How Subjects and Possessors Can Obviate Phasehood

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Nick Huang

Recent proposals on phases claim that locality restrictions are obviated when the subject of a clausal phase has certain syntactic or discourse properties, suggesting that phasehood is acquired over the course of a derivation. I evaluate these claims with acceptability judgment experiments and argue that these phase-related locality effects can be derived from independently motivated principles, such as Feature Inheritance / Value–Transfer Simultaneity or the Principle of Minimal Compliance. I further point out similar effects with possessors and nominals in English, expanding the empirical domain. The nominal data constitute a novel argument for treating nominals as phases and strengthen the case for a general theory of phases that can account for these effects.

1971 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. H. Daw

‘Suppose a man becomes ill, gets worse and dies. His death is instantaneous but the cause of his death—deterioration of health—may have been progressing for some time. Death takes place because his health has deteriorated beyond a certain limit.’ So wrote C. D. Rich (1940) in introducing his ‘General theory of mortality’ which can also be regarded as a theory of sickness, although Rich does not develop this aspect of it. The point in the gradual deterioration of health at which death takes place is unmistakable but the point at which sickness begins is hazy and ill defined, as also is the point at which recovery from sickness takes place when health is improving. As Stocks (1949) says ‘The distinction between the living and the dead is clear cut, but no such frontier line between sickness and health can be said to exist except in the case of acute illness caused immediately and directly by an external agent. There is a zone between the two states in which the decision whether the subject is sick or not depends on definitions or standards of good health and also on who decides.’


2017 ◽  
Vol 73 (5) ◽  
pp. 387-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Chirikjian ◽  
Sajdeh Sajjadi ◽  
Bernard Shiffman ◽  
Steven M. Zucker

In molecular-replacement (MR) searches, spaces of motions are explored for determining the appropriate placement of rigid-body models of macromolecules in crystallographic asymmetric units. The properties of the space of non-redundant motions in an MR search, called a `motion space', are the subject of this series of papers. This paper, the fourth in the series, builds on the others by showing that when the space group of a macromolecular crystal can be decomposed into a product of two space subgroups that share only the lattice translation group, the decomposition of the group provides different decompositions of the corresponding motion spaces. Then an MR search can be implemented by trading off between regions of the translation and rotation subspaces. The results of this paper constrain the allowable shapes and sizes of these subspaces. Special choices result when the space group is decomposed into a product of a normal Bieberbach subgroup and a symmorphic subgroup (which is a common occurrence in the space groups encountered in protein crystallography). Examples of Sohncke space groups are used to illustrate the general theory in the three-dimensional case (which is the relevant case for MR), but the general theory in this paper applies to any dimension.


Author(s):  
Iuliia Rossius

The goal of this article consists in demonstration of the impact of research in the field of history and theory of law alongside the hermeneutics of Emilio Betti impacted the vector of this philosophical thought. The subject of this article is the lectures read by Emilio Betti (prolusioni) in 1927 and 1948, as well as his writings of 1949 and 1962. Analysis is conducted on the succession of Betti's ideas in these works, which is traced despite the discrepancy in their theme (legal and philosophical). The author indicates “legal” origin of the canons of Bettis’ hermeneutics, namely the canon of autonomy of the object. Emphasis is placed on the problem of objectivity in Betti's theory, as well as on dialectical tension between the historicity of the interpreted subject and strangeness of the object that accompanies legal, as well as any other type of interpretation. The article reveals the key moment of Betti's criticism of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Regarding the question of historicity of the subject of interpretation. The conclusion is made that the origin of the general theory of interpretation lies in the approaches and methods developed and implemented by Betti back in legal hermeneutics and in studying history of law.   Betti's philosophical theory was significantly affected by the idea on the role of modern legal dogma in interpretation of the history of law. Namely this idea that contains the principle of historicity of the subject of interpretation, which commenced  the general hermeneutical theory of Emilio Betti, was realized in canon of the relevance of understanding in the lecture in 1948, and later in the “general theory of interpretation”. The author also underlines that the question of objectivity of understanding, which has crucial practical importance in legal hermeneutics, was transmitted into the philosophical works of E. Betti, finding reflection in dialectic of the subject and object of interpretation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-80
Author(s):  
Margus Vihalem

