Unstable Autonomy: Conscience and Judgment in Kant's Moral Philosophy

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Limited Role ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn this paper I argue that Kant's claims about conscience in his moral writings of the 1790s reveal a fundamental instability in his moral philosophy. The central issue is the relationship between the moral law as the form of universality and the judgment of individuals about specific cases. Against Thomas Hill's claim that Kant has only a limited role for conscience, I argue that conscience has a comprehensive role in Kantian deliberation. I unpack the claims about conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals to show that they describe conscience as both a basic act of self-consciousness and as an all-things-considered judgment. I outline the role of conscience in moral motivation, and argue that taken together Kant's writings about conscience reveal a way to rethink Kant's conception of the Fact of Reason.

scholarly journals The 'spirit' and the 'letter' of the moral law: Text and commentary in the hermeneutics of German idealism, I

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-157
Author(s):  
Vladimir Milisavljevic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Historical Origins

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on different aspects of the hermeneutical problem in post-Kantian philosophical 'constellation'. In this domain, the problem of the relationship between the text and its commentary is theorized in terms of the antithesis between 'Spirit' and 'Letter', which clearly has religious roots. Therefore, the first part of the paper examines the historical origins of this antithesis, as well as its application in philosophical discussions which developed by the end of the 18th century about the problem of finding the 'true' interpretation to Kant's philosophy. The second part of the text, which is to be published in the next issue of this review, brings the duality of spiritual and literal interpretation into closer connection with the topics of Kant's moral philosophy.

Kant's Justification of Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen Ware
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Critical Methodology ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Historical Contextualization ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Moral Normativity ◽  
Moral Requirements

Kant’s arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, leaving Kant’s project of justification exposed to conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this major re-reading of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant’s mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law’s primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant’s arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant’s critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today.

Moral education

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John White
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Natural Process ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
History Of

This entry looks at three contemporary approaches to moral learning and education, all of which have roots in the history of philosophy. The first holds that just as children grow, or develop, in a physical sense, so they also develop in their moral dispositions or judgments. A central issue here is whether the concept of development is applicable outside its biological home. The second sees moral learning not as a natural process, but as a deliberate induction into socially approved norms or values. On one version of this view, it is not enough to bring children to follow the rules enshrined in conventional moral codes as they need to learn to sift these in the light of higher-order rational principles. Problems arise here both about moral motivation and about whether morality is wholly to do with rules and principles. For other theorists moral education is more a matter of shaping children’s nature-given desires and emotions into settled dispositions or virtues on Aristotelian lines. While the ‘rational principle’ view focuses on the morally autonomous individual, this view has its roots in communal moral traditions. Despite Plato’s belief that only knowledge is teachable, and therefore that it is doubtful whether moral goodness can be taught at all, the third view of moral learning maintains that it must include the acquisition of relevant knowledge and understanding, and cover the formation of dispositions. All this bears on how moral education should feature in schools – on the role of school ethos, learning by example, and the contribution of the whole curriculum.

scholarly journals Reflexões sobre o lugar de uma Psicologia da Religião

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-204
Author(s):  
Jorge Ponciano RIBEIRO
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Psychology Of Religion ◽  
Human Existence ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Special Position ◽  
Connection With Nature ◽  
The Relationship

The present work studies the Psychology of Religion as a theme to be understood from the concept of totality. It discusses the issue of the nature of religion, psychology and the relationship between both. It approaches the human conflicts from their connection with nature, and, above all, with God. As a possible path of a creative and healthy adjustment, faith fills a special position establishing the relationship between psychology, religion and the human person. The nature of the soul and the psychological struggles bring up a central issue: what is the role of the Religion Psychologist facing the human angst caused by guilt, by the loss of meaning of God in the human existence or up to what theoretical point does the Psychology of Religion oppose the clinical practice where the silent presence of the hallowed in human conflicts become apparent while being ignored at the exercise of our profession.

Geography and ethics II

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (6) ◽  
pp. 830-838 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Political Emotions ◽  
Emotional Geographies ◽  
Geographical Perspective ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
The Relationship

In this second report, I consider the relationship between emotion and morality from a geographical perspective. Though traditional and contemporary engagements in moral philosophy and psychology offer a diverse range of theories and approaches to emotions and morality, few of these explicitly consider or incorporate the role of space. I consider theories of embodiment and relationality as one means through which emotions become collective and institutionalized, with a focus on emotional geographies and care. I conclude by reflecting on political emotions as conflictive but insightful signals of societal shifts in our moral emotions, and suggest that incorporating emotions may also provide a different way of thinking about the problem of distant care.

