scholarly journals Précis of Unbelievable Errors

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 687-696
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer

In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgments, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory.

2017 ◽  
Vol 922 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.A. Shekhovtsov ◽  
R.P. Shekhovtsova ◽  
D.P. Ivenin ◽  
O.V. Raskatkina

The article contains the method of discrete scanning points in the vertical plane of the columns and roof trusses for the simultaneous determination of vertical columns, the distance between them in flight at their tip and deflection farms with one point standing and only one performer. The technique is based on the use of reflectorless electronic tachymeter and its SDh key. Experimental research of methods on the elements of building structures NNGASU educational housing using electronic tachymeter SET530R. Results of the experiments were monitored by a coordinate and photographic methods, as well as with the developed at the chair of Engineering Geodesy laser-mirroring device designed to measure inaccessible or hard to reach distances. Analysis methods of error theory position and the results of its comparison with other methods have shown that it provides the required accuracy, easy to perform, does not require the output of the observer on the crane path or lift to the towers, free from the multiple engagement of the bridge crane and can be successfully applied on practice.


Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew

Pettigrew focuses on trade-off objections to epistemic consequentialism. Such objections are similar to familiar objections from ethics where an intuitively wrong action (e.g., killing a healthy patient) leads to a net gain in value (e.g., saving five other patients). The objection to the epistemic consequentialist concerns cases where adopting an intuitively wrong belief leads to a net gain in epistemic value. Pettigrew defends the epistemic consequentialist against such objections by accepting that the unintuitive verdicts of consequentialism are unintuitive, but offering an error theory for why these intuitions do not show the view to be false.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989606
Author(s):  
Štěpán Bahník ◽  
Emir Efendic ◽  
Marek A. Vranka

When asked whether to sacrifice oneself or another person to save others, one might think that people would consider sacrificing themselves rather than someone else as the right and appropriate course of action—thus showing an other-serving bias. So far however, most studies found instances of a self-serving bias—people say they would rather sacrifice others. In three experiments using trolley-like dilemmas, we tested whether an other-serving bias might appear as a function of judgment type. That is, participants were asked to make a prescriptive judgment (whether the described action should or should not be done) or a normative judgment (whether the action is right or wrong). We found that participants exhibited an other-serving bias only when asked whether self- or other-sacrifice is wrong. That is, when the judgment was normative and in a negative frame (in contrast to the positive frame asking whether the sacrifice is right). Otherwise, participants tended to exhibit a self-serving bias; that is, they approved sacrificing others more. The results underscore the importance of question wording and suggest that some effects on moral judgment might depend on the type of judgment.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 743-754
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  

I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.


1984 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-171
Author(s):  
D. Peterson
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. A364
Author(s):  
P Hanly ◽  
R Maguire ◽  
M Balfe ◽  
L Sharp

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-629
Author(s):  
Maura Tumulty

Some theories of language, thought, and experience require their adherents to say unpalatable things about human individuals whose capacities for rational activity are seriously diminished. Donald Davidson, for example, takes the interdependence of the concepts of thought and language to entail that thoughts may only be attributed to an individual who is an interpreter of others’ speech. And John McDowell's account of human experience as the involuntary exercise of conceptual capacities can be applied easily only to individuals who make some reasonable judgments, because conceptual capacities are paradigmatically exercised in judgments. In both cases, we seem forced towards an error theory about any ordinary understanding of impaired human individuals as minded, or as undergoing human experience.


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