The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Jaszczolt
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Attitude Reports

scholarly journals Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 465
Author(s):  
João Branquinho
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Cognitive Significance ◽  
De Re ◽  
General Conception ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Careful Assessment

This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain senselike entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many accounts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend tosupplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive significance of sentences containing indexical terms.

Walter Burley on Co-Signification in Opaque Contexts

2020 ◽  
pp. 221-247
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Bulthuis
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
Walter Burley

Foreshadowing in many ways theories of direct reference popular today, Walter Burley (died c. 1345) favors a theory of direct signification, according to which names directly signify things in the world. But he recognizes that opaque contexts, such as propositional attitude reports, represent a challenge to that theory. In response, Burley develops a sophisticated account of our noetic states, one according to which those states can be individuated more finely than in terms of their contents. Paired with a certain semantic analysis of propositional attitude reports, that account of our noetic states is ready-made to accommodate Burley’s commitment to direct signification even in the face of opacity considerations.

Propositional attitude statements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Semantic Function ◽  
False Conclusion ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Apparent Violation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Indiscernibility Of Identicals

Propositional attitude statements – statements about our beliefs, desires, hopes and fears – exhibit certain logical peculiarities. For example, in apparent violation of Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals, we cannot freely substitute expressions which designate the same object within such statements. According to Leibniz’s law, every instance of the following scheme is valid: - a = b - F(a) - Therefore, F(b) The validity of Leibniz’s law seems beyond question. It says, in effect, that if an object has a certain property, then anything identical to that object also has that property. Valid instances abound. But consider the following apparently invalid instance: - Hesperus is Phosphorus - Hammurabi believed that Hesperus often rose in the evening - Therefore, Hammurabi believed that ‘Phosphorus’ often rose in the evening. If we take ‘Hammurabi believed that…often rose in the evening’ to serve as the predicate F and ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to be a and b respectively, this argument appears to be an instance of Leibniz’s law. Yet (3) apparently fails to follow from (1) and (2). Hammurabi believed that Hesperus and Phosphorus were two heavenly bodies not one. And he believed that Hesperus did, but that Phosphorus did not rise in the evening. We have derived a false conclusion from true premises and an apparently valid law. If that law is really valid, then our argument had better not be a genuine instance of the law. The tempting conclusion, widely accepted, is that we were wrong to construe propositional attitude statements as simple predications. We should not, that is, construe ‘Hammurabi believed that…often rose in the evening’ to be just a long predicate with the semantic function of attributing some property to the object commonly denoted by ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. But then the question arises: if attitude reports are not simple predications, what are they? Philosophers have disagreed sharply in their answers. Moreover, their disagreements are intimately connected to a wide range of deep issues about the nature of meaning and reference.

scholarly journals Vivid attitudes: Centered situations in the semantics of 'remember' and 'imagine'

2015 ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Tamina Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Sensory Perception ◽  
Direct Perception ◽  
De Se ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Centered Worlds

This paper deals with a subset of uses of propositional attitude predicates such as 'remember' and 'imagine.' I argue that these have a distinct "vivid" reading, which requires direct witnessing or sensory perception similar to that required in direct perception reports. To account for this use, I introduce a notion of centered situations, combining situations in the sense of Kratzer (1989) with centered worlds in the sense of Lewis (1979) and others. I propose that, on their vivid uses, these predicates make reference to a (real or possible) centered situation. This makes it possible in particular to account for attitude reports that are simultaneously vivid and obligatorily 'de se.'

Frege's Detour

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Perry
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Indirect Discourse ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Sense And Reference ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Indirect Reference

I argue that Frege’s treatment of propositional attitudes in “On Sense and Reference” put the philosophy of language on a detour. His doctrine of “indirect reference” reflected and reinforced the view that beliefs, desires, etc. consist in having relations to propositions. According to this doctrine expressions in embedded sentences in indirect discourse and propositional attitude reports do refer as they do when unembedded, but instead refer to their ordinary senses, so sentences refer to Thoughts, Frege’s version of what are now callled general or qualitative propositions. Davidson call this move abandoning “semantic innocence” which is the view that such embedded sentences work as they usually do. I agree with Davidson, that semantic innocence should not be abandonned. I argue that such cognitive states have truth-conditions in virtue of their causal and informational roles, which can be encoded in a variety of ways for different purposes, and provide a better explanation of the considerations that drove Frege to abandon innocence. I trace the problems I see to Frege’s abandonment of the framework of his early work, the Begriffsschrift. I argue that by adding the levels of senses and Thoughts to his Begriffsschriftframework, and retaining “circumstances” as the referents of sentences containing singular terms, Frege could have avoided the doctrine of indirect reference, and philosophy could have taken a different path.

scholarly journals Vivid attitudes: Centered situations in the semantics of 'remember' and 'imagine'

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamina Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Sensory Perception ◽  
Direct Perception ◽  
De Se ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Centered Worlds

This paper deals with a subset of uses of propositional attitude predicates such as 'remember' and 'imagine.' I argue that these have a distinct "vivid" reading, which requires direct witnessing or sensory perception similar to that required in direct perception reports. To account for this use, I introduce a notion of centered situations, combining situations in the sense of Kratzer (1989) with centered worlds in the sense of Lewis (1979) and others. I propose that, on their vivid uses, these predicates make reference to a (real or possible) centered situation. This makes it possible in particular to account for attitude reports that are simultaneously vivid and obligatorily 'de se.'

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