The Justification of Associative Duties

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have these relationships, if we do not recognise associative duties, before concluding that we should therefore recognise associative duties. I then introduce a nonteleological alternative, grounded in the Appropriate Response approach to ethical theory.

2021 ◽  
pp. 107-124
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

Contrary to Schopenhauer’s claim that positive feelings consist simply in the cessation of negative feelings, it is contended that positive feelings are feelings just like negative feelings. But there is a bias or asymmetry in favour of the negative to the effect that negative feelings can in general have a greater intensity: pain can be more intense than pleasure, depression than elation, etc. This is because negative feelings often signal losses that are irreversible, and that by themselves guarantee reductions of well-being, whereas this is not true of the improvements signalled by positive feelings. Due to this asymmetry, compassion can be stronger than sympathetic joy and, as these emotions provide moral reasons, this explains why, intuitively, it seems morally more urgent to prevent what is bad than to produce what is good as, e.g. negative utilitarianism maintains.


Author(s):  
Roger Crisp

This chapter concerns the relation between prudential (“self-regarding” or “self-interested”) reasons and moral reasons. It begins with definitions of these types of reasons, arguing that moral reasons be understood as those described in ineliminably moral terminology, before moving on to central current views on reasons, well-being, and what makes actions right or wrong. Forms of egoism are distinguished and some objections to normative egoism answered. Views egoists might take on morality are then discussed, including that of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic. The following section covers impartial views, including the extreme form found in utilitarianism. The chapter then outlines the range of “dualistic” positions available, in which reasons are grounded both in the good of the agent and in morality. It concludes with discussion of some recent work on the relation of prudential and moral reasons.


Labyrinth ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Dimka Gicheva-Gocheva

The approach of this paper is a retrospective one. It is an attempt to show that many important ideas of Herodotus, a great ancestor of Aristotle, have influenced his practical philosophy. The paper focuses specially on several topics from the Histories of Herodotus, which have found a resonance in the Nicomachean ethics and in the Politics of Aristotle. The main ones in respect of the ethical theory are: the different forms of justice and the just as for example the super-human justice, the just in the family relations, the judicial just and the just in the polis or the larger human community. Book Epsilon of the Nicomachean Ethics is indebted to Herodotus in several points. In respect of Aristotles' political theory, there are two topics in the History of Herodotus which deserve a special interest: firstly, the conversation of the three noble Persians, who discuss the six basic types of political order and organization of power-and-submission in a state or city-state (in book ІІІ, 80-82); this becomes a paradigm for the next typologies of Plato (in the Republic and the Statesman) and Aristotle (in the Politics); secondly, the importance of personal freedom, the equity of the speaking (discussing?) men on the agora, and the supremacy of law for the well-being of any community and its peaceful future. The legacy of Herodotus is obvious in many anthropological and ethical concepts of Aristotle, especially in his most read and quoted ethical writing and in his Politics


2021 ◽  
pp. 31-66
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

In On What Matters Derek Parfit adopts Henry Sidgwick’s idea of a duality of practical reason consisting in there being personal reasons to care about our own well-being as well as moral reasons to care about everyone else’s well-being. But this sits ill with his well-known claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity is not what matters. For this implies that were we to divide into two individuals, we would have the same reasons to care about these individuals as ourselves, though they are distinct from us. It is suggested that this is because we empathize with them in the same way as with ourselves in the future, ‘from the inside’, and that considerations of justice do not apply to them because their wills are too dependent on our wills.


