Reacting to the Decline of the West?

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Brice Didier

Abstract This article discusses the European Union (EU)’s strategic adaptation to the relative decline of the United States (US)-led Western world order by introducing the concept of hedging: a strategy of concomitant engagement with the system leader and its competitors aiming to minimise the risks of confrontation with either of them. To grasp the EU’s shift towards strategic hedging, the article analyses the subsequent 2003 Security Strategy, 2008 Implementation Report, 2015 Strategic Review and ongoing 2016 Global Strategy, and then puts the latter’s core concepts of ‘principled pragmatism’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ into perspective vis-à-vis international developments since 2016, related to ‘America First’ and the Sino-American rivalry. The article ultimately argues that, confronted with global power diffusion but constrained by the preponderance of transatlanticism, hedging has become a primary strategic option for the EU to emancipate from the US without alienating it and to compensate for the waning of the Western world order.

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-477
Author(s):  
Sascha Lohmann

Abstract The ideal of the European Union (EU) as a global peace and security actor is increasingly clashing with the reality of a multipolar world defined by militarised conflict, and a loosening of the formerly close trans-Atlantic relationship with the United States. European policy-makers have identified strategic autonomy as a possible remedy in the face of a growing number of internal and external security threats. This paper adds to the conceptualisation of strategic autonomy by contextualising its current usage and political genealogy. Empirically, European strategic autonomy is examined concerning the efforts to preserve the Iranian nuclear deal after the Trump administration had ceased US participation in May 2018. In particular, the paper assesses the European response to counter the re-imposed unilateral United States (US) sanctions against European individuals and entities by updating the so-called blocking regulation, and setting up a special purpose vehicle (spv) for facilitating trade with Iran. The results show that the European struggle toward achieving strategic autonomy has largely failed, but that it holds valuable lessons to approximate this ideal in the future.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Bryc

Russia attempts to revise a Western-led liberal world order. However, challenging the West seems to be a strategy aimed at improving Russia’s international standing. This strategy is undoubtedly ambiguous as Russia challenges the West, particularity the United States, and looks for a rapprochement at the same time.The Russian Federation abandoned the West in 2014 as a result of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula what constituted breaking international law, andengagement into the war in the East Ukraine. Nevertheless, the milestone was not 2014, but 2008 when Russia had decided for the first time to use its militar yforce against Georgia and indirectly against the growing Western military and political presence in this post-Soviet republic. This game changer was hardly a surprise, because several signals of a desire to challenge the Western-led world order had appeared in the past at least twice in president Putin’s speeches in 2007 at Munich Security Conference and in 2014 during Valdai Club session in Sochi. This article seeks to provide a take in the discussion about the way Russia has been trying to reshape the post-Cold War order. This paper probes the notion that Russia has become a revisionist state trying to shape a post-Western world order. Besides, there are a few questions to be answered, first of all whether anti-Westernism is in fact its goal or rather an instrument in regaining more effective impact on international politics and how it may influence the post-ColdWar order despite its reduced political and economic potential.


Author(s):  
Mario Esteban

Abstract Spanish elite’s perceptions of the European Union-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) are positive given its economic and normative prospects and its compatibility with Spain’s policy objectives. Spanish Ministry officials and business representatives welcome the potential progress on market access, level-playing field, and sustainable development, as it would offer economic opportunities in the Chinese market and bilateral investment, without precluding increased monitoring of Chinese economic activities. The agreement is in line with their willingness to increase bilateral ties under a normative framework that defends Spanish interests and values. Spanish elites consider that it is compliant with Spain’s and the European Union’s strategies and characterization of China as a partner, competitor, rival, which acknowledges that China is a key economic and multilateral partner, but also promotes a unified European China strategy, European strategic autonomy, and initiatives that tackle China’s challenges related with human rights, or investments in strategic sectors. Hence, Spanish political parties supported the resolution of the European Parliament freezing an eventual ratification of the CAI whilst Chinese sactions against European stakeholders are in place. Spanish elites also value that the agreement does not prevent greater cooperation with the United States, a key ally and more significant partner than China. Some political and private groups have expressed their opposition to the agreement, but their impact is likely to be limited. Finally, the practical implications—and reception—of the agreement will depend of its implementation.


Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht ◽  
Rhianna Hamilton

Responding to concerns about burden-sharing and aiming to improve internal defence cooperation, act more quickly and harness resource synergies, the European Union (EU) initiated the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017. PESCO, however, is controversial. On the one hand, the United States (US) wants greater burden-sharing by European allies whilst concerned about greater European military autarky that would undermine US influence over NATO, Europe/EU and EU member states. Onthe other hand, at least one European NATO ally wants to leverage PESCO precisely as an instrument to shore up European “strategic autonomy”. This tension over competing European defence futures leaves participation by third countries in limbo. Arguably, third-country participation would hinder greater European defence autarky. The article makes the case for the mutual benefits of third-country participation, focusing on Canada. Canada has a major stake in the outcome. NATO is Canada’s most important multilateral institution and Europe is Canada’s second-most important strategic partner, after the US. Canada’s unequivocal strategic interests in Europe have long informed its expeditionary priorities -- from the two world wars, when Canada coming to Europe’s defence long before the USproved existential for both parties, to nowadays. Since the 1970s, Canada and Europe have worked consistently together bilaterally beyond NATO to advance regional stability and mutual security interests. Canada’s and Europe’s defence futures are thus interdependent. Excluding third countries from participating in PESCO would have detrimental consequences for Canadian, European and transatlantic defence interests. In contrast, with third country participation, PESCO will be instrumental to effective transatlantic and transeuropean defence integration.


Author(s):  
Andrii Nykonenko ◽  
◽  
Larysa Kapinus ◽  

The development of the information society in Western world contributes to the introduction of e-systems in the field of public procurement. As a result, the level of corruption in this area decreases and the efficiency of tenders increases. The objectives of the article are to study the best practices of using e-systems in tender procedures in Western countries and to search for ways to improve the domestic system of electronic public procurement. The stages of the e-tender procedure in the field of public procurement are presented. A message about the planned tender is distributed on a special electronic resource. It also contains detailed information about the terms of these trades. On a special electronic resource, there should be tools for posting proposals of bidders and their subsequent automatic evaluation. The mentioned resource should provide opportunities for the execution of the contract and individual financial transactions in the field of public procurement. The types of e-tenders in the European Union are considered. The level of development of the organization of e-tenders in separate countries of the European Union is analyzed. The countries with high and low levels of use of e-systems in the field of public procurement are highlighted. The organization of electronic tenders in Lithuania and Norway was considered. The practice of using e-systems in the field of public procurement in the United States has been studied in detail. In particular, the procedure for collecting, storing and disseminating data on public procurement was considered. The US Federal Procurement Data System stores and provides information on public procurement for the past forty years. This allows for effective state and public control in this area. The organization of electronic trading in Ukraine is analyzed. Its weaknesses and recent measures to overcome them are considered. The main directions for improving the organization of electronic public procurement in Ukraine have been determined. This is the introduction of a central information system for public procurement, innovative partnerships and electronic ordering.


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