Elite Competition, Social Movements, and Election Violence in Nigeria

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 40-78
Author(s):  
Megan Turnbull

Election violence varies significantly within countries, yet how and why are undertheorized. Although existing scholarship has shown how national-level economic, institutional, and contextual factors increase a country's risk for violence during elections, these studies cannot explain why elites organize election violence in some localities but not others. An analysis of gubernatorial elections in Nigeria reveals the conditions under which elites recruit popular social-movement actors for pre-election violence. Gubernatorial elections are intensely competitive when agreements between governors and local ruling party elites over the distribution of state patronage break down. To oust their rivals and consolidate power, elites recruit popular reformist groups for pre-election violence and voter mobilization. Conversely, when local ruling-party elites are aligned over how state patronage is to be distributed, the election outcome is agreed to well in advance. In this scenario, there is little incentive to enlist social movement actors for violence. Case studies of the Ijaw Youth Council and Boko Haram provide empirical support for the argument. The theory and evidence help explain subnational variation in election violence as well as the relationship between intraparty politics and violence during elections, and speak to broader questions about political order and violence.

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 441-441
Author(s):  
Joseph Blankholm

Abstract There are more than 1,400 nonbeliever communities in the United States and well over a dozen organizations that advocate for secular people on the national level. Together, these local and national groups comprise a social movement that includes atheists, agnostics, humanists, freethinkers, and other kinds of nonbelievers. Despite the fact that retired people over 60 dedicate most of the money and energy needed to run these groups, the increasingly vast literature on secular people and secularism has paid them almost no attention. Relying on more than one hundred interviews (including dozens with people over 60), several years of ethnographic research, and a survey of organized nonbelievers, this paper demonstrates the crucial role that people over 60 play in the American secular movement today. It also considers the reasons older adults are so important to these groups, the challenges they face in trying to recruit younger members and combat stereotypes about aging leadership, and generational differences that structure how various types of nonbeliever groups look and feel. This paper reframes scholarly understandings of very secular Americans by focusing on people over 60 and charts a new path in secular studies.


Significance The MAS’s national-level appeal tends not to translate into support in localised elections, and a poor choice of candidates, particularly in El Alto, has proved self-defeating. Impacts Second-round gubernatorial elections will probably take place in six out of nine departments. Camacho, a far-right businessman turned politician, will use his newly gained legitimacy to harry the government. The Arce government will seek a modus vivendi with opposition mayors such as those of La Paz and Cochabamba.


Significance Notably, the party defied expectations by reportedly winning comfortably in the capital Addis Ababa. Impacts Ethiopia’s government will invoke the outcome to reject international pressure and perceived encroachments on the country’s sovereignty. As electoral calculations fade, Abiy may have greater scope to make concessions on major national and international disputes. Tigray will remain unrepresented at the national level.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wahman ◽  
Edward Goldring

Cross-national research on African electoral politics has argued that competition increases the prospects for pre-election violence. However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effect of political competition on pre-election violence at the subnational level. We theorize that in African democracies characterized by competition at the national level but low subnational competitiveness (polarization), violence is often a manifestation of turf war and a tool to maintain and disrupt political territorial control. Consequently, contrary to expectations derived from the cross-national literature, pre-election violence is more likely in uncompetitive than competitive constituencies. Locally dominant as well as locally weak parties have incentives to perpetrate violence in uncompetitive constituencies. For locally dominant parties, violence is a tool to shrink the democratic space in their strongholds and maintain territorial control. For locally weak parties, violence can disturb the dominance of the opponent and protect their presence in hostile territory. We hypothesize that pre-election violence will be particularly common in opposition strongholds. In such locations, ruling parties can leverage their superior repressive resources to defend their ability to campaign, while the opposition can use their local capacity to reinforce the politics of territoriality. We test our hypotheses with original constituency-level election violence data from the 2016 Zambian elections. Data come from expert surveys of domestic election observers and represent a novel way of measuring low-level variations in election violence. Our analysis shows patterns of pre-election violence consistent with our theory on pre-election violence as a territorial tool.


