Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack S. Levy ◽  
William R. Thompson

Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable. Its core propositions about balancing strategies and the absence of sustained hegemonies apply to the European system and perhaps to some other autonomous continental systems but not to the global maritime system. Sea powers are more interested in access to markets than in territorial aggrandizement against other great powers. Consequently, patterns of coalition formation have been different in the European system and in the global maritime system during the last five centuries. An empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system. Higher concentrations of power in the global system lead to fewer and smaller rather than more frequent and larger balancing coalitions, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it.

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Layne

The conventional wisdom among U.S. grand strategists is that U.S. hegemony is exceptional—that the United States need not worry about other states engaging in counterhegemonic balancing against it. The case for U.S. hegemonic exceptionalism, however, is weak. Contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, no new great powers have emerged since the end of the Cold War to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—that is, at least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. Here, however, they conflate the absence of a new distribution of power in the international political system with the absence of balancing behavior by the major second-tier powers. Moreover, the primacists' focus on the failure of new great powers to emerge, and the absence of traditional “hard” (i.e., military) counterbalancing, distracts attention from other forms of counterbalancing—notably “leash-slipping”—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the same result: the end of unipolarity. Because unipolarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony, if it ends, so too will U.S. primacy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 494-515
Author(s):  
Augusto César Dall'Agnol

This article aims to analyze, through a critical bias, the implications of unipolarity to balancing behavior. In order to do so, it discusses the dynamics of balance of power theory, assumed to be inoperative in the post-Cold War period by the main academic debates over unipolarity: i) unipolar stability; ii) balance of threats; iii) soft balancing; iv) liberal institutionalism. What is argued is that, including the unipolar illusion view, tied to the balance of power theory, these approaches overestimated the effects of the unipolarity to the balancing behavior of other states. In this sense, it is assumed here that the issues related to the unipolar moment are directly connected to the hegemonic interregnum discussions. By concluding that the dynamics of balance of power, especially those of hard balancing, are still observed in the post-Cold War era, the two main ponderations of the literature become inverted: i) that balancing became inoperative and; ii) that the only available strategies to other states would be soft balancing and bandwagoning. In sum, this conclusion has directly implication to the available strategies both to the United States and its main peer competitors.         Recebido em: Agosto/2018. Aprovado: Setembro/2018.


Author(s):  
George W. Breslauer

Several theories are considered to explain the determinants of Cold War between the United States and the USSR, countries that had been allies until 1945. If Stalin, not FDR, had died in 1945, there might have been a greater prospect of continued cooperation between the two great powers.


Author(s):  
Barry Buzan ◽  
Evelyn Goh

Chapter 4 begins in present-day NEA, and unpacks its core strategic problem of uncertainty associated with an apparent power transition, relating it squarely to the enforced alienation between the two indigenous great powers, China and Japan. It argues that neither a purely power-political understanding nor one that overly emphasizes nationalism and domestic impediments has been especially helpful to advancing our understanding of how Sino-Japanese alienation serves to constrain the development of East Asia’s post-Cold War order. Instead, one should understand the contemporary problem as resulting from the disintegration of the region’s post-Second World War settlement that centred on the United States acting as a ring-holder between China and Japan. Introducing the great power bargain framework, it shows how we might usefully distinguish between the constitutive and regulative aspects of such bargains. It then employs this framework to analyse Sino-Japanese alienation after the long nineteenth century, examining how efforts to create a partial new bargain between 1945 and 1989 were eventually undermined by the two countries’ changing characters and politics after the Cold War.


2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy, meaning that it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia and China with a nuclear first strike. A simple nuclear exchange model demonstrates that the United States has a potent first-strike capability. The trajectory of nuclear developments suggests that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in favor of the United States in coming years. The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy has significant implications for relations among the world's great powers, for U.S. foreign policy, and for international relations scholarship.


