scholarly journals Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

Jonas Olson writes that “a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity”. I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. In this symposium contribution, I first argue that Olson should say that reasons for belief are irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then explain why I think Olson's objections to this argument fail. I end by showing that Olson cannot defend his view as a partly revisionary alternative to an error theory about all irreducible normativity.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-218
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
Argument From Analogy ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Categorical Reasons

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

scholarly journals Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
External World Skepticism

In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one knows that they do not know everything. And it could not be the case that we do not know that there is thought when we believe that there is thought and that we do not know that we do not know everything. I address several objections to the claim that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief. It might seem that arguing against the error theory on the grounds that it entails that no one knows anything is just providing a Moorean argument against the moral error theory. I show that even if my argument against the error theory is indeed a Moorean one, it avoids Streumer's, McPherson's and Olson's objections to previous Moorean arguments against the error theory and is a more powerful argument against the error theory than Moore's argument against external world skepticism is against external world skepticism.

scholarly journals Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Wouter Floris Kalf
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

V-Moral Error Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hallvard Lillehammer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

scholarly journals Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-418
Author(s):  
Daan Evers
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

The Analogy

2019 ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Argument From Analogy

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

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