2020 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-758
Author(s):  
Eun Hee Woo

This paper analyzes how democratization has affected the dynamics of candidate selection in South Korea. After democratization in the late 1980s, it was expected that intra-party democracy would follow. In response to increasing public demand, the major parties adopted primary systems in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, most candidates for the legislature are still nominated by a small number of central party elites without additional ballots in the local branches. To explain the persistence of such exclusive, centralized features of candidate selection, I highlight the limited impact democratization has had on the political environment in which the parties operate. More specifically, since the 1987 democratization process resulted in a compromise agreement established by a small number of party leaders, South Korea retained much of the political legacy from authoritarian times, such as an electoral system advantageous to the major parties and legal provisions restricting electoral campaigns, party activities, and political participation. The continuation of these political institutions makes radical candidate selection reform highly unlikely as the party elites have no incentive to expand and decentralize the selection process. Without significant changes to the political institutions at the national level, the dominance of the central party elite over the final outcome of candidate selection looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future.


Significance Opposition leader Raila Odinga and supporters of his National Super Alliance (NASA) have long since lost faith in the capacity of the IEBC to deliver a free and fair election and have regularly alleged that the ruling party plans to steal the vote. Opposition supporters claim Msando was killed because he was determined to ensure that the technology designed to prevent electoral fraud worked -- his murder lends credibility to Odinga's narrative that the process is being undermined from within. With only a week until the election, attention is focused not on political platforms but on the potential for voter fraud or a contested result. Impacts Electoral controversies and the delegitimisation of the electoral commission increase the risk of post-election violence. Widespread ethnic clashes on the scale of 2007-08 are unlikely due to heavy deployments of state security forces. Political instability, even if limited, will deter tourism and investment, hurting short-term economic growth.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton ◽  
Susan D. Hyde ◽  
Ryan S. Jablonski

It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, this article shows that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 1221-1238
Author(s):  
Ntagahoraho Z Burihabwa ◽  
Devon E A Curtis

Abstract The widespread enthusiasm for internationally-supported liberal statebuilding since the 1990s has become much more tempered, due in part to the mixed record of postwar liberal statebuilding. Over time, many postwar countries have adopted more authoritarian statebuilding trajectories, despite the fact that negotiated peace agreements tend to reflect liberal principles. This is often attributed to ‘liberal’ international actors encountering resistant ‘illiberal’ domestic elites. The postwar statebuilding trajectory in Burundi appears to fit this dominant narrative, with the ruling party, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), deviating from some of the liberal principles that underpinned the Burundian peace agreement. Drawing on a detailed analysis of the internal politics of Burundi's ruling party, we show that this account is flawed. We question overly simplified accounts of ‘illiberal’ ruling party elites and we argue that tensions, competition and fragmentation within the ruling party were decisive in Burundi's statebuilding path. Rather than seeing Burundi as an inevitable failure of liberal statebuilding, we highlight how there was some commitment to liberal principles even within the ruling party. Internal struggles within the ruling CNDD-FDD led to current outcomes in Burundi, which should not be interpreted as predestined or definitive. We show that understanding the complexities, diversities and contingencies within ruling parties opens new spaces for thinking about the creation and recreation of political orders after war.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Geer

Qualities that can make activism possible under an authoritarian regime can become disadvantages when restrictions on the political field are eased. Under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, the March 9 Group for University Autonomy, a small group of academics, campaigned against the interference of the state security apparatus and the ruling party in academic affairs and campus life. This article suggests that the group’s survival in that context, and its ability to organize successful campaigns within certain limits, depended on the involvement of highly accomplished academics, some of whom are well-known outside academia, on its practice of a particular type of participatory democracy, and on its focus on institutional autonomy from the state. All these assets became liabilities following the revolutionary uprising of January 2011, and the group has to a large extent demobilized as a result.


Author(s):  
Sona N. Golder ◽  
Ignacio Lago ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Elisabeth Gidengil ◽  
Thomas Gschwend

Existing accounts of multi-level elections focus on voters rather than on political parties, but the multi-level arrangement also affects party strategies. Party elites base their voter mobilization strategies in part on the features of each electoral arena, and make decisions about how to allocate their resources across these arenas accordingly. Small parties, in particular, focus their mobilization efforts on electoral arenas in which the electoral rules are more permissive, so that the parties have a better chance of winning seats. This chapter shows that larger or more nationalized parties tend to make different choices with respect to what kind of potential voters they attempt to mobilize, and for which kind of election, compared with smaller, under-resourced, or regionally based parties.


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