Peace Proposals, Diplomacy, and War: Was an Opportunity Lost for an Early Settlement in Vietnam?

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-180
Author(s):  
George C. Herring ◽  
Wallace Thies ◽  
Merle L. Pribbenow ◽  
Sophie Quinn-Judge ◽  
Jessica M. Chapman ◽  
...  

This forum includes essays by six leading experts on the Vietnam War discussing the recent book by James G. Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), which recounts the various secret efforts mediated by East European governments to foster peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam that would bring an end to the war. All of the commentators praise the book and the scope of Hershberg's research, but most of them do not share Hershberg's belief that a major chance for peace was genuinely “lost.” All the commentators agree that Hershberg provides a rich, nuanced analysis and has performed a valuable service in outlining future directions for research on the topic. The forum ends with a reply by Hershberg to the six contributors.

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-143
Author(s):  
Rory Fidler

The actual effectiveness of the American anti-war movement from 1964-68 and its attempts to sway the policy of President Johnson's administration on the topic of the Vietnam War is debatable. While popular myth has exaggerated the role of protestors in stopping the war, the movement failed to alter state policy on the war in any serious fashion. The anti-war movement could not develop a universal policy of their aims, differing from a gradual exit from Vietnam to a complete anarchist overthrow of the American system, and as such were unable to lobby the government effectively. Within the war itself, however, the Johnson administration and the United States Military encountered a stronger stimulus to reconsider their involvement: the inability to adapt to a guerilla war, the immense man power and resources required to ensure victory, and ultimately the communist Tet offensive of 1968 pushing American forces back. When President Johnson did seek to negotiate with North Vietnam at the end of his term, it was because America had simply failed to beat the Vietcong.


Milli mála ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-61
Author(s):  
Irma Erlingsdóttir

The article explores Hélène Cixous’s 1985 play The Terrible Unfinished Story of Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia (L´Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk roi du Cambodge) by focusing on Cixous’s portrayal of Sihanouk and her interpretation of Cambodia’s history with references to the country’s civil conflict, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. The article seeks to historicize the play by placing it within the context of contemporary political works on Cambodian history. As embedded in the play’s metanarrative and its contemporary metaphor of human suffering, special attention is paid to Cambodia’s power struggles, both internationally and within its own borders. The emphasis is on the tension between Cixous’s portrayal of Sihanouk as the paternal protector of Cambodia’s “eternal cultural heritage” and his political compromises with internal (the Khmer Rouge) and external (the United States, China, North Vietnam) actors. From a broader perspective, an additional focus is on the conflict between traditionalism and modernization, imperialism and resistance, and territoriality and exile.


Author(s):  
Andrew J. Gawthorpe

From 1965 to 1973, the United States attempted to prevent the absorption of the non-Communist state of South Vietnam by Communist North Vietnam as part of its Cold War strategy of containment. In doing so, the United States had to battle both the North Vietnamese military and guerrillas indigenous to South Vietnam. The Johnson administration entered the war without a well-thought-out strategy for victory, and the United States quickly became bogged down in a bloody stalemate. A major Communist assault in 1968 known as the Tet Offensive convinced US leaders of the need to seek a negotiated solution. This task fell to the Nixon administration, which carried on peace talks while simultaneously seeking ways to escalate the conflict and force North Vietnam to make concessions. Eventually it was Washington that made major concessions, allowing North Vietnam to keep its forces in the South and leaving South Vietnam in an untenable position. US troops left in 1973 and Hanoi successfully invaded the South in 1975. The two Vietnams were formally unified in 1976. The war devastated much of Vietnam and came at a huge cost to the United States in terms of lives, resources, and political division at home. It gave birth to the largest mass movement against a war in US history, motivated by opposition both to conscription and to the damage that protesters perceived the war was doing to the United States. It also raised persistent questions about the wisdom of both military intervention and nation-building as tools of US foreign policy. The war has remained a touchstone for national debate and partisan division even as the United States and Vietnam moved to normalize diplomatic relations with the end of the Cold War.


2019 ◽  
pp. 154-177
Author(s):  
Xiaobing Li

Chapter 7 explains Mao’s Cold War theory, in which a clash between China and the United States would inevitably occur sooner or later. The Chinese military should thus have its priorities and preparations established prior to this inevitable conflict. After the Indochina Settlement was signed at Geneva in July 1954, China continued to provide weaponry, equipment, and military training to North Vietnam. This chapter points out that, in June 1965, China began to send its troops to the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1968, China sent twenty-three divisions to Vietnam, including ninety-five regiments, totaling some 320,000 troops. Beginning in 1968, China also sent 110,000 troops to Laos to provide air defense, construct and repair highways, and maintain transportation and communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Nevertheless, the Vietnam War seriously tested the limits of the Communist alliance. Rather than improving Sino-Soviet relations, aid to North Vietnam created a new competition as each superpower attempted to control Southeast Asian Communist movements.


