeal. It concerned a psychiatrist who examined and reported on a convicted murderer in a secure hospital. The report was commissioned by the patient's solicitors as evidence in support of his release. The report was emphatically unfavourable and the doctor insisted that it be revealed to the hospital authorities. The solicitors refused and litigation ensued. The courts were forced to rule on the conflict between the patient's right to privacy and the public interest in revealing the report.


Author(s):  
Tilmann Büttner

The UPC, universally referred to as ‘the Court’ throughout the text of the Agreement pursuant to Art 2(a) UPCA, is to be regarded legally as a legal entity sui generis (Art 4(1) UPCA) and structurally as a uniform entity. The Court entity as a whole comprises both the judiciary structures, which are the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal, and the non-judiciary structures, which are the Registry with sub-registries set up at all divisions of the Court (Art 10(1) and (2) UPCA). The Court’s structure visibly follows that of the CJEU which, according to Art 19 TFEU, comprises as a unitary court the European Court of Justice, the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal, thus establishing a complete system of courts.


Author(s):  
Kiefel Susan

This chapter explores the High Court's jurisdiction in Australia to review legislation for constitutional validity. Every Australian court of competent jurisdiction has the power to declare a law of the Commonwealth or of a State void because of transgressing the Constitution. The High Court, which is the ultimate court of appeal in Australia, is the authoritative and final interpreter of the Constitution. Though this authority is not expressly stated in the Constitution, it can be discerned through various sources. Furthermore, the methods of review vary according to both the nature of the constitutional head of power under which legislation is said to have been enacted, as well as whether the challenge to the validity of the legislation is based upon its restrictive effect upon a constitutionally protected freedom. These freedoms are not individual rights or freedoms, but instead effect a restriction or limitation on the legislative power of the Commonwealth.


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