scholarly journals The perceptual representation of "space" defined by motion versus color

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (10) ◽  
pp. 341
Author(s):  
Kara Emery ◽  
Vicki Volbrecht ◽  
David Peterzell ◽  
Michael Webster
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney

The supposed problem of perceptual error, including illusion and hallucination, has led most theories of perception to deny formulations of direct realism. The standard response to this apparent problem adopts the mistaken presupposition that perception is indeed liable to error. However, the prevailing conditions of observation are themselves elements of perceptual representation, functioning in the manner of predicate modifiers. They ensure that the predicates applied in perceptual representations do indeed correctly attribute properties that perceived physical objects actually instantiate. Thus, perceptual representations are immune to misrepresentation of the sort misguidedly supposed by the spurious problem of perceptual misrepresentation. Granted the possibility that perceptual attribution admits of predicate modification, it is quite possible that perceptual experience permits both rudimentary and sophisticated conceptualization. Moreover, such treatment of perceptual predication rewards by providing an account of aspect alteration exemplified by perception of ambiguous stimuli.


Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney

This chapter continues consideration of reductive intentionalism without embracing the doctrine, framing it in the context of cognitive science. Cognition, including perception, is representation. An agent’s cognitive, perhaps perceptual, state is a relation binding the agent to a proposition by means of her mental representation. Intentionalism would explicate the phenomenal character of a perceiver's experience in terms of the content of her prevailing perceptual representation. While minimal intentionalism maintains that the phenomenal character of the perceiver's experience merely supervenes on her representation's content, maximal intentionalism would reduce character to content. For maximal intentionalism maintains that phenomenal character is simply what introspection finds. Yet, according to maximal intentionalism, introspection, when tuned to conscious perception, detects only the content of experience. Hence, the maximalist identifies phenomenal character with the content carried by perceptual representation.


Author(s):  
Sauro Succi

Fluid flow at nanoscopic scales is characterized by the dominance of thermal fluctuations (Brownian motion) versus directed motion. Thus, at variance with Lattice Boltzmann models for macroscopic flows, where statistical fluctuations had to be eliminated as a major cause of inefficiency, at the nanoscale they have to be summoned back. This Chapter illustrates the “nemesis of the fluctuations” and describe the way they have been inserted back within the LB formalism. The result is one of the most active sectors of current Lattice Boltzmann research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caitlin S. Mallory ◽  
Kiah Hardcastle ◽  
Malcolm G. Campbell ◽  
Alexander Attinger ◽  
Isabel I. C. Low ◽  
...  

AbstractNeural circuits generate representations of the external world from multiple information streams. The navigation system provides an exceptional lens through which we may gain insights about how such computations are implemented. Neural circuits in the medial temporal lobe construct a map-like representation of space that supports navigation. This computation integrates multiple sensory cues, and, in addition, is thought to require cues related to the individual’s movement through the environment. Here, we identify multiple self-motion signals, related to the position and velocity of the head and eyes, encoded by neurons in a key node of the navigation circuitry of mice, the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC). The representation of these signals is highly integrated with other cues in individual neurons. Such information could be used to compute the allocentric location of landmarks from visual cues and to generate internal representations of space.


1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 715-729 ◽  
Author(s):  
A S Fotheringham ◽  
T C Pitts

Given that geographers excel at measuring and explaining spatial variations in attributes, it is surprising that they are not more aware that relationships may vary over space. It is still normal practice, for example, to estimate a set of parameters in a model and to assume that the relationships represented by these values apply equally to all locations and in all directions. Recently, however, there have been several applications of Casetti's expansion method that have been focused on measuring anisotropic trends around locations. Here this technique is used to examine possible anisotropy in distance-decay relationships around origins. That is, the authors attempt to answer the question: does the rate of distance decay vary with direction? The conclusions reached in previous research on this topic are only partially supported here. Via US migration data, it is suggested that although there is evidence of directional variation in distance decay around some origins, and this evidence leads to some interesting insights into the mental representation of space by US migrants, it is impossible to identify any overall trend across origins in directional variability.


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