scholarly journals Partial Identification, Distributional Preferences, and the Welfare Ranking of Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maximilian Kasy
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Hiroaki Kaido ◽  
Francesca Molinari ◽  
Jörg Stoye

The literature on stochastic programming typically restricts attention to problems that fulfill constraint qualifications. The literature on estimation and inference under partial identification frequently restricts the geometry of identified sets with diverse high-level assumptions. These superficially appear to be different approaches to closely related problems. We extensively analyze their relation. Among other things, we show that for partial identification through pure moment inequalities, numerous assumptions from the literature essentially coincide with the Mangasarian–Fromowitz constraint qualification. This clarifies the relation between well-known contributions, including within econometrics, and elucidates stringency, as well as ease of verification, of some high-level assumptions in seminal papers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarek Jaber-Lopez ◽  
Alexandra Baier ◽  
Brent J. Davis

AbstractWe examine gender differences when eliciting distributional preferences as conducted by the Equality Equivalence Test, which has the ability to classify subjects into preferences types. Preferences are elicited when individuals interact with an individual of the same gender and with an individual of the opposite gender. We find elicited preferences are robust across both in-group (same gender) and out-group (opposite gender) interactions. When analyzing the intensity of benevolence (or malevolence) we find that overall women exhibit more malevolence than men, but there is no gender difference for benevolence. Furthermore, women exhibit a higher level of in-group favoritism than men.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Maekelberghe

AbstractThis paper re-examines the semantics of Present-day English gerunds by analyzing their collocational preferences. While traditional approaches suggest that a semantic opposition between ‘actions’ and ‘facts’ determines the meaning as well as the distributional preferences of nominal (the signing of the contract) and verbal (signing the contract) gerunds, these claims have not been supported by quantitative evidence. At the same time, more recent studies which quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the meaning of gerunds from a referential perspective lack a distributional dimension. This study presents a semantic typology of the nouns and verbs that are attracted to nominal and verbal gerunds in noun and verb complementation structures by means of a distinctive collexeme analysis which has been applied to contextual collexemes. The analysis shows that, while nominal and verbal gerunds occur in clearly distinctive contexts, this distinction does not appear to be based on an action-fact dichotomy, but is rather determined by the more abstract features of conceptual (in)dependence and temporal flexibility. Finally, it is shown how these abstract semantic profiles can be filled in more concretely by specific contextual slots, thus arriving at a more fine-grained and dynamic perspective on the semantics of English gerunds.


1956 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Dussault

A simple method, based on oxgall tolerance, is proposed for differentiating red halophilic bacteria commonly found in solar salt and discoloured salted codfish. Tests carried out on 18 strains isolated from various sources have shown that the rod forms are inhibited by low concentrations of Bacto-oxgall and that the coccus forms tolerate relatively high ones. Bacto-oxgall can thus be used as the basis of a simple selective medium. This test has been found useful for the isolation, purification and partial identification of unidentified strains and also for determining the relative proportions of the two main types of red halophilic bacteria present in solar salt and salted fish samples.


2014 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 1449-1499 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis Montiel Olea ◽  
Tomasz Strzalecki

Abstract This article provides an axiomatic characterization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and a more general class of semi-hyperbolic preferences. We impose consistency restrictions directly on the intertemporal trade-offs by relying on what we call “annuity compensations.” Our axiomatization leads naturally to an experimental design that disentangles discounting from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In a pilot experiment we use the partial identification approach to estimate bounds for the distributions of discount factors in the subject pool. Consistent with previous studies, we find evidence for both present and future bias.


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Greiff ◽  
Kurt Ackermann ◽  
Ryan Murphy

In terms of role assignment and informational characteristics, different contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and systemically vary role assignment as well as the way information is displayed to subjects when measuring distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks as well as proper games. Specifically we examine choice behavior in the contexts of role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that there is large heterogeneity in the choices people make when deciding how to allocate resources between themselves and some other person under different contextual frames. For instance, people make more prosocial choices under role uncertainty as compared to role certainty. Furthermore, altering the way information is displayed given a particular situation can have a more dramatic effect on choice behavior than altering the situation itself. That is, depending on how information is displayed, people may behave as if they would perform a non-strategic decision making task when in fact they are playing a proper game characterized by strategic interdependence.


2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Bellemare ◽  
Luc Bissonnette ◽  
Sabine Kröger

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