The present paper outlines some basic concepts of Alain Badiou’s philosophy of the subject, tracking down its inherent and complex philosophical implications. These implications are made explicit in the criticism directed against the philosophical sophistry which denies the pertinence of the concept of truth. Badiou’s philosophical innovation is based on three nodal concepts, namely truth, event and subject, and it must be revealed how the afore-mentioned concepts are organized and interrelated, eventually leading to reformulating the concept of the subject. In its exercise, philosophy is intimately affiliated to the four adjacent procedures of mathematics, art, love and politics that could be understood as overall conditions on the margins of which philosophical thinking takes place. Separating philosophy from ontology and charging philosophy with what exceeds being, Badiou transforms it to the general theory of the event. Consequently the concept of the subject is disconnected from that of the object, the subject being not an instance of knowledge, but always a part of generic procedures and thus definable simply as a finite fragment or an operative configuration of the traces of the event. Therefore, it could be stated that Badiou’s theory of the subject is formal and refuses all essentialist connotations.


Author(s):  
Вадим Леонидович Афанасьевский

Предметом статьи является экспликация методологического базиса разработанной французским правоведом Жаном-Луи Бержелем концепции общей теории права. Автор фиксирует, что методология этой конструкции отличается принципиальной спецификой от классического рационализма научного знания. Бержель для разработки проблем теории права использовал импрессионистский метод, принципиально выходящий за рамки научной методологии. Это приводит к тому, что читатель превращается в соавтора, выстраивая свое представление о предмете теории права. Причем фантазия автора и читателя ничем не ограничена, ибо она уходит от исторических трансформаций развития правовой реальности и традиций теоретического правового дискурса. В статье показано, что предложенная методология привела Бержеля к размытости и непроясненности понятийного аппарата и «терминологическому анархизму». Представив свой анализ его концепции общей теории права, автор статьи приходит к выводу, что основанием методологии Бержеля являются характерные для французской социогуманитарной мысли принципы экзистенциальной философии и постмодернистских штудий. Именно в этом коренится отсутствие целостности в теоретических построениях, наличие эклектизма и туманности употребляемых терминов и понятий. В эту парадигму прекрасно укладывается импрессионистский метод, используемый французским правоведом. Если читатель сам определяет понимание читаемого текста, то смысл уже не определяется объективной реальностью. Он выступает проблемой изолированного индивида, находящегося в произвольно выстроенном им фрагментированном мире, в том числе и мире права The subject of the article is the explication of the methodological basis of the concept of the general theory of law developed by the French jurist Jean-Louis Bergel. The author notes that the methodology of this construction differs in fundamental specificity from the classical rationalism of scientific knowledge. Bergel used the impressionist method to develop problems in the theory of law, which fundamentally went beyond the framework of scientific methodology. This leads to the fact that the reader turns into a co-author, building his own idea of the subject of the theory of law. Moreover, the imagination of the author and the reader is not limited by anything, for it moves away from the historical transformations of the development of legal reality and the traditions of theoretical legal discourse. The article shows that the proposed methodology led Bergel to a vague and unclear conceptual apparatus and «terminological anarchism». Having presented his analysis of his concept of the general theory of law, the author of the article comes to the conclusion that the basis of Bergel's methodology is the principles of existential philosophy and postmodern studies that are characteristic of French socio-humanitarian thought. This is the root of the lack of integrity in theoretical constructions, the presence of eclecticism and the vagueness of the terms and concepts used. The impressionistic method used by the French jurist fits perfectly into this paradigm. If the reader himself determines the understanding of the text being read, then the meaning is no longer determined by objective reality. It acts as a problem of an isolated individual who is in a fragmented world arbitrarily built by him, including the world of law


Author(s):  
Laurence Saglietto

The concept of intermediation has existed for a long time and taken numerous different forms. In this introductory chapter, we will therefore start by examining the state of the art of intermediaries through a range of different disciplines (history, management, economics, health, sociology), highlighting their historical evolution and current forms. We will then present the different models and theories of intermediation and their development, to produce an appreciation of their similarities and differences and a comprehensive view of the subject. This will allow us, in the last section, to propose the framework for a general theory of intermediation, in terms of organisational architecture and the services provided.


