All things not being equal: Aviation in the EU ETS

Climate Law ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Gudo Borger

The EU ETS lays down distinctions between the aviation sector and other covered sectors with regard to the determination of the emission cap and the manner in which allowances are allocated to operators in different sectors. The choices made by the legislature could infringe upon the principle of equality. I rely upon the criteria set out by the Court of Justice of the European Union to assess whether the principle is respected under the EU ETS. The decision to use different base years for the aviation sector in the calculation of the emission cap can be justified by the undue burden that would be placed on the sector if the base year were set to 1990, in view of its rapid growth over the past two decades. The use of a different allocation method for aviation is not so easily explained. Whether the principle of equality is respected as between different sectors and within the aviation sector will depend on the material effect that the EU ETS will have. In turn, this depends on the development of the price of EUAs. The treatment of aviation under the EU ETS in phase three could give rise to a challenge in a national court once the effects of it become clear.

2019 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-154
Author(s):  
Ernő Várnay

AbstractAccording to the generally accepted understanding, judicial activism arises when a court behaves improperly, straying beyond the limits of the judicial function and acting like a legislature.It is convincing that in the great majority of the cases the Court of Justice of the European Union fulfils the roles assigned to it by the founding treaties of the European Union without any excess, but there are decisions which may be characterized as activist, be they necessary or useful for the proper functioning of the European legal system, and there are decisions (refusing or avoiding to decide) which may be qualified as manifestations of judicial passivism.Judicial passivism is defined in the narrow sense of the term, i.e., when the court clearly refuses or avoids to decide the case before it, or does not answer the question legitimately referred to it. In the jurisprudence of the CJEU, such cases arise when the Court systematically waits for the withdrawal of the action, exceeds the reasonable time of the proceedings, or does not answer the question raised in the preliminary ruling procedure by the national court. The inadmissibility of questions referred by national courts may be perceived as passivism when the qualification of ‘not a court or tribunal’ in the sense of Article 267 TFEU is questionable, or when the scope of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is defined too narrowly. Cases may arise – at least in theory – in which the Court, while it would be in a position to act, defers the question to the EU or the Member State’s legislator or to the national judge to decide, with the not entirely convincing qualification of the act under scrutiny in annulment proceedings as ‘not an act for the Article 263 TFEU’. The label ‘judicial passivism in a broad sense of the term’ is used when the Court sticks to its position in a questionable manner (conservatism as passivism), steps back from its earlier position, narrowing the scope of EU law expressly or implicitly overruling its former decision, or it introduces new conditions with the same result (retreat).It has been demonstrated that the Court systematically opposed the Member States, the Commission and the parties in the main proceedings, arguing in favour of inadmissibility of referrals for preliminary questions − the Court avoided, in a large number of cases, the temptation of judicial passivism. On the other hand, the Court’s increased rigour in the preliminary ruling procedures is detectable in recent years. The Court took a less benevolent approach towards the qualification of the referring body as ‘court or tribunal’; the questions proved to be ‘hypothetical’ more often than before, and more importantly, the lack of sufficient information regarding the factual and regulatory context led more easily to inadmissibility.The driving forces behind the passivism of the Courts of the European Union are the ‘reasonableness’ of the judiciary in a time of crisis of the European integration, self-defence against the overburden of case-law and against unnecessary pressure from the public, in order to maintain the health of the management of justice and a certain ‘path-dependence’ as far as the traditional theoretical foundations of European integration are concerned.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 390-407
Author(s):  
Ludwig Krämer

Abstract In May 2020, the German constitutional court decided that under certain conditions, a decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union should or could be ignored by a national court, which would have the last word to decide on the compatibility with the EU Treaties of a measure adopted by an EU institution or body. The contribution examines, whether this German decision is compatible with the EU Treaties and concludes that it this is not the case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-352
Author(s):  
Balingene Kahombo

