Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-139
Author(s):  
Michael McFaul

Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.

Author(s):  
Robert H. Donaldson

Russian foreign policy has both been similar and unique to that of other great powers. As a general rule of statecraft, Russia has pursued balance-of-power policies, which essentially involves the mobilization of power to countervail the power of an enemy or a potential adversary. The enduring goals pursued by Russian foreign policy have placed primary emphasis on ensuring national security, promoting the economic wellbeing of the country, and enhancing national prestige. The dominant theme in the Russian foreign policy under the tsars is that of expansionism. No single motive force can be found to explain tsarist Russian expansionism; rather, the influences of geography, regime type, the international system, and ideology all weigh in, though in different proportions at different times. The ideology known as Marxism–Leninism has also had a significant effect on Soviet and post-Soviet policy. Meanwhile, Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin’s primary aim in foreign policy, like Mikhail Gorbachev’s before him, was to create a nonthreatening external environment that would be most conducive to his country’s internal economic and political development. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin pursued a pragmatic, cautious, and nuanced policy. The most visible change that Putin brought to Russia’s foreign policy was a heightened level of presidential activism. In his second presidential term, Putin further changed the direction of Russian foreign policy, increasingly demanding that Russia be recognized as a great power and be given commensurate weight in the resolution of global issues.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Sitenko

Abstract The crisis in Ukraine, that broke out in 2013 and escalated in 2014, has led to sanction policy and the emergence of significant political divergences between Russian Federation and the West. This has resulted in an intensification of Russia’s foreign and economic policy alliances with its neighboring countries as well as with the rest of the BRICS members. In his interview with Cuba’s Prensa Latina, Vladimir Putin further classified cooperation with Latin American states as one of the key and very promising lines of Russia’s foreign policy. In light of the above mentioned developments, this paper addresses the Latin American vector of Russian foreign policy using the example of Russian-Venezuelan partnership, which has been intensified after 2004. It explores the underlying key elements of this partnership based on realist and constructivist assumptions and is aimed at outlining foreign policy identities, perceptions and interests constitutive for the cooperation between the two countries. The author concludes, that the cooperation is based both on realist and constructivist elements, whereas Russian interests are mainly realist and Venezuelan constructivist, and that fact could hinder long-lasting and both-way beneficial bilateral collaboration.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-189
Author(s):  
M. A. Neimark

While studying the changes in the conceptual foundations of Russian foreign policy from its inception to the present day, an important place is occupied by the systematization of factors, circumstances and trends that predetermined the beginning of overcoming mistakes and errors of the 90s and the transition to its doctrinal sovereignty. The collapse of the USSR became the litmus test of the attitude of the West, primarily the USA, to the new Russia. Having no historical precedent, such a swift — overnight — reverse formation leap from «real socialism» to real capitalism, and by no means the expected transition from confrontational bipolarity to monopolistic unipolarity, predetermined the hopes of B. Yeltsin and his immediate circle for the elimination of past geopolitical antagonisms, high expectations regarding the readiness of the collective West, led by the United States, for an equal dialogue with Russia. That clearly emerged with the regard to the elaboration of the first conceptual model of the foreign policy of Russia in 1993 that in a number of basic parameters had a pronounced american-centric character. The idea of the “westernization” of the foreign policy activity of Russia was pushed primarily by the liberal circles as a panacea for the elimination of the ideological and political pillars of the Soviet system, overcoming the deepest social and economic crisis with the hope, and even with the conviction that the «benevolent hegemon» of the United States and the West as a whole «will help us». The author proceeds from the fact that referring to the sources of the formation of the conceptual base of international activity of Russia, taking into account underestimated or, conversely, overestimated factors, is of great practical importance for updating and optimizing the foreign policy strategy of our country, improving the work of Russian diplomacy and increasing its effectiveness in the fight against new international challenges and threats.


Subject Prospects for Russian politics in 2016. Significance This has been another challenging year for President Vladimir Putin. Russian foreign policy adventures have plunged relations with the West to a new low, the economy continues to struggle and the assassination of Boris Nemtsov has exposed elite-level divisions. However, although the economic situation has forced the Kremlin to restrain budgetary spending, Russia's opposition is weak and demoralised.


2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-38
Author(s):  
Józef M. Fiszer

In this article, the author analyses Ukraine’s international policy and particularly its balancing between the East and the West from the moment of its declaration of independence in 1991 to the present day. He states that Ukraine’s foreign policy fluctuates between Russian (eastern) and transatlantic (western) orientations. In the author’s opinion, this difficult choice is determined by many factors, including historical, cultural, social, economic and international ones. Moreover, the author presents the position of Poland towards this still unsolved Ukrainian dilemma and towards Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the European Union. The main thesis of this article is the author’s conclusion that the imperial international policy of Russia under President Vladimir Putin and the passive stance of NATO, the European Union and the United States have exerted a particular influence on Ukraine’s foreign policy and the position of Poland towards its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Being afraid of Russia, the West in a broad sense has come to terms with its aggressive policy towards Ukraine and has forgotten about Crimea. It cares about its economic cooperation with Russia more than about the security of Ukraine and Poland.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-144
Author(s):  
Michael Aleprete Jr.

