Just War Theory & the Conduct of Asymmetric Warfare

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Allen S. Weiner

A central element of the dominant view of just war theory is the moral equality of soldiers: combatants have equal rights to wage war against one another and are entitled to certain protections if captured, without regard to which side's cause of war is just. But whether and how this principle should apply in asymmetric armed conflicts between states and nonstate groups is profoundly unsettled. I argue that we should confer war rights on fighters for nonstate groups when they are engaged in violence that has risen to the level of armed conflict, and when the state against which the war is being waged is not entitled to assert its monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force, either because 1) the nonstate group has established sufficient control over territory to assert its own governing authority; or 2) because the group is located abroad. Conferring war rights on nonstate fighters does not, however, permit them to engage in acts that violate the laws of war. Fighters who commit such violations are individually subject to prosecution without regard to their group's entitlement to war rights.

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Luban

AbstractThis essay examines the similarities, but even more the dissimilarities, between (nonrevisionist) just war theory and the laws of war. The similarities are obvious: both just war theory and the laws of war distinguish jus ad bellum from jus in bello, and incorporate the principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity. The dissimilarities derive from the special character of law. Law needs binary, yes-no standards for drawing lines, for example between armed conflict and lesser forms of violence. Laws come in packages (regimes), so that changing only one law is not always practicable. And legal propositions, unlike philosophical propositions, are often detachable from their reasons and applied in unexpected and unwelcome ways. This is especially important in the stresses of battle, when rules of warfare must be usable “off the shelf” by middle- or lower-ranked personnel with no opportunity for bespoke deliberation. The essay provides contemporary illustrations of these differences.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Finkelstein

Abstract:In his famous book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer articulates a thesis he calls the “Moral Equality of Soldiers,” namely, the principle that combatants have an equal right to kill other combatants in war, regardless of the justice of the cause for which they are fighting. The Moral Equality Thesis, as I shall call it, is an essential component of traditional Just War Theory, in that it provides the basis for distinguishing the jus in bello from the jus ad bellum. It also plays a crucial role in identifying the nature of the difference between combatants and civilians. The Moral Equality Thesis has recently come under attack by scholars of Just War Theory, notably philosopher Jeff McMahan, on the grounds that killing for immoral purposes cannot be justified, and so it cannot be true that combatants all have an equal right to kill, regardless of the justice of their cause. In this essay, I defend the Moral Equality Thesis in its traditional formulation. Without it, I argue, the rule of law would not apply in war. The failure to recognize the equal right of combatants to kill in war, I suggest, creates an inconsistency between the rules of war and basic concepts in the law and morality of self-defense, an inconsistency that McMahan himself would think undesirable. I argue that McMahan’s argument applies more compellingly to armed conflict in asymmetrical warfare. Arguably, the Moral Equality Thesis does not apply in an armed conflict between combatants and unlawful combatants. In that context, the divergence from the law and morality of self-defense is less of a concern.


Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

The first chapter opens the substantive analysis of the organization requirement for non-state parties to armed conflicts. First, it briefly examines why the laws of war have originally been state-focused, and shows how this state focus coined international law requirements of main characteristics of a party to an armed conflict. Second, it analyses how philosophers broadened the legal notion of ‘war’ as to include conflicts involving certain non-state entities. Subsequently, this chapter examines state practice to identify which qualities a non-state armed group needed to possess to obtain the ‘belligerent’ status. It also examines the question of which kind of entities could qualify as ‘insurgents’ or ‘rebels’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 365-388
Author(s):  
Pablo Kalmanovitz

Abstract Over the past 25 years, criminal prosecutions for war crimes have become a central element in the long-standing project of governing hostilities in international law. According to many, the threat of criminal prosecutions can be a general deterrent against violations of the laws of war, and can contribute more broadly to the diffusion and domestic appropriation of humanitarian norms. This article discusses some unintended effects of this “anti-impunity turn” in the laws of war in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Specifically, it examines the consequences of the fact that states typically have a monopoly over the means of legitimate criminal investigation for alleged crimes committed in their territory. Far from operating on a level playing field, criminal investigations in war contexts must be undertaken under institutional conditions that tend to favor state agents over non-state opposition groups. The article spells out some implications of this form of state bias and argues that it can contribute to exacerbate conflict and prolong violence in war.