Abstract This paper reviews the relevance of the Western Sahara cases brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union to international law. These cases relate to the contestations of the consistency of a number of economic agreements concluded between the European Union (EU) and the Kingdom of Morocco, as well as the EU acts that approved them, with the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The issues arising from these disputes include the legality of the Court’s jurisdiction to review the validity of a treaty which is already in force between parties and the rules of international law that the contested legal instruments have violated, perhaps entailing their invalidity under EU law. While the Court has rightly found that none of the aforementioned agreements is applicable to Western Sahara—since their territorial scope does not extend to a territory which is not subject to Moroccan sovereignty——this paper tries to answer a different question as to whether the Court’s decisions are in line with international law. It is demonstrated that though the Court’s competence to rule on the validity of EU unilateral acts is obvious, the establishment of its power to review the validity of a treaty which is in force, such as the fisheries agreement of 2006, is dubious because of the inconsistency of such power with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In any event, the question which remains to be solved—and which was not submitted to the Court—pertains to the determination of the effects of the illegal application of the EU-Morocco agreements to Western Sahara on the rights of its people. It is concluded that such an application has violated the law of occupation and eventually international human rights law. These violations do not touch upon the validity of the contested legal instruments but relate to the question of responsibility for a wrongful act stemming from the illegal application of those agreements to occupied Western Sahara in a manner which is harmful to the interest of its people.


Author(s):  
Narine Ghazaryan

The chapter analyses the limited impact of Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law on the legal order of the Republic of Armenia. Despite Armenia’s geographic proximity to the EU, CJEU precedents feature in only two cases of the Constitutional Court of Armenia. In both cases, CJEU case law is seen merely as part of comparative international legal practice, informing the judgment of the national court, rather than affecting the ratio per se. The chapter analyses the main reasons behind the apparent lack of CJEU impact on Armenian judicial practice and the legal order more generally. These include, for example, low intensity in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia and cognitive barriers. The chapter also addresses the main features of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement and covers future possibilities for judicial interaction between the two legal orders.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonelli

In December 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its awaited decision on the Taricco II case, responding to a preliminary reference from the Italian Corte Costituzionale. The latter, unhappy with the outcome of the earlier Taricco I decision, asked for a re-interpretation of Article 325 TFEU and threatened the Court of Justice with the possible activation of its controlimiti doctrine. The CJEU partially ‘corrected’ its previous ruling and prevented an open conflict between EU law and Italian constitutional law. This case note discusses the saga and its three episodes against the background of the growing constitutional conversation between top European courts. It argues that Taricco is a positive episode of judicial dialogue and may further contribute to its consolidation: on one hand, constitutional courts are increasingly willing to ‘play the game’ and refer to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU; on the other, the Court of Justice seems more reactive than in the past to constitutional courts’ claims and now considers them with increasing attention and detail. Finally, the case note reflects on the partially diverging languages for constitutional dialogue: national courts use the language of constitutional identity, while the CJEU prefers to refer to the ‘common constitutional principles of the EU’.


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Daukšienė ◽  
Arvydas Budnikas

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the purpose of the action for failure to act under article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The statements are derived from the analysis of scientific literature, relevant legislation, practice of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) and the European Union General Court (EUGC). Useful information has also been obtained from the opinions of general advocates of the CJEU. The article of TFEU 265, which governs the action for failure to act, is very abstract. For this reason, a whole procedure under the article 265 TFEU was developed by the EU courts. The original purpose of the action for failure to act was to constitute whether European Union (EU) institution properly fulfilled its obligations under the EU legislation. However, in the course of case-law, a mere EU institution’s express refusal to fulfill its duties became sufficient to constitute that the EU institution acted and therefore action for failure to act became devoid of purpose. This article analyzes whether the action for failure to act has lost its purpose and become an ineffective legal remedy in the system of judicial review in the EU. Additionally, the action for failure to act is compared to similar national actions.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIS ANTONIADIS

Ranging from the denial of direct effect to WTO law by the Court of Justice to a WTO-friendly legislative culture currently booming in the EU's political institutions, different approaches towards WTO law have been adopted within the EU. This article classifies the different approaches into reactive, coactive, and proactive by drawing on their common characteristics. The principal aim is to explore the considerations shaping the development of the different approaches and to argue that these stem from the interaction between the judiciary and the legislature. In doing so, this article purports to provide a comprehensive view of the application of WTO law within the Community legal order.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


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