Beyond Gridlock: How Global Governance Continues to Shape our World

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-253
Author(s):  
Klaus Dingwerth

Abstract In 2013, Thomas Hale, the late David Held and Kevin Young published Gridlock. Their book made sense of a widely shared perception. The edifice of global governance, this perception suggested, had begun to crumble under a range of pressures. The empirical evidence that lay beneath this perception was puzzling not only in a normative, but also in an analytical sense. It did not seem to match the demand for international institutions, which was the most central factor scholars pointed to when they had to explain the emergence, changes and effects of international institutions. The subtitle of Hale, Held and Young’s neatly summarised what was at stake. What had to be explained was ‘why global cooperation is failing when we need it most’. The three titles reviewed in this essay challenge this view. They suggest that many international organisations continue to do their everyday work (Dolowitz et al.), that many informal global governance institutions have been added (Roger), and that various forms of ‘ebb and flow’ have been a constant in global governance since 1850 (Grigorescu).

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Oates

AbstractScholars of international organisation commonly differentiate among three dimensions when studying the legitimacy of international institutions: input, throughput, and output legitimacy. I argue that the study of global governance needs to consider a fourth ‘face’ of legitimacy: constitutional legitimacy. This dimension addresses the normative and practical questions related to the constitutive justification for an institutional order – such as in whose name it is founded, whose interests it should serve, and how authority should be distributed within that institutional order. These questions are distinct from the procedural features of institutions emphasised by other dimensions and concern the constituent power that should ground the authority of governance institutions. In this article, I develop this fourth dimension of legitimacy, explore its varied expressions in world politics, and show how it has implications for the constitutional structure of global governance arrangements. I argue that different representations of constituent power shape the legitimacy of different authority relations within international institutions and illustrate these claims with an analysis of the politics of legitimacy in three cases: the ongoing effort to reform the UN Security Council, the negotiations over the founding of the International Criminal Court, and the debates over the Responsibility to Protect at the UN.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-23
Author(s):  
Marina Larionova ◽  
◽  
John Kirton ◽  

Assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on international institutions and international relations is essential for shaping global governance for the post COVID crisis world. The authors review the actions of the key international institutions in response to the pandemic undertaken in January-March 2020 reflecting on three questions. First, were the actions undertaken by the international institutions adequate, coordinated and timely? Second, could the outbreak have been contained if the global governance system was not in a state of severe strain, with many of the gaps exposed and reforms promised in the wake of the 2009 financial and economic crisis unfulfilled, its key causes unaddressed and unilateralism rising among its key members? In addition, was the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated by the crisis of multilateralism? Third, and most difficult, what is the future of global governance after the COVID-19 crisis ends? The analysis of international institutions performance three months into the crisis leads to authors to conclude that there have been inadequate actions to produce a timely, coordinated international response from all the major multilateral organizations and from the newer plurilateral summit institutions of the BRICS, G7 and G20. The failure of these global governance institutions was due not only to the severe strains from leading members’ unilateralism and competition, but from the very architecture designed in 1945 that now poorly matches intensely globalized world. Global governance in the post COVID world should not descend into the old war-prone balance of power, nor flow from a new Bretton Woods-San Francisco as in 1944–1945 but from an intensification and expansion of G20 governance that will generate and coordinate more comprehensive, stronger multilateral organizations for the benefit of all.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (Suppl 2) ◽  
pp. s89-s93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas F McInerney

IntroductionThis article analyses experience with the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in the context of global governance. It examines ways in which the WHO FCTC has been addressed by international institutions, particularly within the UN system at the international and national levels. It seeks to understand the extent to which the WHO FCTC as an international legal obligation has contributed to its integration in the strategies, policies and programmes of UN system organisations.MethodsThe article examines documentation reflecting global governance responses to tobacco control since the Convention’s entry into force in 2005. It also considers discussions with officials involved in the design and management of various UN initiatives. Finally, it draws on the findings of the Expert Group on the Impact Assessment of the WHO FCTC.ConclusionsThe influence of the WHO FCTC in global governance can be at least partially attributed to its status as an international legal obligation. While tobacco control would have likely been a priority in international public health even in the absence of the WHO FCTC, the importance of tobacco control has been relatively greater as a result of the treaty. In assessing the potential utility of any future global public health instrument, it is important to consider the need to mobilise action by other global governance institutions and ensure that the chosen instrument will be capable of stimulating such action.


Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

The authority–legitimation link states that international institutions exercising authority need to nurture the belief in their legitimacy. The authority–legitimation link points to fundamental challenges for the global governance system: with the rise of international authorities that are, at the same time, more intrusive, state consent is undermined and societies are affected directly. Consequently, legitimation problems arise, followed by processes of delegitimation, which then trigger responses by the challenged institutions. Using concepts of historical institutionalism, it is argued in this chapter that the authority–legitimation link produces reactive sequences either via the route of societal politicization or via counter-institutionalization by states. These reactive sequences may result in either a decline or a deepening of global governance depending on the responses of authority holders.


Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

Political and epistemic authorities in the global governance system often restrain the freedom of constituent members and therefore need to be justified with reference to the impartial pursuit of a shared social purpose. An international authority must therefore develop a convincing legitimation narrative and display a sense of impartiality to be seen as legitimate. The thrust of the argument in this chapter is that the legitimacy of the global governance system is structurally precarious. Two legitimation problems can be identified: a technocratic bias in the justification of authority and the lack of impartiality in the exercise of authority. International institutions often have authority, but lack sufficient legitimacy beliefs.


