Has the Supreme Court Been More a Friend or Foe to African Americans?

Daedalus ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 140 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Klarman

This essay challenges the conventional wisdom that regards the Supreme Court as a heroic defender of the rights of racial minorities against majority oppression. It argues that over the course of American history, the Court, more often than not, has been a regressive force on racial issues. Klarman draws three lessons from his survey of the Court's racial jurisprudence: (1) the composition of the Court influences whether its racial jurisprudence is progressive or regressive; (2) the composition of the Court is, in significant part, a reflection of national politics; and (3) the Court's constitutional interpretations regarding race – just as on any other issue – broadly reflect the political and social climate of the era and thus rarely deviate far from dominant public opinion.

Author(s):  
Will Guzmán

This chapter recounts how Nixon helped lay the foundation for Black voting rights in the South as the central plaintiff in two landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases: Nixon v. Herndon (1927) and Nixon v. Condon (1932), and the little-discussed case of Nixon v. McCann (1934), Nixon's third attempt to dismantle the all-white Democratic primary. Nixon, along with the NAACP, helped set legal precedent that ultimately led to the dismantling of all-white primaries throughout the entire South. The political and social climate at the local, state, and national levels during the 1920s, as well as the 1923 Texas law that barred African Americans from voting in the Democratic primaries, compelled Nixon and the NAACP to take action. As these changes were brewing in the South, many—such as the Ku Klux Klan—would come to see them as a threat.


Daedalus ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 141 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
Linda Greenhouse

The relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion remains ambiguous, despite efforts over many years by scholars both of the Court and of mass behavior to decipher it. Certainly Supreme Court Justices live in the world, and are propelled by the political system to their life-tenured positions. And certainly the Court, over time, appears to align itself with the broadly defined public mood. But the mechanism by which this occurs–the process by which the Court and the public engage one another in a highly attenuated dialogue–remains obscure. The Court's 1973 abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, offers a case in point. As the country began to reconsider the wisdom of the nineteenth-century criminalization of abortion, which voices did the Justices hear and to which did they respond? Probing beneath the surface of the public response to Roe serves to highlight rather than solve the puzzle.


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1139-1153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory A. Caldeira

I show the intimate connection between the actions of the justices and support for the Supreme Court during one of the most critical periods of U.S. political history, the four months of 1937 during which Franklin D. Roosevelt sought legislation to “pack” the high bench with friendly personnel. Over the period from 3 February through 10 June 1937, the Gallup Poll queried national samples on 18 separate occasions about FDR's plan. These observations constitute the core of my analyses. I demonstrate the crucial influence of judicial behavior and the mass media in shaping public opinion toward the Supreme Court. This research illuminates the dynamics of public support for the justices, contributes to a clearer understanding of an important historical episode, shows the considerable impact of the mass media on public attitudes toward the Court, and adds more evidence on the role of political events in the making of public opinion.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-28
Author(s):  
Dragutin Avramović

Following hypothesis of Andrew Watson, American professor of Psychiatry and Law, the author analyses certain psychological impacts on behavior of judges and examines the relationship between their idiosyncrasies and their judicial decisions. The survey encompasses the judges of Criminal Department of the Supreme Court of Cassation of the Republic of Serbia and, also, for comparative reasons, the judges of Criminal Department of the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Considering the main issues there is no great discrepancy between answers given by the judges of the Supreme Court and those of the Basic Court. Most responses of the Serbian judges deviate from Watson's conclusions, namely: they do not admit that they feel frustrated due to heavy caseloads, the significant majority of judges are reluctant to acknowledge their prejudices and influence of biases on their ruling, the significant majority of judges are not burdened with the idea of possible misuse of their discretion, they nearly unanimously deny that public opinion and media pressure affect their rulings, etc. Generally, the judges in Serbia are not willing to admit that they cannot always overcome their own subjectivities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 223
Author(s):  
Thiago Aguiar Pádua

RESUMOEste artigo busca dialogar com recentemente artigo publicado pelo professor Eduardo Mendonça, no qual expõe a percepção de que o desgaste da representação político-parlamentar daria lugar a uma atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal como representante da opinião pública. Discordamos de sua construção teórica a partir de recurso metodológico da argumentação jurídica. Realizamos análise sobre dois documentos contextualizados de nossa historiografia constitucional, advindos as vésperas de dois períodos de exceção, e que também se fundamentavam no mesmo desgaste da representação político-parlamentar: 1) missiva escrita por Monteiro Lobato em 1924 ao presidente Artur Bernardes, e, portanto, as vésperas da revolução de 1930; e, 2) artigo-manifesto escrito por Goffredo Telles Jr em 1963, e assim sendo, as vésperas do golpe de Estado Civil-Militar de 1964. Articulamos discussão de premissas, utilizando o pensamento do jurista e sociólogo argentino Roberto Gargarella, discutindo as causas do desgaste da representação político-parlamentar, constatando que tal desgaste decorre da forma como as instituições foram desenhadas, de maneira a afastar a cidadania das discussões políticas, por temor do fenômeno democrático. Concluímos constatando que ao invés de se realizar empoderamento de um agente decisório, de duvidosa conotação democrática como o STF, mais adequado seria estimular e fomentar o acesso da população à “Sala de Máquinas da Constituição”.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Desgaste da Representação Política; Suprema Corte; Opinião Pública; Sala de Máquinas da Constituição.  ABSTRACTThis article is a dialogue with a recently published article by the professor Eduardo Mendonça, which exposes perception that the erosion of political and parliamentary representation would result in a performance of the Supreme Court as a representative body of public opinion. We disagree with his theoretical construction, articulating the critique from methodological analysis of the legal argument. We also analysis two documents of our constitutional history, coming on the eve of two periods of exception, which also were based on the same argument of erosion of political and parliamentary representation: 1) The letter written in 1924 by Monteiro Lobato to President Artur Bernardes, and therefore short before the 1930’s revolution. 2) The article-manifest written by Goffredo Telles Jr in 1963 a few days before the 1964 Civil-Military coup d’état. We articulate a discussion of premises, using the thought of the argentine sociologist and jurist Roberto Gargarella, discussing the causes of the erosion of political and parliamentary representation, noting that such thing arises from the way the political institutions were designed, in order to depart citizenship of political discussions, for the fear of the democratic phenomenon. We conclude noting that instead of performing empowerment of a decision-making agent of dubious democratic connotation, as the Supreme Court, most appropriate would be to encourage and foster the population's access to “Engine Room of Constitution”.KEYWORDS: Erosion of political and parliamentary representation; Supreme Court; Public Opinion; Engine Room of the Constitution.


2021 ◽  
pp. 62-77
Author(s):  
L. L. Kofanov ◽  

The paper deals with the Roman senatus in the period from 5th to 3rd century BC, from the point of view of its composition, completion and selected competences. As to its composition, in the most arcaic times of the Roman state, the senate was an assembly of the heads of clans (patres gentium), who represented the ideas of patricians. The autor presents gradual transformation of the composition of the senate and switch towards the inclusion of the plebeians. It describes also the process of the cooptation of the members, rules of which incurred fundamental changes from the hereditary principles to the regulation given by statutes. A significant part of the article is devoted to the judicial functions of the Senate and the relationship between the iudicium senatus and the iudicium populi, the transformation of the Senate court from a regional body to the highest, global court of the entire Mediterranean. It’s noted that if the original Roman Senate de iure was the judicial authority only one of the Latin Confederation, later after 338 BC, it becomes the Supreme court of the Latin Union, and by the end of the Republic is transformed into the «Supreme Council of the world».


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