Shame, Guilt and Morality

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Teroni ◽  
Otto Bruun
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Moral Relevance ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Narrow Focus ◽  
The Social ◽  
Shame And Guilt

AbstractThe connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame and the Social Argument to shame's link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion that they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt have obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives.

Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Phenomenal States

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.

Social ethology of the wolverine

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey P. Copeland ◽  
Arild Landa ◽  
Kimberly Heinemeyer ◽  
Keith B. Aubry ◽  
Jiska van Dijk ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Organization ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Resource Availability ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Social System ◽  
Group Living ◽  
Field Studies ◽  
Ecological Framework ◽  
The Social ◽  
Living Species

Social behaviour in solitary carnivores has long been an active area of investigation but for many species remains largely founded in conjecture compared to our understanding of sociality in group-living species. The social organization of the wolverine has, until now, received little attention beyond its portrayal as a typical mustelid social system. In this chapter the authors compile observations of social interactions from multiple wolverine field studies, which are integrated into an ecological framework. An ethological model for the wolverine is proposed that reveals an intricate social organization, which is driven by variable resource availability within extremely large territories and supports social behaviour that underpins offspring development.

Social Evolution, Hamilton’s Rule, and Inclusive Fitness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Inclusive Fitness ◽  
Popular Approach ◽  
Hamilton’S Rule ◽  
Inclusive Fitness Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Encounters ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Hamilton's Rule

Inclusive fitness theory, originally due to W. D. Hamilton, is a popular approach to the study of social evolution, but shrouded in controversy. The theory contains two distinct aspects: Hamilton’s rule (rB > C); and the idea that individuals will behave as if trying to maximize their inclusive fitness in social encounters. These two aspects of the theory are logically separable but often run together. A generalized version of Hamilton’s rule can be formulated that is always true, though whether it is causally meaningful is debatable. However, the individual maximization claim only holds true if the payoffs from the social encounter are additive. The notion that inclusive fitness is the ‘goal’ of individuals’ social behaviour is less robust than some of its advocates acknowledge.

scholarly journals Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian List
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Intelligent Systems ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Legal Personhood ◽  
The Social ◽  
Intentional Agents ◽  
Regulatory Challenges

AbstractThe aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.

L'identité Wallonne saisie par l'enquête : Une approche constructiviste de l'identité collective

Res Publica ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 343-359
Author(s):  
Marc Jacquemain ◽  
René Doutrelepont ◽  
Michel Vandekeere
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
Survey Research ◽  
Social Identity Theory ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Social Identities ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Social Level

At first view, the methodology of survey research may seem rather unsuitable to the study of such "holistic" phenomena as collective and social identities.  That difficulty vanishes - at least partly - as soon as we consider social identity as the link between the individual and his belongings, as does the "social identity theory", developed from the work of Taffel and Turner.  From there on, survey research may prove to be a useful device to cope with some main characteristics of social identity: mainly its variability among groups and classes within a same society and its particular sensitivity to socio-political contexts.  Survey research, combined with the social identity theory may help to test historical assumptions at a macro-social level. It may also give some ''flesh" and some additional realism to the micro-theories of social behaviour, which are too often limited by their conception of a strictly rational and interested agent.

scholarly journals Regulating Genome Editing: For an Enlightened Democratic Governance

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
GIULIA CAVALIERE ◽  
KATRIEN DEVOLDER ◽  
ALBERTO GIUBILINI
Keyword(s):  
Genome Editing ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
Democratic Governance ◽  
Theoretical Level ◽  
Ethical Pluralism ◽  
The Face

Abstract:How should we regulate genome editing in the face of persistent substantive disagreement about the moral status of this technology and its applications? In this paper, we aim to contribute to resolving this question. We first present two diametrically opposed possible approaches to the regulation of genome editing. A first approach, which we refer to as “elitist,” is inspired by Joshua Greene’s work in moral psychology. It aims to derive at an abstract theoretical level what preferences people would have if they were committed to implementing public policies regulating genome editing in a context of ethical pluralism. The second approach, which we refer to as the democratic approach, defended by Francoise Baylis and Sheila Jasanoff et al., emphasizes the importance of including the public’s expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. After pointing out a serious shortcoming with each of these approaches, we propose our own favored approach—the “enlightened democracy” approach—which attempts to combine the strengths of the elitist and democratic approaches while avoiding their weaknesses.

scholarly journals The Experimental Psychology of Moral Enhancement: We Should If We Could, But We Can't

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 313-328
Author(s):  
Sylvia Terbeck ◽  
Kathryn B. Francis
Keyword(s):  
Side Effects ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Psychological Assessment ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Human Enhancement ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Problems And Solutions ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
Experimental Findings

AbstractIn this chapter we will review experimental evidence related to pharmacological moral enhancement. Firstly, we will present our recent study in which we found that a drug called propranolol could change moral judgements. Further research, which also investigated this, found similar results. Secondly, we will discuss the limitations of such approaches, when it comes to the idea of general “human enhancement”. Whilst promising effects on certain moral concepts might be beneficial to the development of theoretical moral psychology, enhancement of human moral behaviour in general – to our current understanding – has more side-effects than intended effects, making it potentially harmful. We give an overview of misconceptions when taking experimental findings beyond the laboratory and discuss the problems and solutions associated with the psychological assessment of moral behaviour. Indeed, how is morality “measured” in psychology, and are those measures reliable?

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