A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Stark
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Optional Extra

AbstractInspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian moral outlooks: namely, is feeling the correct emotions necessary to virtue or is it an optional extra, which is permitted but not required. I argue that there are good reasons for siding with the Aristotelians: virtuous agents must experience the emotions appropriate to their situations. Moral virtue requires a change of heart.

Le azioni compiute sotto costrizione, le azioni “misteˮ e la nozione di volontarieta

Elenchos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-188
Author(s):  
Francesco Aronadio
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ancient Texts

Abstract The interpretation of Eth. Nic. C 1, and particularly of the notion of ``voluntariness'' and ``involuntariness'' is often distorted by the inappropriate overlap of questions deriving from modern moral philosophy. Firstly, this paper presents the scholarly debate on the topics frequently connected with the Aristotelian concepts of ἑκούσιον/ἀκούσιον (determinism/indeterminism, mixed acts and dirty hands theory, mixed acts vs. instrumental acts, role of circumstances, etc.). The next step is the analysis of the relevant passages of Eth. Nic. through a close examination of the relationship between the notions of ``choice'' and ``voluntariness'': what is crucial for the voluntariness of an action is the individuation of the efficient cause. On this basis it is possible to clarify the role and the significance of mixed acts and of other kinds of actions described by Aristotle. Finally, the topics previously displayed are re-examined in order to shed some light on the distortions arising from the adoption of inadequate lens in interpreting ancient texts.

scholarly journals The Role of Reasons and Sentiments in Tugendhat’s Moral Philosophy

2008 ◽  
Vol 40 (119) ◽  
pp. 29-43
Author(s):  
Adriano Naves de Brito
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral System ◽  
The Relationship

In this paper I discuss Tugendhat’s moral philosophy by focusing on his conception of moral justification and the role sentiments play in it. In order to understand, and to criticize, the relationship between reasons and sentiments in Tugendhat’s moral philosophy, the correlation between judgment and affection is scrutinized. Furthermore, I argue that as far as the innermost structure of morality is concerned individuals have far less autonomy to accept or reject any moral system than Tugendhat is prepared to admit.

Mental Faculties, the Moral Law, and Human Motivation

2021 ◽  
pp. 38-60
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
General Introduction ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
Practical Principle ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

This chapter addresses the following topics pertaining to Section II of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals: 1. Kant’s conception of the faculty of desire and its relation to the faculties of feeling and cognition; 2. The significance of Kant’s distinction between will and choice in relation to human freedom of the will; 3. The distinction between maxims and imperatives as two fundamental types of practical principle; and 4. Kant’s conception of both nonmoral and moral motivation—the latter fundamental for understanding Kant’s theory of virtue. The chapter establishes Kant’s background ideas on these ideas and faculties and also addresses aspects of his theory of action.

Die 2de en 3de gebruik van die sedewet?

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacobus De Wit de Koning
Keyword(s):  
New Testament ◽  
Persian Period ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
New Developments ◽  
The New Testament ◽  
The Law ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In this article, it is indicated that the Protestant teaching of the so-called second and third use of the moral law is not confirmed by Romans 3:31’s statement: “Do we then overthrow the law by this faith? By no means! On the contrary, we uphold the law.” After looking at developments concerning the study of the role of the Torah that indicated a descriptive view rather than a prescriptive view thereof in Israel’s history, until a change to a more prescriptive view during the Persian period and thereafter, the relationship of faith and Torah in the Canonical Pentateuch came under scrutiny. Following this, new developments regarding Paul and the law were considered. Paul’s statement in Romans 3:31 was then examined in the context of Romans 2–4. After establishing the fact that this verse cannot be used to confirm the ongoing relevance of the law for the New Testament Christian concerning the knowledge of sin and rule for Christian living, it was tested against Galatians 3:12, which seems to contradict the findings on Romans 3:31. It was concluded that Paul indeed indicates that the truth of justification through faith is confirmed by the Torah itself and therefore the so-called second and third use of the moral law cannot be confirmed by Romans 3:31. Some implications of this conclusion are finally highlighted.

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