Violent Extremism and Moral Disengagement: A Study of Colombian Armed Groups

2020 ◽  
pp. 088626052091364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalio Blanco ◽  
Amanda Davies-Rubio ◽  
Luis De la Corte ◽  
Lourdes Mirón

Violent extremism is commonly conditioned by a variety of psychological processes and mechanisms that when activated or deactivated aid implication in extreme behavior, including destructive actions with a large dose of cruelty against people and groups. One of those processes is moral disengagement, which was originally postulated by Bandura. To test this relationship, the present research focused on studying these mechanisms in members of Colombian illegal armed groups. Total sample size was 18 (14 males and four females) demobilized members of the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]) and guerrilla organizations (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC], National Liberation Army [ELN], among others), which had participated directly or indirectly in violent actions against people and groups, which included murders, tortures, and massacres. Qualitative methodology was used, specifically in-depth interviews and content analysis. This analysis led to the verification in the narratives of the participants of the use of all the mechanisms of moral disengagement described by Bandura aiming to justify their behavior within the armed group. The most noteworthy mechanisms were those that minimized participation (especially, attributing behavior to obeying orders: displacement of responsibility) and moral justification, especially, the context of confrontation. Moral disengagement processes are found in armed group members (such as insurgency, terrorist organizations, or militias). These mechanisms cancel ordinary psychological reactions of rejection, fear, and moral controls that oppose the carrying out of cruelty and extreme violence.

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 634-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regina Bateson

When the Guatemalan civil war ended in 1996, the Peace Accords required the demobilization of the civil patrols. Yet, nearly two decades after the end of the war, the ex-patrollers remain organized and active. At first glance, the persistence of Guatemala’s civil patrols sounds like a triumph of socialization: the men enrolled in the civil patrols were effectively socialized during the war, so they continue patrolling today. This argument is seductively simple, but it is incorrect. Using process tracing to analyze historical documents and interviews with former civil patrollers, I show that the military did not succeed in socializing most of its patrollers. The military was, however, remarkably successful at socializing civilians in conflict zones. After enduring a ferocious scorched earth campaign followed by re-education, civilians either learned to fear and comply with the military and the civil patrols, or they internalized the military-promulgated narrative that repression is necessary to guarantee security. Both these outcomes facilitate patrolling in postwar Guatemala, where many civilians in war-affected areas either embrace or tolerate extralegal security patrolling as a means of preventing crime from spreading to their communities. Theoretically, the case of Guatemala’s civil patrols expands our knowledge of socialization in militias and civil defense forces. Mass socialization of group members is not necessary for an armed group to retain its influence in the long term, even after a conflict has ended. Additionally, socialization occurs not just within groups, but also dynamically and interactively across group boundaries. To fully understand the trajectories of armed groups, it is important to analyze both socialization within armed groups and the socialization of the broader civilian population.


Author(s):  
Vera Mironova

Even if a rebel group could mitigate the threat posed by group members interested in ideology, doing so would take significant time and resources away from the main group’s objective. As a result, well-organized groups in the rebel bloc need to find a delicate balance between using ideology as a screening mechanism and preventing it from becoming a fighter’s top priority. To achieve that, armed groups need to be very clear about their true goals to avoid any misunderstanding among potential recruits. Another helpful tactic is to have a small but more radical non-independent armed group in the rebel bloc to draw such fighters away from the main mother group while still keeping them in the rebel bloc to fight the enemy. Highly dedicated foreign fighters can join the smaller group, thus still pursuing the overall war goals without threatening the mother group and its leadership.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-100
Author(s):  
Sujata Thapa

The peace process in Nepal has been slow and fragile with many hurdles and drawbacks. Nepal is in the crossroad to peace and democracy- there is still a long road ahead for establishing a democratic country. This article traverses through the critical juncture of the country’s history by analyzing the situation of eastern Tarai in the context of an increasing number of youths joining non-state armed groups and forces. This development had led to insecurity in the region and can seriously derail the ongoing peace process in Nepal. This article is based on the in-depth interviews conducted with the armed group members, local youth and community elders. The field work spanned almost two years from early 2009 to the end of 2010. The findings show that the motivations of armed groups are as varied as their respective nature of operation. The paper provides the implication of these groups to the ongoing peace process in Nepal and offers some recommendations toward restoring peace and rebuilding normal lives and livelihoods.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winnifred R. Louis ◽  
Craig McGarty ◽  
Emma F. Thomas ◽  
Catherine E. Amiot ◽  
Fathali M. Moghaddam

