scholarly journals Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aila M. Matanock

Why does fighting recur following some civil conflict peace settlements, but not others? What kind of agreements are associated with more enduring peace? Post-conflict elections can often complicate and even undermine peace agreements. Agreements that contain “electoral participation provisions,” however, may help stabilize settlements and produce more enduring peace. Electoral participation provisions mandate that rebel groups be allowed to compete alongside the government in post-conflict elections. Such provisions encourage external actors, such as intergovernmental organizations and foreign donors, to become engaged in post-conflict elections. As part of this engagement, they can provide incentives to the parties to adhere to the terms of the settlement, as well as detect and sanction instances of noncompliance. New cross-national data suggest that conflict after peace settlements recurs less often when electoral participation provisions are included than when they are not. The data also suggest that this pacifying relationship holds when combatants expect international engagement.

Author(s):  
Idean Salehyan ◽  
Clayton L. Thyne

Civil war is an armed conflict between the state and another organized domestic party over a contested political incompatibility, which results in a number of casualties exceeding a certain threshold for both parties. Attempts to operationalize these criteria have produced many data sets, which conceptualize civil war as distinct from one-sided violence, organized crime, and communal fighting. Civil wars are devastating for states experiencing them, their neighbors, and the entire global community. Combatant and civilian deaths, rape, massive refugee flight, negative impacts on economy and infrastructure, spread of infectious diseases, global spread of illegal narcotics, and the promotion of terrorism are all consequences of civil wars. Theories explaining why civil wars occur focus on objectives of the rebels, ability of rebels to successfully challenge the government, influence of external actors on interactions between the government and the opposition, external financing of potential rebel groups, and impact of a state’s neighbors on the likelihood of civil conflict or how neighboring conflicts and refugee communities serve as breeding grounds for cross-border rebel movements. Conflicts persist until neither side believes that it can achieve unilateral victory and continued fighting is costly. Governments are more likely to win early when they have large armies, but time to government victory increases when they are faced with secessionist rebels and when external parties are involved. Meanwhile, external mediation diminishes informational and credible commitment problems during bargaining and reduces conflict duration. Promising directions for future research on civil war include geographic disaggregation, survey research, and computational/agent-based modeling.


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Maves Braithwaite ◽  
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham

Abstract Scholars have spent decades investigating various sources of rebellion, from societal and institutional explanations to individual motivations to take up arms against one's government. One element of the civil war process that has gone largely unstudied from a cross-national perspective is the role preexisting organizations in society play in the formation of rebel groups, principally due to a lack of comparable data on the origins of these armed actors across conflicts. In an effort to fill this gap, we present the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset, which offers information on the “parent” organizations and the founding processes that gave rise to rebel groups active between 1946 and 2011 in intrastate conflicts included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Database. The new information on rebel foundations introduced in this research note should help scholars to reconsider and newly explore a variety of conditions before, during, and after civil wars including rebel-civilian interactions, structures of rebel organizations, bargaining processes with the government, participation in postwar governance, and more.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 205316801773407
Author(s):  
Alan Potter

The location of the national capital is frequently contentious in domestic politics. Almost 30% of countries house their capitals outside of their largest city and 11 countries have relocated their capitals since 1960. This paper argues that locating the capital outside of the largest urban center may reduce civil conflict by limiting the ability of any single faction to dominate the government. When the government is less afraid of large urban populations in the capital, it is better able to appease multiple factions. Cross-national evidence supports this argument in that locating the capital outside of a major city is associated with a significant reduction in both violent and non-violent civil conflict.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316801772205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiffany S. Chu ◽  
Alex Braithwaite

There has been a great deal of discussion about the large volumes of foreign fighters involved in civil conflicts in Syria and Iraq over recent years. Yet, there remains little systematic evidence about the effect, if any, that foreign fighters have upon the conflicts they join. Existing literature distinguishes between the resources fighters bring to rebel groups and the liability they represent in regards to campaign cohesion. We seek to establish preliminary evidence as to whether or not foreign fighters contribute to the success of the campaigns they join. Our multinomial logistic and competing risks regression analyses of civil conflicts between 1946 and 2013 suggest that foreign fighters are associated with a decreased likelihood of government victory. Furthermore, we offer partial evidence to suggest that foreign fighters from non-contiguous countries are more likely to help rebels achieve a negotiated settlement or to continue their struggle against the government, but not to directly help them achieve victory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 1165-1192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Mi Hwa Hong

Why do some states pursue transitional justice (TJ) in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict while others do not? What drives a state to select a particular type of justice mechanism over another? Building on the political explanations of TJ, we argue that postconflict justice (PCJ) decisions are driven by the interests and power of political elites shaped by recently ended conflicts. Our empirical analysis shows that conflict outcomes and their subsequent impact on the balance of power between the government and rebel groups are the most important determinants of PCJ decisions. Domestic trials are most likely to emerge out of a decisive, one-sided victory while truth commissions and reparations are most likely to occur after a negotiated settlement. We also find that conflict severity interacts with conflict outcomes to affect PCJ decisions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph V Steinert ◽  
Janina I Steinert ◽  
Sabine C Carey

