Mental Element (Mens Rea) of the Crime of Aggression and Related Issues

Keyword(s):  
Mens Rea ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Holton

This paper develops an account of core criminal terms like ‘murder’ that parallels Williamson’s account of knowledge. It is argued that while murder requires that the murderer killed, and that they did so with a certain state of mind, murder cannot be regarded as the conjunction of these two elements (the action, the actus reus, and the associated mental element, the mens rea). Rather, murder should be seen as a primitive notion, which entails each of them. This explains some of the problems around criminal attempt. Attempted murder cannot be seen simply as involving the state of mind of murder minus success; rather, it has to be seen as a self-standing offence, that of attempting to commit the murder.


2021 ◽  
pp. 26-87
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

The chapter begins the exploration of the elements of criminal offences. Two factors are crucial: the event, behaviour or state of affairs known as the external element or actus reus, and the state of mind known as the mental element or mens rea. This chapter discusses the principle of actus reus, proof and the elements of the offence, how to identify elements of actus reus and mens rea, coincidence of actus reus and mens rea, the effect of penalty provisions in determining the elements of the actus reus, actus reus and justification or excuse, the problematic case of Dadson with regard to actus reus, physical involuntariness, a ‘state of affairs’ as an actus reus, general liability for omissions, offences of mere omission, causation, the ‘but for’ principle, the connection between fault and result and negligible causes.


2020 ◽  
pp. 87-138
Author(s):  
Janet Loveless ◽  
Mischa Allen ◽  
Caroline Derry

This chapter focuses on mens rea (MR), the mental element of a criminal offence, and discusses some of the components of MR, which include intention, recklessness, negligence and gross negligence. It explains that intention can either be direct or oblique and that recklessness may be defined as the conscious taking of an unjustified risk. It also explains how to distinguish between negligence and gross negligence: negligence is unreasonable conduct that creates risk while gross negligence is a high degree of negligence deserving criminal punishment. The chapter also considers several examples of cases relevant to MR and analyses the court decisions in each of them.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter discusses the law on offences involving intoxication. It distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary intoxication, and between ‘specific’ and ‘basic’ intent. Cases are presented to show that state of mind is both a necessary element in the definition of an offence as well as in some defences. Just as intoxication may cause a person to lack the mens rea of an offence so it may cause him to have the necessary mental element of a defence.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

The chapter begins the exploration of the elements of criminal offences. Two factors are crucial: the event, behaviour or state of affairs known as the external element or actus reus, and the state of mind known as the mental element or mens rea. This chapter discusses the principle of actus reus, proof and the elements of the offence, how to identify elements of actus reus and mens rea, coincidence of actus reus and mens rea, the effect of penalty provisions in determining the elements of the actus reus, actus reus and justification or excuse, the problematic case of Dadson with regard to actus reus, physical involuntariness, a ‘state of affairs’ as an actus reus, general liability for omissions, offences of mere omission, causation, the ‘but for’ principle, the connection between fault and result, and negligible causes.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Herring

Mens rea is the legal term used to describe the element of a criminal offence that relates to the defendant’s mental state. Different crimes have different mentes reae: some require intention, others recklessness, negligence, or knowledge. Some crimes do not require proof of any mental state of the defendant. This chapter considers the following concepts that are used throughout criminal law: (a) intention, (b) recklessness, (c) negligence, and (d) knowledge.


1996 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 82-105
Author(s):  
Björn Burkhardt

In this paper, I shall address three problems: the question of content and limits of the “mens rea” elements (part II), the controversy over the correct concept of negligence (part III), as well as the problem of “divergence from the intended causal chain” (part IV). In doing so, I will compare the regulations of the Israeli draft Code (the “Israeli Draft”) not only with German law, but also with English and American law. Of course, within the scope of this paper I can neither probe deeply into the subject matter nor address all the important questions related to it.Before starting with my questions and comments, I would like to make two introductory remarks:1. First, I have to admit that I am unsure whether I understand correctly the regulations of the Israeli Draft (sec. 19-21, 22, 54). At least three sources of potential misunderstanding exist: first, the English version of the Israeli Draft is a preliminary translation of the Hebrew text. Any translation may shift the meaning of the original and binding Hebrew text. Second, misunderstanding may also result from my rather modest knowledge of the English language.


1936 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Mens Rea ◽  

In all common law crimes, other than common nuisance, it appears that some culpable mental element, or mens rea, is required. The mental element is ‘culpable’ in the sense that the actus is only criminal when it is coupled with a realization of the probable consequences of the act or omission. In statutory offences this rule does not hold good; the actus may be prohibited in such language that a person may be liable for doing an act whether or not he did, or could, have foreseen the consequences. Such offences create what is commonly called Absolute Liability. Unfortunately our judges have used the expression mens rea in different senses. In this paper I use mens rea in its common law sense, and discuss at the end a meaning of mens rea that is now becoming common.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Brett

In this paper I address a question that has not been a prominent feature of cases or articles which have concerned the issue of consent in relation to sexual offenses. Much work has been done by judges and legal theorists regarding the defendant’s beliefs about the consent of the complainant and the mental element or mens rea of this offense. But, any answers to these questions presuppose some answer to a prior question: What is consent? What must be true of a person who does consent? What must be missing, on the other hand, in a situation where sexual activity takes place without consent?Common sense provides a relatively simple answer to these questions: To consent is to give permission; a person acts without consent where no such permission has been obtained. It is this answer that I want to defend in this paper. This view assumes that talk of consent only makes sense in relation to some autonomy right. Giving consent involves autonomously making changes in a prevailing pattern of rights and obligations. It is a limited withdrawal of a right not to be interfered with; and it will make legally permissible actions that would otherwise be subject to criminal and civil penalties. To me it seems obvious that such a change in the prevailing pattern of rights and obligations can only take place where there is communication between the parties. This means that the question of consent is not just a question about the state of mind or attitude of the complainant. Rather, the matter which should be central to a court’s consideration of consent is the question of what was said or done that could be construed as granting permission to do the acts in question.


Author(s):  
Māris Leja ◽  

The article deals with the flaws of the Criminal Law in determination of the particular form of mental element (mens rea) which is required for the specific criminal offense. Taking into account that the majority of legal provisions does not contain such indications, one of the elements of criminal offense is not described by the law. Such legislator`s approach raises doubts about the compliance of the Criminal Law with the principle of legal certainty. The article also criticizes opinions expressed in legal theory that attempt to fill the gaps allowed by the legislator, as well as offers amendments to the Criminal Law aiming to improve its coherence.


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