Author(s):  
Jonas Tallberg ◽  
Karin Bäckstrand ◽  
Jan Aart Scholte

Legitimacy is central for the capacity of global governance institutions to address problems such as climate change, trade protectionism, and human rights abuses. However, despite legitimacy’s importance for global governance, its workings remain poorly understood. That is the core concern of this volume, which engages with the overarching question: whether, why, how, and with what consequences global governance institutions gain, sustain, and lose legitimacy. This introductory chapter explains the rationale of the book, introduces its conceptual framework, reviews existing literature, and presents the key themes of the volume. It emphasizes in particular the volume’s sociological approach to legitimacy in global governance, its comparative scope, and its comprehensive treatment of the topic. Moreover, a specific effort is made to explain how each chapter moves beyond existing research in exploring the book’s three themes: (1) sources of legitimacy, (2) processes of legitimation and delegitimation, and (3) consequences of legitimacy.


Author(s):  
Gina Heathcote

Reflecting on recent gender law reform within international law, this book examines the nature of feminist interventions to consider what the next phase of feminist approaches to international law might include. To undertake analysis of existing gender law reform and future gender law reform, the book engages critical legal inquiries on international law on the foundations of international law. At the same time, the text looks beyond mainstream feminist accounts to consider the contributions, and tensions, across a broader range of feminist methodologies than has been adapted and incorporated into gender law reform including transnational and postcolonial feminisms. The text therefore develops dialogues across feminist approaches, beyond dominant Western liberal, radical, and cultural feminisms, to analyse the rise of expertise and the impact of fragmentation on global governance, to study sovereignty and international institutions, and to reflect on the construction of authority within international law. The book concludes that through feminist dialogues that incorporate intersectionality, and thus feminist dialogues with queer, crip, and race theories, that reflect on the politics of listening and which are actively attentive to the conditions of privilege from which dominant feminist approaches are articulated, opportunity for feminist dialogues to shape feminist futures on international law emerge. The book begins this process through analysis of the conditions in which the author speaks and the role histories of colonialism play out to define her own privilege, thus requiring attention to indigenous feminisms and, in the UK, the important interventions of Black British feminisms.


2021 ◽  
pp. 016224392199910
Author(s):  
Nina Frahm ◽  
Tess Doezema ◽  
Sebastian Pfotenhauer

Long presented as a universal policy-recipe for social prosperity and economic growth, the promise of innovation seems to be increasingly in question, giving way to a new vision of progress in which society is advanced as a central enabler of technoeconomic development. Frameworks such as “Responsible” or “Mission-oriented” Innovation, for example, have become commonplace parlance and practice in the governance of the innovation–society nexus. In this paper, we study the dynamics by which this “social fix” to technoscience has gained legitimacy in institutions of global governance by investigating recent projects at two international organizations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Commission, to mainstream “Responsible Innovation” frameworks and instruments across countries. Our analysis shows how the turn to societal participation in both organizations relies on a new deficit logic—a democratic deficit of innovation—that frames a lack of societal engagement in innovation governance as a major barrier to the uptake and dissemination of new technologies. These deficit politics enable global governance institutions to present “Responsible Innovation” frameworks as the solution and to claim authority over the coproduction of particular forms of democracy and innovation as intertwined pillars of a market-liberal international order.


Author(s):  
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni

AbstractMany observers worry that growing numbers of international institutions with overlapping functions undermine governance effectiveness via duplication, inconsistency and conflict. Such pessimistic assessments may undervalue the mechanisms available to states and other political agents to reduce conflictual overlap and enhance inter-institutional synergy. Drawing on historical data I examine how states can mitigate conflict within Global Governance Complexes (GGCs) by dissolving or merging existing institutions or by re-configuring their mandates. I further explore how “order in complexity” can emerge through bottom-up processes of adaptation in lieu of state-led reform. My analysis supports three theoretical claims: (1) states frequently refashion governance complexes “top-down” in order to reduce conflictual overlap; (2) “top-down” restructuring and “bottom-up” adaptation present alternative mechanisms for ordering relations among component institutions of GGCs; (3) these twin mechanisms ensure that GGCs tend to (re)produce elements of order over time–albeit often temporarily. Rather than evolving towards ever-greater fragmentation and disorder, complex governance systems thus tend to fluctuate between greater or lesser integration and (dis)order.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Aart Scholte ◽  
Soetkin Verhaegen ◽  
Jonas Tallberg

Abstract This article examines what contemporary elites think about global governance and what these attitudes might bode for the future of global institutions. Evidence comes from a unique survey conducted in 2017–19 across six elite sectors (business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, research) in six countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, the United States) and a global group. Bearing in mind some notable variation between countries, elite types, issue-areas and institutions, three main interconnected findings emerge. First, in principle, contemporary leaders in politics and society hold considerable readiness to pursue global-scale governance. Today's elites are not generally in a nationalist-protectionist-sovereigntist mood. Second, in practice, these elites on average hold medium-level confidence towards fourteen current global governance institutions. This evidence suggests that, while there is at present no legitimacy crisis of global governance among elites (as might encourage its decline), neither is there a legitimacy boom (as could spur its expansion). Third, if we probe what elites prioritize when they evaluate global governance, the surveyed leaders generally most underline democracy in the procedures of these bodies and effectiveness in their performance. This finding suggests that, to raise elites' future confidence in global governance, the institutions would do well to become more transparent in their operations and more impactful problem-solvers in their outcomes.


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