Diálogos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 126
Author(s):  
Adriano De Freixo

A partir dos anos 1950, no auge do processo de descolonização afro-asiática, Portugal sofreu diversas pressões internacionais devido à sua política colonial. Marcado historicamente por sua debilidade econômica, o país havia implementado um modelo colonialista baseado na abertura de seus domínios ultramarinos à atuação do capital internacional, em um modelo de colonialismo dependente. Este fato, aliado aos interesses estratégicos dos EUA e da OTAN, no contexto da Guerra Fria, fez com que as grandes potências acabassem esvaziando as pressões contrárias ao colonialismo português. Assim, apesar da política isolacionista implementada pelo regime salazarista e da condenação da opinião pública internacional, os interesses econômicos e financeiros das grandes potências e as determinações político-estratégicas da conjuntura internacional acabaram por garantir alguma sobrevida ao Império Colonial Luso até meados da década de 1970. Abstract The crisis of the last empire: the Cold War and the final decades of Portuguese colonialism (1945-1975) From the 1950s onwards, at the height of the process of Afro-Asian decolonization, Portugal underwent various international pressures due to its colonial policy. Historically marked by its economic weakness, the country had implemented a dependent colonialist model based on the opening of its overseas domains to the international capital. In addition, the strategic interests of the United States and NATO within the context of the Cold War resulted in a deflation of the pressures against Portuguese colonialism by the great powers. Hence, despite the isolationist policy implemented by the Salazar regime and the condemnation of colonialism by international public opinion, the economic and financial interests of the great powers, as well the political and strategic constraints of the international conjuncture, granted the survival to the Portuguese Colonial Empire until the mid-1970s. Resumen La crisis del último imperio: la Guerra Fría y las últimas décadas del colonialismo portugués (1945-1975) Desde la década de 1950, en el apogeo del proceso de descolonización africano-asiática, Portugal sufrió varias presiones internacionales debido a su política colonial. Marcado históricamente por su debilidad económica, el país había implementado un modelo colonialista basado en la apertura de sus dominios de ultramar a la actuación del capital internacional, en un modelo de colonialismo dependiente. Este hecho, junto con los intereses estratégicos de los EE.UU. y la OTAN en el contexto de la Guerra Fría, hizo que las grandes potencias acabaran por vaciar las presiones contra el colonialismo portugués. Así, a pesar de la política aislacionista implementada por el régimen salazarista y la condena por la opinión pública internacional, los intereses económicos y financieros de las grandes potencias y las determinaciones político-estratégicas de la coyuntura internacional acabaron por garantizar alguna sobrevida al Imperio Colonial Luso hasta mediados de la década de 1970


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1317-1333
Author(s):  
Norrin M Ripsman

Abstract Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.


1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Pastor

For 40 years, the United States was so fearful of a thermonuclear bang that it barely noticed the whimper when the Cold War ended. There was not even any agreement on the date of the war’s end. Still, the people of the United States sensed its eagle had completed a great adventure and was returning to its nest, and that’s where they wanted it.President George Bush was more sensitive to the shift in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf than to the swing in US mood. His quick success in the Persian Gulf lifted his popularity to a zenith, making his reelection defeat the next year all the more painful and seemingly inexplicable.


Author(s):  
Lu Ding ◽  
Xuefeng Sun

Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, establishing partnerships has been part and parcel of the grand strategy of great powers. The partners that great powers seek fall under the two categories of security partners and political-economic partners. Statistics show a significant variation in the proportions of great powers’ security partners. The authors argue that such variation is mainly determined by two factors, namely, great powers’ strategic threats, and their ways of maintaining national security [self-help or security-dependent (on the United States)]. Specifically, both the security-dependent great powers that are under China’s strategic threat and the self-help great powers that are under the US’s strategic threat have a higher proportion of security partners than the security-dependent great powers that are not under China’s strategic threat and the self-help great powers that are under China’s strategic threat. These findings will help to refine the current theories of great power politics.


Author(s):  
Vladimir PECHATNOV

The concluding results of the anti-Hitler coalition meeting in Yalta have long been criticized in the United States by the antagonists of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy. In recent decades, they have raised renewed criticism in Central and Eastern Europe and across the West. Though, the decisions of Yalta Conference were fully determined by the balance of power and the real military situation on the war theatre by spring 1945. Each of the Allies pursued their own interests, but they appeared able to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise of these interests for the sake of final victory over common enemy. The Yalta Conference manifested the last upsurge of the Allied cooperation and in no way it served a prologue to the Cold War as it is now being asserted.


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