1974 ◽  
Vol 14 (163) ◽  
pp. 527-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danièle Bujard

The year 1974 marks the centennial of the International Declaration of Brussels on the Laws and Customs of War. This effort to codify the most important laws of war, undertaken on the initiative of Czar Alexander II of Russia, constituted a decisive stage in the development of the law of war. It is this event which the Committee for the Protection of Human Life in Armed Conflicts, under the patronage of the Belgian Government, proposes to commemorate by an international seminar on the theme “The Concept of International Armed Conflict—New Perspectives”, in December of this year.


Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations.


2008 ◽  
Vol 90 (872) ◽  
pp. 835-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Wenger ◽  
Simon J. A. Mason

AbstractCivilians play an increasingly important and complex role in armed conflicts, both as victims and as perpetrators. While this overall trend towards ‘civilianization’ encompasses all types of present-day conflicts, it is twofold: it takes on a very different nature in high-technology warfare than in the context of low-technology combats that are typical of many civil wars. This article explores these two trends, shows how they merge in asymmetric warfare and outlines key implications for international stabilization and state-building efforts. The present-day conflict landscape is presented from a security policy point of view, placing the ongoing debates on the civilian participation in hostilities in a broader strategic context.


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (11) ◽  
pp. 58-73
Author(s):  
Arseniy D. Kumankov

The article deals with the problem of moral justification of humanitarian intervention by modern just war theorists. At the beginning of the article, we discuss the evolution of the dominant paradigms of the moral justification of war and explain why the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention appears only at the present stage of the development of ethics and the law of war. It is noted that theorization of humanitarian intervention began in the last decades of the 20th century. This is due to a significant transformation, a retreat in the legal and ethical studies of war from the position of radical condemnation of aggressive actions and the recognition of the political subjectivity of non-state groups. Thus, there is a rethinking of the long tradition, the Westphalian system of international relations, according to which the state was recognized as the main participant of big politics, and its sovereign right to conduct domestic policy was considered indisputable. Further, we take the works of Michael Walzer as the main source of modern conceptualization of the ethics of humanitarian interventionism, since Walzer repeatedly addressed this topic and formulated a position on this issue that is representative of the entire modern Just War Theory. The arguments of Walzer and his supporters in favor of the moral justification of humanitarian intervention are considered. Among them are the following. First, the argument about the state as an organization which goal is to protect the rights of its own citizens. If this goal is not not achieved, the state shall loose its power over these people and in this territory. Second, Walzer calls for identifying governments and armed forces involved in mass murders as criminal and, therefore, deserving of punishment. Finally, there is, perhaps the most important, demonstrative argument: an appeal to the self-evident impossibility to stand aside in cases of mass violence in any state. This is followed by a critique of these arguments, as well as a demonstration of how the modern Just War Theory can respond to these criticisms.


Diametros ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Maciej Marek Zając

Just War Theory debates discussing the principle of the Moral Equality of Combatants (MEC) involve the notion of Invincible Ignorance; the claim that warfi ghters are morally excused for participating in an unjust war because of their epistemic limitations. Conditions of military deployment may indeed lead to genuinely insurmountable epistemic limitations. In other cases, these may be overcome. This paper provides a preliminary sketch of heuristics designed to allow a combatant to judge whether or not his war is just. It delineates the sets of relevant facts uncontroversially accessible and inaccessible to contemporary professional soldiers. Relevant facts outside these two sets should by default be treated as inaccessible until proven otherwise. Even such a rudimentary heuristic created in this way demonstrates that practical recommendations of MEC-renouncing Just War Theory are not too challenging to follow and still signifi cantly impact a compliant combatant’s behavior.


Author(s):  
Reagr F. Muhammadamin ◽  
Bryar S. Baban

The protection of women during armed conflicts has from time to time been a matter of concern to the international community in various forms and degrees. The laws of war have regulated the protection of women long before the Geneva Conventions and additional protocols system. The aim of this paper is to highlight the protection that women should be given in armed conflict, also taking into account their special needs.


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