Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam: Thinking Clearly about Causation

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 124-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan D. Caverley

Cost distribution theory suggests that the costs to the median voter in a democracy of fighting an insurgency with firepower are relatively low compared to a more labor-intensive approach. Therefore, this voter will favor a capitalintensive counterinsurgency campaign despite the resulting diminished prospects of victory. Primary and secondary sources show that President Lyndon Johnson and his civilian aides were very much aware that, although they considered a main force—focused and firepower-intensive strategy to be largely ineffective against the insurgency in South Vietnam, it was politically more popular in the United States. Importantly, civil-military agreement on warfighting strategy does not undermine this explanation, which assumes that civilian leaders, and ultimately the public, play an essential role in that strategy's determination. Appointing and supporting Gen. William Westmoreland was just one means by which the Johnson administration ensured that the U.S. military emphasized the fight against conventional enemy units and relied on the use of firepower for the fight against Vietcong insurgents. Civil-military disagreements over strategy, however rare, therefore provide the essential test of cost distribution theory's explanatory power. When officials suggested that the U.S. military adopt more labor-intensive pacification approaches to fight the insurgency, the Johnson administration rejected them.

2020 ◽  
pp. 165-188
Author(s):  
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres

This chapter describes the efforts by the United States and Eduardo Frei to prevent Salvador Allende from attaining the presidency. The Nixon administration, after choosing not to involve itself in the 1970 presidential race to the extent the Johnson administration had in the 1964 election, reacted with great alacrity to Allende's victory in the popular election. Richard Nixon himself instructed CIA director Richard Helms to conduct covert operations in Chile, behind Ambassador Korry's back. In addition, Chilean politicians, particularly Christian Democrats of the Frei line, tried or at least explored ways of averting an Allende victory and sought for that purpose the support of the U.S. embassy in Santiago. Though many of the documents that tell this part of the story have been available to researchers since at least the early 2000s, only one scholarly work has treated these attempts by Chilean politicians, especially Eduardo Frei, in depth. The tendency of scholars of U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War to assume rather uncritically that the only decisions that mattered were taken in Washington has narrowed the perspectives from which the history of Cold War Chilean politics has been studied and interpreted.


1986 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 629-649 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elias T. Nigem

This article examines the status of Arab Americans in the United States in light of their migration history and selected demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Using the “Ancestry question” to define this group, and data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and other secondary sources, the findings indicate that Arab Americans, although a recent group, share similar migratory forces with other emigrant groups. However, they are above the national average in terms of socioeconomic status. Also, there appears to be a difference with respect to socioeconomic and demographic characteristics between those of single- and multiple-ancestry groups.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-77
Author(s):  
Edwin Moise

In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson sharply escalated the U.S. military effort in Vietnam and prepared for further escalation in 1966. He and his aides, notably Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, did their best to forestall a public debate about the potential costs of the war. They concealed their plans for increased military expenditures and expanded commitments of American troops. Not until the United States was deeply embroiled in Vietnam did a full-fledged public debate finally emerge, along with protests and demonstrations at American universities. If the administration had been more candid about its plans from the outset, U.S. policy might have gone in a different direction, and the domestic and international costs of the war might not have been as onerous.


Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


Author(s):  
Youngbee Dale ◽  

This paper describes various fraudulent visas used by criminals operating in the U.S. sex market. Studies show that many foreign women exploited through commercial sex rely on visa brokers to enter the U.S. However, scholars have not investigated various visa brokers and the techniques they use to bring foreign women into U.S. prostitution as a whole. Therefore, this paper aims to provide an overview of the different types of fraudulent visas and criminal techniques used in the U.S. sex market. In doing so, this paper relies on both primary and secondary sources, such as interviews with both survivors and U.S. government officials, scholarly articles, NGO reports, U.S. legal cases, press releases, online forums, news reports, and blogs written in English, Russian, Korean, and Chinese. This paper then discusses the current issues with combating visa fraud in the U.S. sex market and provides recommendations to fight the problem more effectively.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syeda Menebhi

<p>The United States became deeply involved in Vietnam during the 1960s largely due to America’s desire to assure that developing countries modernize as capitalist and democratic. Thus, American involvement began with economic and social support in South Vietnam. Yet slowly, throughout the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the goal of modernizing South Vietnamese society and containing communism became increasingly implemented by military means. Further, it seems clear that, regardless of how much effort the United States geared towards Vietnam, American defeat was inevitable. By Richard Nixon’s presidency, the initial modernization goals in Vietnam mattered only in so far as they could preserve American credibility. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all failed to realize that while U.S. time was limited in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese had all the time they needed to fight for the independence of their country. The South Vietnamese forces could not defend themselves and the United States had to withdraw eventually.</p>


2013 ◽  
pp. 82-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Bonds

Despite widespread beliefs that the United States has not used chemical weapons since the distant past of World War I, this study suggests a more complicated history by examining U.S. use of herbicides and incapacitating gases in the Vietnam War and its use of herbicides in the "War on Drugs." This article places such use of toxic violence within a context of U.S. hegemony, by which U.S. officials have used contested forms of violence to secure geopolitical goals, but have also been pressured to comply with humanitarian norms or-when there is a gap between norms and state policy-to do legitimating work in order to maintain domestic and international consent. Based on case study analysis of archival and secondary sources, this article identifies three main techniques U.S. officials use to legitimate contested forms of violence. These techniques are defensive categorization, humanitizing discourse, and surrogacy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-219
Author(s):  
Galen Jackson

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States took a relatively passive approach to Middle East peacemaking. The passivity shown by the administration of President Lyndon Johnson stemmed primarily from its belief that the Arab states had failed to make reasonable proposals for an agreement and from the White House's awareness that pressuring Israel would likely have significant domestic political consequences. Thus, even though it felt the need to press Israel to withdraw to prewar boundaries as part of a settlement, the administration made little effort to achieve an agreement on that basis.


2018 ◽  
pp. 3-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Turse

This chapter presents a broad summary of this conflict, beginning with its roots in nineteenth-century colonial French Indochina. It details the buildup of U.S. military and economic aid to the South Vietnamese regime after French withdrawal, early U.S. intervention in the ongoing civil war between North and South Vietnam, and the gradual escalation of America’s presence in Southeast Asia under presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. It describes how and where the war was fought, who served and why, and on-going political and social movements in the U.S. throughout the war and after U.S. withdrawal. It summarizes the human costs in Vietnam and the United States. It describes attempts by psychiatrists to create frameworks for understanding and addressing the trauma, anguish, alienation, and rage experienced and expressed by the U.S. veterans who fought this controversial war, including official recognition in the new diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.


2005 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-440
Author(s):  
PIERRE ASSELIN

The spring 1965 deployment of U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam and initiation of sustained aerial and naval bombardments of the North by the U.S. military marked a turning point in the history of the Vietnamese Revolution. Until recently, Western scholars only vaguely understood Hanoi's attitude toward those developments and what they meant for the revolution it spearheaded. Newly available materials from Vietnam provide a clearer picture of the concerns of North Vietnamese policymakers in the period immediately before and after the American intervention. Based on such materials, this article demonstrates that, when it committed the North to a wider war with the United States, Hanoi did so reluctantly. Having made the commitment, however, it stopped at nothing to guarantee the ultimate success of its efforts.


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