2015 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Michael D. Yates

In a letter to Vietnam War veteran Charles McDuff, Major General Franklin Davis, Jr. said, "The United States Army has never condoned wanton killing or disregard for human life." McDuff had written a letter to President Richard Nixon in January 1971, telling him that he had witnessed U.S. soldiers abusing and killing Vietnamese civilians and informing him that many My Lais had taken place during the war. He pleaded with Nixon to bring the killing to an end. The White House sent the letter to the general, and this was his reply.&hellp; McDuff's letter and Davis's response are quoted in Nick Turse's <em>Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam</em>, the most recent book to demonstrate beyond doubt that the general's words were a lie.&hellp; In what follows, I use Turse's work, along with several other books, articles, and films, as scaffolds from which to construct an analysis of how the war was conducted, what its consequences have been for the Vietnamese, how the nature of the war generated ferocious opposition to it (not least by a brave core of U.S. soldiers), how the war's history has been whitewashed, and why it is important to both know what happened in Vietnam and why we should not forget it.<p class="mrlink"><p class="mrpurchaselink"><a href="http://monthlyreview.org/index/volume-67-number-1" title="Vol. 67, No. 1: May 2015" target="_self">Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the <em>Monthly Review</em> website.</a></p>


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenz M. Lüthi

Contrary to later Vietnamese allegations, China did not “sell out” the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) during the last two years of the Paris negotiations (1971–1973). North Vietnamese, Chinese, Soviet, East European, and American sources show that Hanoi could have gotten from Washington an agreement similar to the final Paris Agreement (January 1973) as early as the spring of 1971. Sino-American rapprochement did not help the United States in the negotiations, as claimed by the North Vietnamese, because the Chinese side made no concessions at all on Vietnam. In fact, China increased military aid to the DRV. Similarly, U.S.-Soviet detente did not damage the North Vietnamese effort, although Moscow unsuccessfully tried to mediate between Hanoi and Washington. In the end, U.S. success in rebuffing the DRV's Easter Offensive and Hanoi's miscalculations about U.S. domestic developments in 1972 prolonged the Vietnam War unnecessarily.


Author(s):  
Ingo Trauschweizer

In this chapter I explore Taylor’s role in the American escalation in Vietnam in 1964-1965, when he served as ambassador in Saigon. Lyndon Johnson put Taylor in charge of all American assets and agencies in Vietnam, including the military effort. Taylor feared the spread of Communism and held that Vietnam was the place to stop the spread of “wars of national liberation.” Taylor was a vocal advocate for air strikes against North Vietnam, yet he opposed deployment of large numbers of US ground forces and wanted to leave the fighting to the South Vietnamese army. By the end of his tenure, however, the United States was committed to an air and land war in Vietnam and Taylor would become one of the war’s most ardent defenders.


Author(s):  
David Luhrssen

Vietnam was the focal point of a larger set of conflicts that broke out in Indo-China in 1945 and resulted by 1975 with Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam falling under the rule of various Communist parties. The first Vietnam War (1945–1954) pitted French colonists and their local allies against Vietnamese Communist rebels. It ended with the French withdrawal from Indo-China and the partition of Vietnam into two states, Communist North Vietnam and pro-Western South Vietnam. In the second Vietnam War (1955–1975), North Vietnam and Communist rebels in the south fought against the US-backed South Vietnamese regime. No conflict in American history since the Civil War was as divisive as Vietnam, yet the war was widely supported until US ground forces entered the fray (1965). Mounting casualties and the threat of conscription fueled a growing antiwar movement that forced Washington to find a way out of the war. After the United States withdrew in 1973, Communist forces overran South Vietnam and reunited the country under their rule in 1975. Films about the Vietnam War were produced in both North and South Vietnam, the Soviet Union (which armed the North) and South Korea and Australia (both dispatched troops to support the South). With few exceptions, many were seldom seen outside their lands of origin. With Hollywood’s dominance of movie markets in much of the world, American stories about the war dominated the imagination of moviegoers in the United States and most other countries. Hollywood took only slight interest in Vietnam during the war’s early years. The first major motion picture about American combat in Vietnam, John’s Wayne’s pro-war The Green Berets (1968), was a box-office hit but universally derided by critics. With the war’s increasing unpopularity and unsuccessful conclusion, the subject was deemed “box-office poison” by the studios for several years. By the late 1970s a rising generation of filmmakers embraced Vietnam as material for displaying American heroism, explaining the US defeat or exploring the ethical basis for war. The commercial breakthrough for Vietnam War movies was achieved by director Sidney Furie’s The Boys in Company C (1978), Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter (1978), and Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979). Each reflected in different ways America’s disillusionment and the physical and psychological toll charged to the men who served in the conflict. The theme continued with Platoon (1986), directed by a Vietnam combat veteran, Oliver Stone. A counter-trend appeared with Sylvester Stallone’s Rambo series (1982–2019), which amplified the resurgent nationalism that began under the Reagan administration. Providing a third perspective, Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987) presented the war unemotionally as a fact of history. In the 21st century, movies on the Vietnam War continue to be made, if in diminished number. Characteristic of recent films, We Were Soldiers (2002) validates the experience of US servicemen while honoring the heroism of the enemy.


This chapter reviews the books Fútbol, Jews and the Making of Argentina (2014), by Raanan Rein, translated by Marsha Grenzeback, and Muscling in on New Worlds: Jews, Sport, and the Making of the Americas (2014), edited by Raanan Rein and David M.K. Sheinin. Rein’s book deals with the “making” of Argentina through football (soccer), while Muscling in on New Worlds focuses on the “making” of the Americas (mainly the one America, called the United States) through sports. Muscling in on New Worlds is a collection of essays that seeks to advance the common theme of sport as “an avenue by which Jews threaded the needle of asserting a Jewish identity.” Topics include Jews as boxers, Jews and football, Jews and yoga, Orthodox Jewish athletes, and American Jews and baseball. There are also essays about the cinematic and literary representations of Jews in sports.


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