scholarly journals The Problem of Monopolies & Corporate Public Corruption

Daedalus ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 147 (3) ◽  
pp. 111-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zephyr Teachout

Defining corruption as the exercise of public power for private, selfish ends, many theorists have argued that individuals can be corrupt even if their actions are legal. This essay explores the knotty question of when legal corporate action is corrupt. It argues that when corporations exercise public power, either through monopolistic control of a market or through campaign contributions and support of governmental actors, they are subject to the same responsibilities of anyone who exercises public power. Therefore, as a theoretical matter, we should call corporations corrupt when they exercise public power selfishly, in a way that puts their own interests over the public's interests. Because they make legal corporate corruption less likely, global anticorruption campaigns should therefore emphasize antimonopoly laws and campaign finance laws.

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 1000-1035
Author(s):  
Ben Gaskins ◽  
Ellen Seljan ◽  
Todd Lochner ◽  
Katie Kowal ◽  
Zane Dundon ◽  
...  

Scholarship suggests the Federal Election Commission lacks adequate enforcement tools to deter those who would violate campaign finance laws. But can and do voters hold political candidates accountable for violating these laws? In this article, we employ two studies to empirically evaluate these questions. The first examines the extent to which media cover campaign finance violations, and how they do so. The second employs an experimental approach to test the effects of such media coverage on evaluations of political candidates, in particular whether knowledge of a candidate’s violation of campaign finance laws erodes voter support. We find that the media are more likely to cover campaign finance impropriety for high-profile offices, when criminal action is alleged, and for most serious violations. We also show that voters care about campaign violations, and certain violations lower voter support similar to other types of political scandal.


2006 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Deborah Goldberg

2001 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Samuels

AbstractBrazil’s 1993 law requiring candidates to report their campaign contributions has generated a new source of data to explore the supposition that Brazilian elections are extraordinarily expensive. An examination of these data from Brazil’s 1994 and 1998 general elections reveals that most money for Brazilian electoral campaigns comes from business sources and that leftist candidates have extremely limited access to such financing. The effect on democracy is that Brazil’s largely unregulated campaign finance system tends to decrease the scope of interest representation.


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