The Structure of Gal’perin’s Model of the Formation of Mental Acts

1987 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 355-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul van Geert
Keyword(s):  
Mental Acts

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine Auyoung
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Literary Studies ◽  
Cognitive Research ◽  
Theoretical Assumptions ◽  
Aesthetic Pleasure ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
The Relationship

The conclusion of this book calls attention to the relationship between comprehending realist fiction and Aristotle’s claim that mimetic representation provides a form of aesthetic pleasure distinct from our response to what is represented. It also argues that, by demonstrating how much nineteenth-century novelists depend on the knowledge and abilities that readers bring to a text, cognitive research on reading helps us revisit long-standing theoretical assumptions in literary studies. Because the felt experience of reading is so distinct from the mental acts underlying it, knowing more about the basic architecture of reading can help literary critics refine their claims about what novels can and cannot do to their readers.

A Relation ‘that relates itself to itself’, Some Regress Threats, and a Mystery

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Textor
Keyword(s):  
Vicious Regress ◽  
Mental Acts

Brentano’s metaphysics of consciousness faces several questions: Can a relation be self-relating without leading to counter-intuitive consequences? Has the vicious regress of conscious-making acts really been stopped by Brentano’s theory or is there a revenge regress? In this chapter I answer these questions on Brentano’s behalf. I will assess Gurwitsch’s argument against Brentano and argue that it shows that one of Gurwitsch’s premises is wrong, not that there is a new regress for Brentano. Pothast also does not show that there is a regress threat for Brentano because Brentano does not, as Pothast claims, hold that the secondary presentation presents itself as a presentation of itself. A similar criticism applies to Frank’s attempt to show that Brentano is open to a regress threat. The chapter concludes by investigating what distinguishes conscious and unconscious mental acts, and why and how self-referentiality makes for consciousness.

MENTAL ACTS

Mind ◽  
1949 ◽  
Vol LVIII (229) ◽  
pp. 78-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. C. EWING
Keyword(s):  
Mental Acts

scholarly journals Peter Geach, Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects

1962 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 328
Author(s):  
Alejandro Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Mental Acts ◽  
Peter Geach

Peter Geach, Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects

Intentionalität und Bewusstsein in der frühen Neuzeit

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Barth
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Salient Features ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
The Mind

How are we to explain the fact that we can refer to objects by means of mental acts? And what accounts for our being conscious of mental acts? René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz provide fascinating answers to these two central questions of the philosophy of mind. In this study, the concepts of both authors are analyzed in detail, compared with each other and related to current positions. The analyses show that Descartes represents a deflationary conception of consciousness (conscientia). Consciousness is "only" an aspect of intentionality that constitutes the essential feature of the Cartesian mind. The analyses of Leibniz unveil that he represents a far more complex and demanding conception of the mind in comparison to Descartes, which makes for a higher connectivity with contemporary convictions. The salient features of his position are the structural conception of intentionality and the distinction between two forms of consciousness (apperception and conscientia) that correspond to the phenomenal consciousness and the reflexive self-consciousness. In contrast to Descartes, Leibniz also assigns consciousness to non-rational animals in the form of apperception. Conscientia, on the other hand, is reserved for rational substances.

Towards an Integrative Model of Deductive-Inductive Commonsense Reasoning

2010 ◽  
pp. 245-278
Author(s):  
Xenia Naidenova
Keyword(s):  
Incremental Algorithm ◽  
Integrative Model ◽  
Commonsense Reasoning ◽  
Recursive Procedures ◽  
Good Classification ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
Made In

The most important steps in the direction to an integrative model of deductive-inductive commonsense reasoning are made in this chapter. The decomposition of inferring good classification tests is advanced into two kinds of subtasks that are in accordance with human mental acts. This decomposition allows modeling incremental inductive-deductive inferences. We give two basic recursive procedures based on two kinds of subtasks for inferring all good maximally redundant classification tests (GMRTs): ASTRA and DIAGaRa. An incremental algorithm INGOMAR for inferring all GMRTs is presented too. The problems of creating an integrative inductive-deductive model of commonsense reasoning are discussed in the last section of this chapter.

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