scholarly journals To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-161
Author(s):  
Melinda Haas ◽  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their miitary plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape its decision: the state's assessment of whether it needs its partner's capabilities to succeed at the military mission, the state's perception of whether the partner will be willing to support the state in the requested role, and the state's anticipated deception costs for not fully informing its partner state. Several cases illustrate how these strategies are chosen: Israel, Britain, and France's decision to use force against Egypt during the Suez Crisis (collusion between France and Israel, and concealment vis-à-vis the United States); Israel's 2007 bombing of Syria's al Kibar reactor (compartmentalization); and Israel's deliberations whether to attack Iran's nuclear reactor (lying). These strategies have implications for intra-alliance restraint and contribute to understanding deception and secrecy between allies.

1971 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Grieb

The militarycoup d'étatwhich installed General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez as President of El Salvador during December 1931 created a crisis involving the 1923 Washington Treaties. By the terms of these accords, the Central American nadons had pledged to withhold recognition from governments seizing power through force in any of the isthmian republics. Although not a signatory of the treaty, the United States based its recognition policy on this principle. Through this means the State Department had attempted to impose some stability in Central America, by discouraging revolts. With the co-operation of the isthmian governments, United States diplomats endeavored to bring pressure to bear on the leaders of any uprising, to deny them the fruits of their victory, and thus reduce the constant series ofcoupsandcounter-coupsthat normally characterized Central American politics.


2019 ◽  
pp. 12-45
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

Because the revolution in Egypt was directed at the state, it is important to properly conceptualize the state apparatus and the regime that ruled it. Thus, chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on authoritarian regimes and explains why it is important to distinguish between states and regimes. Hosni Mubarak’s powerful presidency did not preclude the development of a diverse and unruly civil society, including tens of thousands of nongovernmental organizations. A new framework is employed in order to understand which parts of the state apparatus are most crucial during a period of revolutionary upheaval. It is important to distinguish between tools of the regime and pillars of support for the regime; the latter have the ability to either prop up or potentially withdraw their support. Mubarak relied on four pillars of regime support: the military, the business elite, the United States, and the acquiescence of the people. The chapter then turns to an overview of the literature on revolutions and military coups, which have usually been studied separately, as well as the literature on how establishing civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation.


Author(s):  
Desmond King

I characterize American State power as the expression of a “shock and awe” strategy, that is, the style of making dramatic policy pronouncements which centralise efforts and concentrate bureaucratic resources. Shock and awe,’ refers to the capacity of American state leaders to employ its sovereign power and ample resources determinedly to a particular end. This capacity rebuffs the notion of the United States as a weak state. It describes how powerful the centralized exercise of (civilian and military) bureaucratic authority bent on a single purpose has become in the US state. The state is the executive – the bureaucratic departments and agencies including the military controlled under presidential authority. Shock and awe is a strategy which presidents seek to employ definitively to address a crisis at home or abroad. It is distinctly American because of the constraints – including constitutional, political and electoral – under which the executive pursues policy and responds to crises.


1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-149
Author(s):  
Rex J. Zedalis

During 1994, the total sales value of chemicals exported from the United States exceeded $51 billion, up 15 percent over the previous year and resulting in the chemical sector outpacing all other sectors that finished the year with favorable trade balances. Chemicals leaving the United States were shipped under the control provisions of both the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and the Department of State's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Though this is something of an oversimplification, the EAR basically concerns itself with products that have civilian application, and the ITAR with products of use to the military. Currently, the Commodity Control List of the EAR, overseen by Commerce's Office of Export Licensing within the Bureau of Export Administration, identifies fifty-four chemicals and ten toxins as intermediate agents and precursors to chemical weapons subject to export regulation. The Munitions List of the ITAR, administered by the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, identifies twenty-two chemicals as subject to regulation and cautions that this listing is merely illustrative, as any “chemical agent,” defined as “a substance having military application,” is subject to export control.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaurav Kampani

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many academics, think tank analysts, journalists, and government officials came to perceive India as a de facto nuclear weapons power. The consensus among U.S. policymakers was that normative, rather than technical or organizational hurdles, prevented India from transforming its latent nuclear capability into an operational one. New evidence shows, however, that India lacked technical means to deliver nuclear weapons reliably and safely until 1994–95. Further, until the outbreak of the Kargil War in the summer of 1999, political leaders refrained from embedding the weapons within organizational and procedural routines that would have rendered them operational in the military sense of the term. These deficiencies can be traced to a regime of secrecy that prevented information sharing and coordination among the relevant actors. This secrecy stemmed from risk aversion among Indian decisionmakers, who feared international pressures for nuclear rollback, particularly from the United States.


Commonwealth ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennie Sweet-Cushman ◽  
Ashley Harden

For many families across Pennsylvania, child care is an ever-present concern. Since the 1970s, when Richard Nixon vetoed a national childcare program, child care has received little time in the policy spotlight. Instead, funding for child care in the United States now comes from a mixture of federal, state, and local programs that do not help all families. This article explores childcare options available to families in the state of Pennsylvania and highlights gaps in the current system. Specifically, we examine the state of child care available to families in the Commonwealth in terms of quality, accessibility, flexibility, and affordability. We also incorporate survey data from a nonrepresentative sample of registered Pennsylvania voters conducted by the Pennsylvania Center for Women and Politics. As these results support the need for improvements in the current childcare system, we discuss recommendations for the future.


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