AbstractU.S. and Russian foreign policy elites view the international system in fundamentally different ways. The predominant view held by American elites is that the United States is a unipolar power with unique leadership responsibilities. Russian elites view the international system to be a multipolar arrangement, one in which a group of great powers, including the Russian Federation, possess roughly equal international responsibilities and prerogatives. This essay reviews the key doctrinal statements produced by the Russian and U.S. governments since 1991 that outline the assumptions underlying each state's foreign policy, and discusses how these doctrines developed from each sides' experiences in the post-Cold War era. Particular attention is given to the United States' National Security Strategy, which is published every four years, and to the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which has been published at the beginning of each Russian presidency. The essay also addresses the consequences this role-identity incommensurability will likely have on the prospects for future cooperation between the two states.


2022 ◽  

Russian foreign policy has undergone substantial shifts in the post–Cold War period. Scholarly attention toward the topic has also experienced ebbs and flows as the breakup of the Soviet Union drastically decreased general interest toward a newly emerged Russia. The initial period of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s was to a large degree a continuation of Soviet foreign policy, with its focus on cooperative relations with the West. This, in turn, combined with the general weakness of the Russian state, resulted in the relative disregard of other foreign policy directions. The deepening domestic power struggle led to a growing opposition toward the pro-Western course and paved the way for a number of domestic players to influence Russia’s foreign policy course. Vladimir Putin’s arrival to power in 2000 and the domestic changes he introduced freed foreign policy from most of its domestic constraints, at least temporarily. During his first presidential term (2000–2004), Russian foreign policy oscillated between competition with the West (the United States in particular) and attempts to integrate Russia as the West’s equal partner. The consolidation of the regime, which accelerated in Putin’s second presidential term (2004–2008), left its mark on foreign policy. Russia’s engagement with the external world underwent substantial changes, which turned out to be durable for the next decade and a half. Material resurgence, the strengthening of the state, and the domestic political consolidation fueled Russia’s assertiveness in international politics. These processes culminated in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech and the 2008 war with Georgia. The following period of the so-called tandemocracy (2008–2012), with Putin becoming prime minister and Dmitri Medvedev serving as president, led to a partial warming in relations with the West, though Russia continued its assertive policy. Russia also deepened its cooperation with a rising China. Putin’s return to power in 2012 initiated the conservative-nationalist turn in domestic politics, which was reflected in foreign policy. Russia increasingly positioned itself not only as a geopolitical challenger to the West, but also a normative one. The annexation of Crimea (2014), followed by the military intervention in Syria (2015), opened a new phase in Russian foreign policy. Moscow became bolder in using military force abroad and enlarged its presence in such regions as sub-Saharan Africa. The explanations of change and continuity in Russian foreign policy can be grouped in several camps, with scholars emphasizing power politics and external constraints, domestic politics, and the role of ideas and identity. The emerging trend is the growing popularity of pluralist explanations of Russian foreign policy.


Subject Prospects for Russian foreign policy in 2018. Significance Relations with the United States under President Donald Trump have failed to improve in the ways Moscow hoped and sanctions have intensified rather than eased. Moscow is therefore maintaining confrontational strategies towards the West while consolidating existing ties with China, Iran and Syria, and diversifying into new areas of the Middle East and East Asia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-462
Author(s):  
Maria Raquel Freire

This article touches upon the main dynamics in Russian foreign policy since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. Following a Constructivist approach to the analysis of foreign policy, the article positions this study at the intersection of domestic processes and external relations, as well as understanding foreign policy as a combination of material and ideational aspects. The discursive practices that drive foreign policy shaping and making are the result of social interaction, and thus, of the combination of these elements, in different formats and weights. Three main dimensions in Russias foreign policy course are identified, namely a normative one, defining the guiding principles for foreign policy shaping, the status dimension as the power-alignment underlining foreign policy making, and an identity-driven dimension, ontologically characterizing foreign policy. These three dimensions of analysis are co-constitutive and reinforce each other at different moments and in distinct configurations. The article concludes that Russian foreign policy in the last twenty years has kept its main end-goal quite stable - great power status, - what has changed have been the means - and ways of doing - to achieve this, both regarding a more assertive foreign policy, and increased pressure for revising the international order, attributing Russia the label of a revisionist power in the international system.


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