Israel–South Korea Relations: The Military Dimension

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-192
Author(s):  
Alvite Singh Ningthoujam

As Southeast Asia gains prominence in global geostrategic and geoeconomic environment, Israel’s overture to South Korea is not an exception. Despite prolonged frosty relations between Israel and South Korea between the 1970s and late 1980s, both have managed to strengthen military–security relationship after reopening their embassies in the early 1990s. Currently, their defense cooperation revolves around arms trade but is expanding toward joint ventures, coproduction, and upgrading programs. Arms export is an important component in promoting Israeli foreign policy goals. At the same time, South Korea requires constant defense upgrade as it faces a hostile neighborhood. Within this context, the article argues that military and defense relations are the driving forces in flourishing Israel–South Korea relations.

1967 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Bradford Burns

Mounting Anxieties, frustrations, and fears in Brazil effected a change of government by military force at the end of March of 1964. President Joáo Goulart fled to an Uruguayan exile. Congress, urged by the military, conferred supreme executive power on Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco. Many other sweeping changes followed. None was more complete than the about-face taken in foreign policy.Castelo Branco spoke out early and unequivocally in his regime in favor of a return to more traditional policies. The graduation exercise of the foreign service school, the Instituto Rio-Branco, on July 31, 1964, provided the propitious place and moment for him to outline the foreign policy goals of his government. He paid homage to the ideals consecrated by tradition: world peace, disarmament, selfdetermination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism. Moving into the more pragmatic realm of national interests, the president emphasized that his government's foreign policy aimed to increase national power through social and economic development.


Author(s):  
Michael Mastanduno

This chapter explores the link between economic instruments of statecraft and the broader foreign policy goals and strategies of states. Economic sanctions are used in conjunction with diplomatic and military measures in response to foreign policy problems and opportunities. However, they are not always effective. The chapter begins with a discussion of the instruments and objectives of economic statecraft, including trade restrictions, financial sanctions, investment restrictions, and monetary sanctions. It then explores the potential of economic incentives as a tool of statecraft and the question of whether economic interdependence leads to harmony, as liberals believe, or conflict among states, as realists predict. It shows that economic interdependence can either lead to peace or conflict depending on the future expectations of policy makers, the nature of the military balance, and the form that economic interdependence takes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (02) ◽  
pp. 57-67
Author(s):  
Yongwook RYU

This article provides a comprehensive review of important events in South Korea in 2019. What began as an audacious year for the Moon Jae-in administration had seen its foreign policy goals unfulfilled and domestic situation increasingly mired in political scandals and socio-economic problems. The Moon administration needs to re-examine its policies, face up to its failures and reassess its policy options for the second half of Moon’s presidency to produce concrete results.


2020 ◽  
pp. 181-208
Author(s):  
Phillip C. Saunders

China’s national security calculations have become increasingly global in nature. The expansion of Beijing’s international military-security footprint has paralleled its diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. This includes a range of military and security cooperation programs with other countries, involvement in multilateral security organizations, and unilateral developments undertaken by China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This chapter reviews China’s overseas security interests and the military missions the PLA has been tasked to perform by CCP leaders. It then discusses the PLA’s organization and capabilities, with an emphasis on those relevant for operating beyond China’s borders. China’s military and security interactions include traditional military missions (mostly focused on Asia), military diplomacy efforts to support Chinese foreign policy objectives by engaging foreign military counterparts and providing public goods, and a new emphasis on protecting China’s expanding overseas economic and security interests.


1977 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Brecher

Among India's foreign policy crises since independence the most intense were in the military-security issue-area. Some, like the concentration of Indian and Pakistani forces on the Kashmir and Punjab borders in July 1951, de-escalated without war. Others, like the disputed claims over the Rann of Kutch in the early months of 1965, led to limited military hostilities followed by stalemate. Still others culminated in war with India's principal neighbours - with Pakistan in 1947–9, 1965 and 1971, and with China in 1962. All of these conform to the definition of a crisis along the peace-war continuum:


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-175
Author(s):  
Jos Monballyu

Over de motieven waarom Belgische militairen tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog naar de Duitse vijand deserteerden is al veel geschreven. Volgens de Franstalige patriottische pers en literatuur van kort na de Eerste Wereldoorlog was die desertie uitsluitend te wijten aan de defaitistische ingesteldheid van de Vlaamse Frontbeweging en de talrijke aansporingen waarmee hun vier afgezanten naar de Duitsers (Jules Charpentier, Karel De Schaepdrijver, Vital Haesaert en Carlos Van Sante) de Vlaamse soldaten aan het IJzerfront bestookten. De Vlaamse historici probeerden die beschuldiging op allerlei manieren te weerleggen of schoven de verantwoordelijkheid voor die desertie in de schoenen van Antoon Pira en zijn Algemeen Vlaamsch Democratische Verbond. Geen enkele historicus ging daarbij na wat de deserteurs zelf over hun desertie naar de vijand te vertellen hadden. Dit deden zij nochtans uitvoerig tijdens de verschillende gerechtelijke ondervragingen waaraan zij na de oorlog werden onderworpen wanneer zij konden worden aangehouden. Het feit dat zij daarbij al strafbaar waren van zodra zij wetens en willens deserteerden ongeacht hun eigenlijke motief, liet hen daarbij toe om dit motief vrij complexloos mee te delen. Geen enkele van de overlopers van wie het strafdossier bewaard is, gaf echter toe dat hij omwille van de Vlaamse kwestie was overgelopen. Oorlogsmoeheid en de behoefte om zijn familieleden terug te zien waren, zoals in alle legers, de voornaamste motieven waarom zij naar de vijand deserteerden. Ook de Belgische Militaire Veiligheid en de krijgsauditeurs slaagden er trouwens niet in om een verband te leggen tussen de Vlaamse Frontbeweging en de Belgische deserties naar de vijand.________Desertion to the enemy in the Belgian front army during the First World War (part 2)Much has already been written about the reasons why Belgian soldiers deserted to the German enemy during the First World War. According to the French language patriotic press and literature dating from shortly after the First World War that desertion was exclusively due to the defeatist attitude of the Flemish Front Movement and the many exhortations with which their four representatives to the Germans (Jules Charpentier, Karel De Schaepdrijver, Vital Haesaert and Carlos Van Sante) bombarded the Flemish soldiers at the Yser Front. Flemish historians attempted in a variety of ways to refute that accusation or they shifted the responsibility for the desertion on to Antoon Pira and his Algemeen Vlaamsch Democratische Verbond (General Flemish Democratic Union). Not a single historian investigated what the deserters themselves had to say about their desertion to the enemy. However, the deserters gave extensive explanations during the detailed investigation that took place during the various judicial interrogations, to which they were submitted after the war if it was possible to arrest them. The fact that they were considered to have committed a criminal offence for having knowingly deserted whatever their actual motive, allowed them to communicate this motive without too many complexes. However, none of the defectors whose criminal records have been preserved admitted that he had defected for the sake of the Flemish Question.  As is the case in all armies, the main reasons for desertion to the enemy were war-weariness and the longing to see members of their family. The Belgian Military Security and the military auditors were not able either to establish a causal link between the Flemish Front Movement and the Belgian desertions to the enemy.


Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 402-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brewster

The long-standing strategic disconnect between South Asia and the Korean Peninsula is breaking down. Driven by the changing balance of power in Asia, India and South Korea have developed a strong economic partnership, and taken small but significant steps toward a political and security relationship that refects their numerous shared strategic interests. This article explores the contours of this evolving relationship.


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