Author(s):  
Thomas Giourgas

Is Socrates in the Protagoras a sincere hedonist? The decipherment of the latter question is fundamental to the unraveling of key aspects of Plato’s ethical thought. It has been suggested that Socrates in the Protagoras finds hedonism philosophically attractive for it functions as a necessary anti-akrasia premise and, therefore, it fits his moral psychology. At the same time quantitative hedonism provides for commensurability of moral value and, in turn, for a more straightforward, quantifiable, and action-guiding Platonic ethical theory. Although initially appealing, the latter hypothesis is deeply problematic. On the one hand, hedonism is not a necessary theoretical tool either for commensurability of value or for a quantifiable eudemonistic ethical theory. On the other hand a hedonistic interpretation of the Protagoras would result in a plethora of blatant anomalies for Platonic ethical theory as it is exhibited in the early and middle period dialogues. In particular, the endorsement of quantitative hedonism comes tied with an apotheosis of sophistic education and also with a purely instrumental conception of virtue which contradicts cardinal components of Socrates’ and Plato’s virtue theory. Therefore, a prohedonistic approach of the Protagoras is untenable and has to be rejected. As a result, a sufficiently plausible defense of the Socratic doctrine “no one does wrong willingly” needs to be constructed on non-hedonistic grounds. My suggestion is that we should recast Plato’s treatment of akrasia in terms of two –commonly defended by early Plato- descriptive theses of human psychology; that is, psychological eudemonism and motivational intellectualism. This move will lead us to the conclusion that the traditional conceptualization of akrasia as a single and unified phenomenon is incomplete as it does not pay justice to the richness of Plato’s moral psychology. Rather, as I will maintain, there are two types of akrasia implicit in Plato’s treatment of the phenomenon: synchronic akrasia and diachronic akrasia. On this revisionary theoretical basis, the differences between early Plato and later Plato on akrasia can be understood as variations in the adherence or not to psychological eudemonism and motivational intellectualism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Dietz

There is a growing dissatisfaction with using standard measures of affluence, such as gross domestic product, as the sole conceptualization of human well-being. Experiments are underway with alternative metrics of well-being as ways of informing both research and policy. It is thus important to develop a theory of the production of human well-being to parallel theories of economic development and growth. The traditions of work in growth theory, sustainability theory, and household production functions provide the basis for an emerging structural human ecology of human well-being. Structural human ecology emphasizes the use of manufactured, natural, and human resources in producing well-being but is also attentive to the ways social structure shapes the production of well-being. While this approach is promising, several conceptual issues need to be addressed for it to realize its potential. In particular, we need greater clarity regarding measures of well-being and the ethical theory that underpins them and clearer thinking about the relationship between resources and capital.


2000 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Lindsay ◽  
Helen Graham

Decisions based on ethics confront nurses daily. In this account, a cardiac nurse struggles with the challenge of securing health care benefits for Justin, a patient within the American system of health care. An exercise therapy that is important for his well-being is denied. The patient’s nurse and an interested insurance agent develop a working relationship, resulting in a relational narrative based on Justin’s care. Gadow’s concept of a relational narrative and Keller’s concept of a relational autonomy guide this particular case. As an ethics framework influenced by feminist ethical theory, Gadow’s, Keller’s and Tisdale’s ideas demonstrate the fluidity with which the nurse and others can work while maintaining both autonomy and engagement without being self-sacrificing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-409
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Ward ◽  

In his ethical writings, Duns Scotus emphasized both divine freedom and natural goodness, and these seem to conflict with each other in various ways. I offer an interpretation of Scotus which takes seriously these twin emphases and shows how they cohere. I argue that, for Scotus, all natural laws obtain just by the natures of actual things. Divine commands, such as the Ten Commandments, contingently track natural laws but do not make natural laws to be natural laws. I present textual evidence for this claim. I also show how this view of Scotus on the natural law is consistent with a number of troubling passages. Scotus’s ethical theory implies that there are genuinely moral reasons for acting which are not absolutely binding (because subject to a divine command or permission otherwise) and also some moral reasons for acting which are absolutely binding (because not thus subject).


Utilitas ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 218-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGH TONER
Keyword(s):  

Aristotle's ethical theory is often seen as instructing agents in the prudent pursuit of their own well-being, and therefore labeled egoistic. Yet it is also subject to the opposing charge of failing to direct agents to their well-being, directing them instead to perfection. I am here concerned chiefly with the second criticism, and proceed as follows: I first articulate Sumner's version of the criticism, and second assess his argument for his own (subjective) account of well-being. Third, I present reasons motivating a more objective account of well-being, reasons for taking another look at Aristotle. Finally, granting that Aristotle does indeed direct agents to pursue their perfection, I argue that perfection includes well-being within it. This shows how Aristotle escapes the second criticism, while at the same time pointing the way toward a defense against the first.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
Eric Baldwin

Arthur Danto argues that all Eastern philosophies—except Confucianism—fail to accept necessary conditions on genuine morality: a robust notion of agency and that actions are praiseworthy only if performed voluntarily, in accordance with rules, and from motives based on the moral worth and well-being of others. But Danto's arguments fail: Neo-Taoism and Mohism satisfy these allegedly necessary constraints and Taoism and Buddhism both posit moral reasons that fall outside the scope of Danto's allegedly necessary conditions on genuine morality. Thus, our initial reaction, that these eastern philosophies offer genuine moral reasons for action, is sustained rather than overturned.


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