scholarly journals The Gender Promotion Gap: Evidence from Central Banking

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Laura Hospido ◽  
Luc Laeven ◽  
Ana Lamo
Keyword(s):  
Gender Differences ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Gender Wage Gap ◽  
Wage Gap ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Career Progression ◽  
European Central ◽  
Public Commitment ◽  
Using Data

We examine gender differences in career progression and promotions using personnel data from the European Central Bank (ECB) during the period 2003-2017. A gender wage gap emerges within a few years of hiring, despite broadly similar entry conditions. We also find a gender promotion gap prior to 2010 when the ECB issued a public commitment to diversity. Following this change, the promotion gap disappears. Using data on promotion applications, we find that there is a gender application bias, partly driven by preferences for competition. Following promotion, women perform better in terms of salary progression.

The European Central Bank

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Defining Moment ◽  
European Central ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
History Of

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only central bank governed by supranational constitutional law. As such, it is not only the most important institution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also marks a new stage in the history of central banking in general. Historically, the tasks and functions of the ECB have reflected the different stages of development of the EMU. The basic principles governing its function were set out in Maastricht, reflecting the interests and ideas about Europe’s economic constitution prevailing at that time. The sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in 2010 was the second defining moment for the ECB after Maastricht. It posited the ECB–like the rest of the EMU–to challenges that some of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had not fully anticipated. These new challenges led to the adoption of novel instruments and the further clarification of fundamental rules and principles. Most important of these developments was the entrustment of the ECB with a new task, banking supervision, and the adoption of unconventional measures, which proved necessary to fulfil its monetary-policy mandate. Ultimately, not only did the ECB withstand the crisis but it emerged as a protagonist in securing the unity and integrity of the EMU.

Central banking and financial political power: An investigation into the European Central Bank

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manolis Kalaitzake
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
European Central ◽  
Revolving Doors

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a major scholarly revival of the topic of financial political power and a refocus on questions concerning democracy, elites, and inequality. Nevertheless, there remains a dearth in the literature regarding the precise nature of the political relationship between the financial sector and central banks. This is problematic given the sharp rise in institutional prominence enjoyed by central bank officials in the post crisis era and their fundamental importance in the governance of financial markets. As a corrective, this paper develops a provisional analytical framework through which the power dynamics between the financial sector and central banks can be fruitfully explored, specifically with reference to the European Central Bank. It does so by identifying four mechanisms through which financial actors potentially influence the policy choices of the European Central Bank – revolving doors, closed policy circles, capital flight/disinvestment, Too Big to Fail – and illustrates their operation empirically in the context of the bank’s organizational functioning and post crisis interventions. The paper illustrates how financial actors enjoy systematic advantages in the domain of central bank policymaking and provides significant evidence that the European Central Bank has been a key ally of the financial sector throughout the Eurozone crisis. The paper calls for a more extensive examination by scholars of the financial sector-central bank relationship as a means to clarify the precise scope of, and limitations to, contemporary financial political power.

The ECB’s quantitative easing programme as a constitutional game changer

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-107
Author(s):  
Klaus Tuori
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Central

The European Central Bank started its quantitative easing programme in 2015 in order to support euro area financial conditions and ultimately increase inflation. The controversial Public Sector Purchase programme has resulted in central bank purchases of government bonds in the magnitude of €2.1 trillion and the Eurosystem (the European Central Bank and the national central banks) become the largest creditor to the euro area Member States. The constitutional framework of the European Central Bank did foresee such a programme, which also makes it potentially problematic for the European Central Bank’s accountability. The underlying source for constitutional concerns is the European Central Bank’s exceptional independence, which could be justified with a narrow central banking model, but becomes problematic when the European Central Bank’s influence on the society becomes more multifaceted, which blurs the borderlines between monetary policy and other economic policies. The specific constitutional concerns related to the Public Sector Purchase programme and accountability are highlighted by three claims: (a) With the Public Sector Purchase programme, the European Central Bank takes deeper inroads to the society than with traditional monetary policy; (b) Through the Public Sector Purchase programme, the European Central Bank became the largest creditor to Member States it was not allowed to finance; and (c) The Public Sector Purchase programme can lead to conflicts between the price stability objective and financial stability.

scholarly journals Central Banking and the Crisis. A Comparison of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank Measures, and the ECB’s Changing Role in the EU Economic Governance System

OASIS ◽  
2016 ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Marcin Roman Czubala ◽  
Mónica Puente Regidor
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Eu

The European Central Bank (ECB) has received a lot of criticism for its too little, too late performance to ease market pressures during the economic crisis. At the same time, the ECB and the Federal Reserve (FED) have managed the new economic realities that have emerged in the international context differently. Despite the criticisms, the European Central Bank is the European Union institution that has assumed more control due to the new model of economic governance of the EU. Why did the Federal Reserve act so nimbly and quickly to calm the markets, while the ECB was so cautious in managing monetary policy? The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the management of interest rates and other monetary policy measures undertaken by the Central Bank and the Federal Reserve during the economic crisis, as well as to understand the changes in the context of the ECB and the emergence of its authority within the European Union’s economic governance model since 2011. Thus, in order to carry out a scrupulous exposition, we will also limit the time frame of this study to the 2007-2014 period.

Was für eine Europäische Verfassung?

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (139) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Étienne Balibar
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
European Constitution ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
European Central

The problem of a European Constitution is discussed at a fundamental level. In which way, can we speak about such a Constitution? Thearticle argues against the “postnational souveranism”, legitimating state against citizens. A new kind of citizenship is favoured based on extended social rights. The constitution now proposed contrarily makes the European Central Bank and its neoliberal policy to central and nearly unchangeable institution.

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