Author(s):  
Margaret Schabas

Keynes is best known as an economist but, in the tradition of John Stuart Mill and William Stanley Jevons, he also made significant contributions to inductive logic and the philosophy of science. Keynes’ only book explicitly on philosophy, A Treatise on Probability (1921), remains an important classic on the subject. It develops a non-frequentist interpretation of probability as the key to sound judgment and scientific reasoning. His General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) is the watershed of twentieth-century macroeconomics. While not, strictly speaking, a philosophical work, it nonetheless advances distinct readings of rationality, uncertainty and social justice.


1961 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glanville Williams

Hart and Honoré's book is a thorough and scholarly study of the concept of causation in Anglo-American law. Closely reasoned, with full reference to the literature and a considerable treatment of Continental theories, it represents a serious attempt to restate the law in tort, contract and crime in an intelligible way. In future, any serious student of the subject will have to take note of it. Unfortunately for the authors they have backed a loser in supporting Re Polemis and criticising the foreseeability test; and since much of their argument depends upon their opinion on this question, their book must now be accounted largely out of date, if the decision of the Judicial Committee in The Wagon Mound receives the acceptance that seems probable. In respect of the general theory of causation, however, the discussion retains its intellectual interest; and the chapters on contract and crime, though relatively short, are largely unaffected by The Wagon Mound.


The study of memory is unfortunately a difficult and confused subject. Its importance is beyond question, if only because memory lies near the centre of human abilities. Yet there is little agreement even as to the practical results, if any, that may be expected from its study. Education and psychology proceed empirically for want of a general theory of memory, but it is not clear whether such a theory may be expected to come from psychology as studied in man, from experimental study of animals, or from some discoveries of logic, mathematics or engineering. Yet the subject has certainly not been neglected. Immense efforts have been made by psychologists, clinicians, physiologists and workers in other disciplines. In recent years occurrences of various sorts have been reported in the nervous system during learning, from electrical changes, to changes in the base composition of the ribosenucleotides of single nerve cells. In fact there is such a large literature that one cannot avoid feeling that anything that an anatomist may say on the subject will be irrelevant, superficial, naive or worst of all, confusing. I am encouraged to take the risk by the fact that study of the connexion pattern of the nervous system of the octopus has given me a feeling of beginning to understand a little about the subject of memory. To study the material organization behind any subject or problem is surely the basis of a scientific approach. I shall go so far as to suggest evidence for the existence of a unit of memory or mnemon. The suggestion is made with great hesitation and in full awareness of its dangers. The technique of pushing the analysis of the system as far as possible on the basis of the connexion pattern seems to have brought increasing clarification. Recognition of the units is the next further step. Many of those who have so ably assisted in this work will probably not approve of the identification of a unit, still less of inventing a name for it. Many will regard it as a guess, especially since it is not supported by evidence from microelectrodes. Yet perhaps we need to try to identify units, not only as a basis for discussion but in order to find out where to look in our search for the electrical, chemical and other correlates of memory.


Vivarium ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 169-204
Author(s):  
Julie Brumberg-Chaumont

Abstract Discrete supposition occurs whenever a discrete term, such as ‘Socrates‘, is the subject of a given proposition. I propose to examine this apparently simple notion. I shall draw attention to the incongruity, within a general theory of the semantic variation of terms in a propositional context, of the notion of discrete supposition, in which a term usually has a single semantic correlate. The incongruity comes to the fore in those treatises that attempt to describe discrete supposition as a sort of personal supposition, although the same term cannot be in simple supposition in another propositional context, because it has no significate distinct from its suppositum. This shows a fundamental link between common signification, simple supposition and predicability, three notions that rely on the existence of a significate distinct and independent from the suppositum of the term. The connection is to be seen especially in William of Sherwood’s Introductiones, the only author of a terminist Summa who recognizes the existence of simple supposition for discrete terms.


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