Inequality is Always in the Room: Language & Power in Deliberative Democracy

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Lupia ◽  
Anne Norton
Keyword(s):  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Power Relationships ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Power Asymmetries ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
The Common ◽  
Focal Power

Deliberative democracy has the potential to legitimize collective decisions. Deliberation's legitimating potential, however, depends on whether those who deliberate truly enter as equals, whether they are able to express on equal terms their visions of the common good, and whether the forms and practices that govern deliberative assemblies advance or undermine their goals. Here, we examine these sources of deliberation's legitimating potential. We contend that even in situations of apparent procedural equality, deliberation's legitimating potential is limited by its potential to increase normatively focal power asymmetries. We conclude by describing how deliberative contexts can be modified to reduce certain types of power asymmetries, such as those often associated with gender, race, or class. In so doing, we hope to help readers consider a broader range of factors that influence the outcomes of attempts to restructure power relationships through communicative forums.

scholarly journals Contemporary Nigeria and the Deficit of Deliberative Democracy: Exploring the Indigenous Value of Àgbájọ ọwọ́ as Collegiality

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Ronald Olufemi Badru
Keyword(s):  
Critical Point ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Democratic Practice ◽  
The Common

The paper advances three groups of interrelated claims. First, a fundamental deficit of democratic practice in contemporary Nigeria is that electoral choices/candidates are largely disconnected from the spirit of vibrant deliberation/consideration by the Nigerian demos. Second, candidates that emerge tend to be more parochially disposed to serving the interests of the political sponsors, rather than working towards the promotion of the common good. Third, to address the problem of the research, it is argued that well-meaning, democratically conscious Nigerians should practically embrace the indigenous value of àgbájọ ọwọ́as collegiality to resist electoral choices/candidates of the noted politically influential elites. As one of the socio-moral values of an ideal Yoruba persona, or ọmọlúwàbí, àgbájọ ọwọ́ underscores the critical point that the realty of the common good properly derives from a rational collaboration of the members of a political collectivity. Ultimately, this understanding of collegiality helps in the promotion of deliberative democracy and its benefits in Nigeria.

scholarly journals The Moral Legitimacy of NGOs as Partners of Corporations

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothea Baur ◽  
Guido Palazzo
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Moral Legitimacy ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Common

ABSTRACT:Partnerships between companies and NGOs have received considerable attention in CSR in the past years. However, the role of NGO legitimacy in such partnerships has thus far been neglected. We argue that NGOs assume a status as special stakeholders of corporations which act on behalf of the common good. This role requires a particular focus on their moral legitimacy. We introduce a conceptual framework for analysing the moral legitimacy of NGOs along three dimensions, building on the theory of deliberative democracy. Against this background we outline three procedural characteristics which are essential for judging the legitimacy of NGOs as potential or actual partners of corporations.

scholarly journals Bleaching preferences: Why deliberative procedure should include self-interested preferences

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-93
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic
Keyword(s):  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Public Deliberation ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Desirable Feature ◽  
Open Debate ◽  
The Common

Someone might vote for an option that on his or her view best promotes his or her self-interest. But, someone might vote for an option that promotes what he or she sees as a common good. The point is that there is no necessity here. Empirically oriented investigations showed that people vote both for self-centered and prosocial reasons. On the standard account of deliberative democracy public discussion is oriented towards achieving the common good. In this paper I shall argue that there is no necessity in supposing that public deliberation will lead to consensus over the common good. If consensus over the common good is neither realistic, nor desirable feature of public deliberation, then the most that practically oriented deliberative democrats might hope for is an open debate which may influence post-deliberative voting. Or so I shall argue. On this account, deliberative democracy makes more probable that outcome of the voting procedure will reflect concerns over the common good. According to this conception the appeal to selfinterest is not ex hypothesi excluded. The role of public deliberation is to bring to the fore both self-centered and prosocial concerns, and eventually to show why prosocial concerns should override private concerns. But there is no necessity here. The most important thing is to have sound procedure for weighting the reasons that speak both for and against self-interested concerns.

Must Democracy Be Reasonable?

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Christiano
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Past ◽  
Moral Debate ◽  
The Common

Democratic theorists stress the importance of free and equal discussion and debate in a well-functioning democratic process. In this process, citizens attempt to persuade each other to support legislation by appealing to considerations of justice, liberty or the common good and are open to changing their minds when hearing the arguments of others. They are concerned to ground policy and legislation on the most defensible considerations of morality and the best empirical evidence. To be sure, majority rule remains important in democratic decision making because of the persistence of disagreement. But many have argued that debates over legislation that appeal to moral considerations ought to be given a much larger place in our understanding of the ideals of democracy than theorists have given them in the past. This emphasis on the importance of moral debate and discussion in democracy is characteristic of what I call the wide view of deliberative democracy.

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