This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since these will likely have diminished after the conflict’s termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts compared to their role in the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disarmament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the government, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counterinsurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-77
Author(s):  
Charlotte Fiedler ◽  
Jörn Grävingholt ◽  
Julia Leininger ◽  
Karina Mross

Abstract This article analyzes the success factors for external engagement aimed at fostering peace in conflict-affected states. It focuses on a set of three factors that have been under-researched so far: the strategic prioritization between stability and democracy, the degree of coordination, and the mode of interaction. We compare international engagement in six countries—Burundi, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Senegal, and Timor-Leste. These countries all struggled with violent conflict and experienced a democratic transition in the period 2000–2014. We use an innovative approach to assess the impact of external engagement by analyzing twenty critical junctures in the domestic political processes of these countries mainly linked to elections, constitution-writing processes, and peace agreements, as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Based on over 300 interviews, we find that prioritizing stability over democratization is problematic, good international coordination has positive effects, and preferring cooperative forms of interaction over coercion is mostly but not always useful. In discussing these general features of international support, this article contributes to the broader discussion of factors that explain the impact external actors can have on transformative political processes after conflict.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272098340
Author(s):  
Ingrid Vik Bakken ◽  
Halvard Buhaug

Recent research has directed attention to the transformative potential of war for female empowerment. As a disruptive shock, armed conflict can create a window of opportunity for advancing the societal role of women. We complement this research agenda by looking at how conflict severity and termination condition the outcomes for women in the aftermath of civil conflict. We expect that both level of violence and mode of resolution affect subsequent female empowerment, where severe conflicts ending by a negotiated settlement have the greatest transformative potential. Consistent with expectations, we find that post-conflict improvements in female empowerment occur primarily after high-intensity civil conflicts. However, subsequent tests reveal that this effect is driven largely by conflicts terminated by peace agreements. The greatest improvement in female empowerment is seen when peace agreements have gender-specific provisions. These results support calls for a sustained effort toward mainstreaming gender issues in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-526
Author(s):  
Jungmoo Woo

The literature on civil war onset focuses on the effect of oil on domestic actors but relatively little suggests its effect on external actors who can intervene in an oil-producing state, although most revenues of oil-producing states are generated by their oil export to other states. This article advances a theory of oil export, external prewar support for the government, and civil war onset. In the international oil market, although oil is a primary energy source in most states, there are few oil exporters. This implies that costs of breaking an oil trade tie are greater for an oil-importing state vis-à-vis an oil-exporting state and, thus, oil-importing states are likely to have concerns about oil-exporting states’ political instability that can cause civil conflict onset and break their oil trade ties. I hypothesize that a state’s oil export increases the likelihood of external prewar support for its government. However, because oil-exporting states are likely to conceal the information about their oil export to prevent public grievances against the distribution of oil revenues and their governments’ incompetence in oil export, rebels are less likely to have complete information about oil export. The secrecy of oil export hinders finding a mutually acceptable bargaining range between the government and rebels, and increases the likelihood of civil conflict onset in oil-exporting states without external support for the government. I measure each state’s oil export using network analysis, and test these hypotheses using logit models. Empirical results support the hypotheses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 466-481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph M Cox

Post-conflict justice is an integral component in maintaining stability and building peace in the aftermath of civil conflict. Despite its instrumental function, scholars routinely find that policymakers’ choice of justice is shaped by the structural conditions of the post-conflict environment, with outright victories leading to retributive forms of justice and negotiated outcomes yielding restorative forms of justice. However, existing literature conflates ceasefires and peace agreements into a single phenomenon, thereby overlooking the independent effects of each outcome. Leveraging the dual sovereignty framework, this article argues the conflation of negotiated outcomes is problematic because peace agreements and ceasefires generate different post-conflict environments. Relative to ceasefires, peace agreements lead to a reduction in the degree of dual sovereignty because they resolve a conflict’s incompatibility, thereby encouraging efforts to move society beyond war through restorative forms of justice. Due to the persistent threat of recurrent war generated by high levels of dual sovereignty, policymakers following ceasefires will be inclined to pursue retributive forms of justice that may target political opponents or potential defectors to bolster organizational strength. Statistical analyses confirm the underlying expectation that ceasefires and peace agreements yield different post-conflict justice outcomes. Peace agreements, relative to ceasefires, are more likely to be followed by the implementation of amnesties and reparations, whereas ceasefires exhibit a greater probability of yielding purges in the post-conflict environment.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document