AbstractWhitehouse adapts insights from evolutionary anthropology to interpret extreme self-sacrifice through the concept of identity fusion. The model neglects the role of normative systems in shaping behaviors, especially in relation to violent extremism. In peaceful groups, increasing fusion will actually decrease extremism. Groups collectively appraise threats and opportunities, actively debate action options, and rarely choose violence toward self or others.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-70
Author(s):  
Toncerius M. Lesu ◽  
S.P.N. Nainiti ◽  
Serman Nikolaus

The aim of this research is to find out how big the role of the farmer group members in increasing rice production at Korobhera Village, Meggo Subdistrict, Sikka District. The research has been done on April to May 2019. This is a qualitative study with purposive sampling considering the site was one of rice central production. The objectives of the study were to know : 1) how big the role of the farmer group members to productivity increasing in the area of research ; 2) the constraints faced by the members of the farmer group. Sample was done randomly using simple random sampling method with a total sample size of 50 people, who were the members of four farmer groups existed. The results of research indicated that the role of farmer group members in increasing rice production at the location of research was high, shown by the percentage of the accomplishment maximum score from average score in the amount of 75,65% (average score 87). The constraints faced by members of farmer group were quite similar, which were financial capital limits problem, uncaged livestocks and the availability of production tools was often not on time.


Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald M. Seekins

The appearance of an unwanted visitor in Aung San Suu Kyi's lakeside compound in Yangon gave the SPDC military regime a pretext to extend her house arrest, while the refusal of major armed groups in the border areas to accept subordination under the Tatmadaw (armed forces) central command posed serious problems for Myanmar's future stability.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 183449092199143
Author(s):  
Jovan Ivanović ◽  
Iris Žeželj ◽  
Charis Psaltis

In two post-conflict societies (Serbia and Cyprus), the authors investigated how people cope with in-group historical transgression when heroes and villains relevant for their collective identity are made salient in it. The authors set the events in foundational periods for Serbian (Experiment 1) and Greek Cypriot (Experiment 2) ethnic identity—that is, historical representations of the Battle of Kosovo (1389) and the Liberation Struggle (1955–1959), respectively. In both experiments, a between-subjects design was used to manipulate group membership (in-group or out-group) and representation of the salient character (hero, villain, or neutral) in fictitious but historically plausible accounts of transgressions. In Experiment 1 ( N = 225), the participants showed more moral disengagement in the case of in-group historical transgressions than in the case of identical transgressions by an out-group, while the in-group hero was rejected less than all the other historical characters. Social identification based on in-group superiority moderated both observed effects in such a manner that they were more pronounced for participants perceiving their ethnic group as superior. In Experiment 2 ( N = 136), historical transgression involving the in-group hero provoked the most moral disengagement and the least rejection of the group deviant. In-group superiority and in-group importance as distinct modes of social identification moderated these effects in such a way that they were more pronounced for high-identifying individuals. Taken together, the experiments show that the in-group hero, as a highly valued ethnic symbol, is exempt from the black sheep effect and the sanctions of critically attached group members. The authors discuss the implications of in-group heroes for political and educational communication.


Significance Although a ceasefire has been in place since October 2020, very little has been done during that time to integrate or demobilise the many armed forces and groups that exist across the country. The obstacles are formidable. Impacts Significant demobilisation and reintegration will not happen in the near term. Local security will continue to rest on fragile political and financial arrangements between armed groups and governing authorities. The current high levels of oil and gas revenue will tend to discourage unrest.


Significance The closure of border crossings since March 2020 has fuelled violent competition for control of lucrative informal crossings (trochas) and frontier towns. However, the Venezuelan military is ill-prepared to deal with the expanding presence of Colombia’s irregular armed groups. Recent incursions highlight weaknesses in the Venezuelan armed forces, which have suffered casualties. Impacts The penetration of organised crime groups into Venezuela’s disintegrating state and economy will continue to intensify. Organised criminal violence coupled with the violence of military operations will fuel displacement, COVID and civilian casualties. A speedy, negotiated solution to Venezuela’s political impasse is needed to preclude fusion with Colombia’s own protracted insurgency.


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