Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics and Responsibility, written by Randolph Clarke

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-99
Author(s):  
Tyron Goldschmidt
Keyword(s):  
Randolph Clarke

Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, by Randolph Clarke.

Mind ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 124 (496) ◽  
pp. 1264-1268
Author(s):  
Kenneth Silver
Keyword(s):  
Randolph Clarke

scholarly journals Randolph Clarke: Omissions: Responsibility, Agency, and Metaphysics

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-118
Author(s):  
Samuel Murray ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Randolph Clarke

scholarly journals Replies to Randolph Clarke, John Bishop, and Helen Beebee

2014 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Steward
Keyword(s):  
Randolph Clarke

Responsibility and Omissions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Martin Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Mark Ravizza ◽  
Randolph Clarke

Mark Ravizza and John Martin Fischer have previously offered an account of moral responsibility for omissions. On this account, the conditions for such responsibility are parallel in an important way to the conditions for moral responsibility for actions: that is, neither responsibility for actions nor responsibility for omissions requires access to alternative possibilities. This helps in the semicompatibilist project (i.e., to show that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism). This chapter seeks to address some salient critiques of the account proposed by Ravizza and Fischer, especially in recent work by Randolph Clarke, Carolina Sartorio, and Philip Swenson.

scholarly journals Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Disputatio ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (61) ◽  
pp. 143-158
Author(s):  
Soo Lam Wong
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Randolph Clarke

Abstract My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

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